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Abstract
Algorithmic mechanism design studies the allocation of resources to selfish agents,
who might behave strategically to maximize their own utilities. This thesis studies
these incentive issues arsing from four different settings, that are motivated by real-
life applications. We model the settings and problems by appropriately extending
or generalizing classical economic models. After that we systematically analyze the
auction design problems by using methods from both economic theory and computer
science.
The first problem is the auction design problem for selling online rich media ad-
vertisement. In this market, multiple advertisers compete for a set of slots that are
arranged in a line, such as a banner on a website. Each buyer desires a particular num-
ber of consecutive slots and has a private per-click valuation while each slot is associated
with a quality factor. Our goal is to maximize the auctioneer’s expected revenue given
buyers’ consecutive demand. This is motivated by modeling buyers who may require
these to display a large size ad. Three major pricing mechanisms, the Bayesian pric-
ing model, the maximum revenue market equilibrium model and an envy-free solution
model are studied in this setting.
The second setting is for fund-raising scenarios, where a revenue target is usually
specified. We are interested in designing truthful auctions that maximize the probability
to achieve this revenue target, rather than in maximizing the expected revenue. We
study this topic from the perspective of Bayesian auction design in digital good auctions.
We present an algorithm to find the optimal truthful auction for two buyers with
independent valuations and show the problem is NP-hard when the number of buyers
is arbitrary or the distributions are correlated. We also investigate simple auctions in
this setting and provide approximately optimal solutions.
Third, we study double auction market design where the trading broker wants to
maximize its total revenue by buying low from the sellers and selling high to the buyers
in a Bayesian setting. For single-parameter setting, we develop a maximum mechanism
for the market maker to maximize its own revenue. For the more general case where
each seller’s product may be different, we consider a number of various settings in terms
of constraints on supplies and demands. For each of them, we develop a polynomial
time computable truthful mechanism for the market maker to achieve a revenue at least
i
a constant factor times the revenue of any other truthful mechanism.
Finally, we study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria of all-pay auctions in three
different environments – combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we
consider item-bidding combinatorial auctions where m all-pay auctions run in parallel,
one for each good. For fractionally subadditive valuations, we strengthen the upper
bound by proving some structural properties of mixed Nash equilibria. Next, we design
an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation rule for the multi-unit auction,
which admits a unique, approximately efficient, pure Nash equilibrium. Finally, we
analyze single-item all-pay auctions motivated by their connection to crowdsourcing
contests and show tight bounds on the PoA of social welfare, revenue and maximum
bid.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the emergence of the Internet Economy and Electronic Commerce, one of the chal-
lenging problems arising in computer science is to design and analyze algorithms taking
input not only from the objective reality but also from selfish agents, who may manip-
ulate their private information to maximize their own utility. Algorithmic mechanism
design is such a field that studies these incentive issues arsing from real-life applications
by using methodologies from both economic theory and theoretical computer science.
Prominent successful applications include sponsored search auction[37, 77] that is used
by search engines to sell advertisement slots and FCC spectrum auctions[23] that are
recruited by the US government to sell the licenses for electromagnetic spectrum.
Despite this remarkable progress, a number of applications still require theoretical
model and systematic study. This thesis is dedicated for this purpose, which concen-
trates on studying the incentive issues in practical auction design. We analyze four
different practical problems arising from applications and provide different extensions
and generalizations for existing economic models. In order to tackle these problems, we
employ classical concepts in economics and computational techniques from theoretical
computer science. For all these problems, we either give a solution which is computa-
tionally efficient or provide hardness results by reductions from classical hard problems
in computer science.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.1, we provide some
basic knowledge for auction design by presenting elementary concepts and illustrative
examples. The goal of this part is to help readers get familiar with the primary notions
and terminologies in algorithmic mechanism design. After that, we give a brief overview
for each problem that is going to be studied in this thesis. Each section corresponds
to a problem studied in a chapter of the thesis. We will discuss how we consider these
problems from the viewpoint of theoretical computer science. Moreover, we will lightly
motivate the problems and briefly discuss the interesting questions arising there.
1
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Auctions
Auctions are widely used for the exchange of a very large variety of commodities.
The most prevalent auction is the English Auction, also called open ascending price
auction [78], where the potential buyers iteratively increase the price starting from the
auctioneer’s reserve price until there is only one interested buyer. Another interesting
type of auction is the Dutch auction, which is also called the open descending price
auction [58]. In contrast to the English auction, in the Dutch auction, the auctioneer
starts by announcing a high enough price such that no buyers are interested. Then the
price gradually decreases until it is affordable for a buyer.
One might note that in both English and Dutch auctions, multiple rounds of inter-
actions are needed between the auctioneer and buyers. In particular, buyers need to
rise the price iteratively in the English auction while in the Dutch auction, the auc-
tioneer is required to announce descending prices continuously. One direct question
here is whether these multi-round auctions can be simulated by one-shot auctions or
sealed-bid auctions. Actually, the affirmative answer to this question is given by the
Revelation Principle [65], which states that when designing mechanisms, we only need
to focus on the sealed-bid auctions where bidders are only allowed to submit their bids
once (in sealed envelopes) to represent their willingness to pay, which is without loss of
generality.
However, even restricted in sealed-bid auctions, there are still a number of auctions,
including the first price auction and the second price auction (Vickrey auction) [78].
Given the buyers’ sealed bids, both auctions sell the item to the buyer with the highest
bid but ask the winner to pay his bid or the second highest bid respectively. Vickrey
[78] shows that the English auction is equivalent to the second-price auction. We give
an example here to illustrate the intuition behind it. Consider an auctioneer who wishes
to sell an item to two potential buyers where the first buyer would like to pay 10 pounds
for the item. In auction theory, this value 10 is called buyer 1’s valuation. Suppose
the second buyer has valuation 8 and the English auction starts with a reserve price
5. During the auction, buyer 1 first rises the price to 6, then the price increases to 7
by the other buyer and finally stops with 8. This is because the utility of the second
player, which is defined as the difference between his valuation and the price, is 0 when
the price is 8. The outcome is that the first buyer is the winner and pays 8 for the
item. Now consider what happens in a second price auction, the buyers bid 10 and 8
respectively and then buyer 1 wins the item by paying 8. That is exactly the same as
the outcome in the English auction.
2
1.1.2 Nash Equilibrium and Truthfulness
As we mentioned before, in the auction, buyers have their own objectives which are
represented by their own utility functions. In order to maximize their utility, buyers
will behave strategically, like making incremental price increases in the English auction,
manipulating their bids in sealed-bid auctions. To model and analyze these strategic
plays is an ultimate goal in game theory. The most prominent concept is Nash equi-
librium named after John Nash [66]. In a Nash equilibrium, every player/buyer plays
a best strategy which maximizes his utility given other players’ strategies. In other
words, every player in the Nash equilibrium makes a best response to other players’
strategies. In sealed-bid auctions, the differences among the strategies are represented
by the different submitted bids. So in a Nash equilibrium of a sealed-bid auction, no
bidder can improve his utility by changing his own bid unilaterally.
Truthfulness is the most important concept in auction theory and a main criterion
when designing auctions [78]. In particular, buyers have incentive to deviate from
truthfully reporting if this deviation can improve their own utilities. Roughly speaking,
an auction is truthful if it is a Nash equilibrium when buyers use their true valuations as
their bids. It has some advantages to use truthful auctions instead of non-truthful ones.
First, buyers don’t need to do any computation or optimization when participating the
auction since bidding true value is a dominant strategy in this game. Second, the
auctioneer can easily infer buyers’ valuations from their bids. This information is
really important to get buyers’ preferences and optimize subsequent sales. Finally, for
theoretical interest, truthful auctions are easy to analyze since no manipulation exists
in the auction. A notable example of truthful auction is the second price auction. We
give the primary idea of the proof. Given buyers’ valuations and truthful bids, it is
clear that losers can only win the item by bidding higher than their valuations. This
will result in negative utilities for them. On the other hand, the winner cannot decrease
his payment because the price he pays depends on the second highest buyer’s bid, not
on his own bid.
It is also worth mentioning that even in truthful auctions, the truthfully bidding
might not be the only Nash equilibrium. For instance, consider the example we de-
scribed above, i.e. a second price auction with two buyers whose valuations are 10 and
8 respectively. Clearly, bidding 10 and 8 is a truthful Nash equilibrium here. But bid-
ding 0 and 11 is also a Nash equilibrium in this auction. It seems like that the second
buyer makes a bid that is higher than his valuation and given this bluffing strategy, the
first buyer cannot do anything better than bidding 0. Actually, such strategic bidding
needs the complete information of all buyers’ valuations, which is almost impossible in
common scenarios.
3
1.1.3 Auction Design
Before considering sealed-bid auction design, we need to represent these auctions in a
mathematical expression. In particular, every sealed-bid auction can be characterized
by a pair of functions, i.e. allocation function and payment function. An allocation
function is a mapping from buyers’ bidding vector to an allocation vector which in-
dicates the allocation of the items among buyers. In single-item case, this is just the
index of the winning buyer. Similarly, a payment function is a mapping from buyers’
bids to a payment vector which encodes the buyers’ final payments. For example, in
first-price auction, the allocation function is to give the item to the highest bidder and
the payment function is to charge the winner his bid and nothing for the losers.
Given these representations, we can see a pair of allocation and payment functions
specifies an auction. In order to design auction, we need to specify which auctions
are good or useful in applications. There are two major objectives in auction design –
social welfare and revenue. The social welfare is the sum of all buyers’ valuations of the
final allocation. In single-item case, the social welfare is exactly the winner’s valuation.
So in order to maximize the social welfare, we need to sell the item to the buyer with
the highest valuation (not the highest bid since bidders may manipulate their bids).
The revenue is the sum of all bidder’s payments, which is a common objective for the
auctioneer.
Therefore, an auction design problem can be viewed as an algorithm design problem
in the following sense. Given the auction setting (like single-item or multi-item), the
goal is to design an algorithm where for any bidders’ valuations, the objective (like
social welfare or revenue) is optimized or approximately optimized. For single-item
case, it has been shown that the second-price auction is an social-optimal truthful
auction that always sells the item to the bidder with the highest valuation. But for
revenue maximization, no such universally optimal auction exists. This is because given
buyers’ valuations, the optimal way to extract revenue is to sell the item with a fixed
price equal to the highest valuation. Clearly, this revenue in this auction is optimal
since no bidder would like to pay more than his valuation. But this type of auctions
might not be optimal for other buyer profiles.
1.1.4 Bayesian Auction Design: An Algorithmic View
In the auction design problems considered above, we assume the auctioneer has no
knowledge about buyers’ valuations and aims to design an auction which is optimal for
any valuation profiles. But in many real-life scenarios, the auctioneer might be able
to learn buyers’ valuations from their consumption habits or previous trade records.
Such information is called prior knowledge that is obtained prior to the execution of
an auction. Normally, this prior knowledge is represented by a distribution of buyers’
valuations. For instance, the auctioneer may assume the buyers’ valuations are drawn
4
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Figure 1.1: Illustration for Bayesian Auction Design
from a uniform distribution with a carefully selected support or a normal distribution
with properly estimated mean and variance.
On the other hand, from buyers’ perspective, Nash equilibrium is a slightly strong
concept which requires them to have the full information of other players. An appro-
priate relaxation is to use the prior knowledge to be the common knowledge among
buyers. That is, each buyer knows the distributions of other buyers’ valuations instead
of the exact valuations. This setting is called Bayesian setting or incomplete infor-
mation setting, which is broadly studied in economics [46]. In contrast, we call the
setting without prior knowledge prior-free setting. The corresponding concept of Nash
equilibrium in Bayesian settings is called Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Similarly, we can
define Bayesian truthfulness, for which we defer the definitions to Chapter 2.
In the Bayesian setting, the auction design problem takes buyers’ valuation distri-
butions as an additional input to that in prior-free setting. So our goal in Bayesian
auction design is to design an algorithm that take distributions as input and outputs
an auction tailored for the given distribution (illustrated in Figure 1.1). As mentioned
above, an auction is represented by a pair of functions, which might not be able to be
represented in polynomial size of the number of items and buyers. So how to represent
the outputted auction in a succinct way is already a challenging problem. Despite these
difficulties, Myerson developed an auction which maximizes the auctioneer’s expected
revenue for any product distribution in his celebrated work [65]. A simple example
is that the optimal way to sell one item to a buyer whose value for the item is uni-
formly distributed in [0, 1] is to price the item at 0.5. The expected revenue is 0.25.
Another example is that for independent, identical and regularly distributed buyers,
the second-price auction with a distribution related reserve price is the optimal auction
which maximizes the expected revenue. We will discuss more details about Myerson’s
auction in Chapter 2.
5
1.2 Rich Media Advertisement
Auctions for selling online advertisement have been extensively studied in the litera-
ture, especially for sponsored search auctions, which account for a major part of search
engines revenue. In the traditional model of sponsored search auction[37, 77], adver-
tisement positions in the search results are allocated to advertisers. Each position is
characterized by a quality number, representing the number of clicks it could provide.
Each bidder is associated with a valuation that represents his monetary valuation per
click and his valuation for an advertisement slot is the product of his per-click value
and the slot’s quality number.
Besides sponsored search auction, other format for online ads like banner advertise-
ment and rich media advertisement also raise a large amount of revenue for Internet
companies. From the standpoint of advertiser, the significant difference between rich
media advertisement and sponsored search is that, in rich media advertisement market,
each buyer desires a particular number of consecutive slots which is needed to display
his specific advertisement. Note that this demand constraint is called sharp in the
sense that the buyer will buy the whole bundle of slots or nothing. A question risen
here is how to extend and generalize the traditional sponsored search auction model
to a model suitable for rich media advertisement market. Furthermore, it is also a
challenging task to decide the allocations and the prices in order to maximize the total
revenue of the market maker.
From the viewpoint of theoretical computer science, the buyers’ consecutive and
sharp demands impose new combinatorial constraints upon the traditional models. As
a consequence, providing complete solutions to the revenue optimization problems in
this setting requires some amount of care and effort. In addition, it is also desirable to
see a rigorous analysis of the potential impact of these new combinatorial constraints
on auction design and a systematic study of the associated mechanism design issues.
1.3 Fund Raising
Suppose a start-up company would like to raise a specific amount of capital investment
from a number of potential investors. One of the most difficult problems they are facing
is how to decide a suitable amount of money for each investment proposal associated
with different types of investors. In terms of auction theory, this problem can be viewed
as an auctioneer (the start-up company) wants to sell identical items (their business
plan) to a number of buyers (investors). In addition, the objective of the auctioneer is
to maximize the probability to achieve some given revenue target. Actually, in Internet
crowd-sourcing platforms that support fund-raising for business start-ups (Kickstarter,
Indiegogo, RocketHub etc.), it is typical to aim for some amount of money. Similarly,
a common feature of charitable fund-raising is the identification of a target revenue to
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be raised.
By contrast, in most work that considers revenue maximization in auctions, the
objective is expected revenue, as opposed to the probability to achieve some target.
Despite remarkable progress on the front of maximizing expected revenue, it is still
unclear how to design auctions that attempt to maximize the probability to achieve
some given revenue target. While a fund-raising effort is not the same thing as an
auction, to some extent it can be modeled as one: an approach to a donor (or investor)
corresponds to an attempt to sell an item to a would-be buyer. Besides fund raising,
it is also desirable to raise a particular amount of money in other auction scenarios.
For example, in a bankruptcy situation, the administrator may wish to sell a collection
of items to repaying the debt. And while the FCC spectrum auction wants to raise as
much money as possible, it is also required to cover its costs.
In the perspective of theoretical analysis, it is more difficult to maximize the prob-
ability to achieve some given revenue target than to maximize the expected revenue.
Maximizing the probability can be viewed as maximizing an utility function of the total
revenue. This utility function takes value 1 if the revenue is at least the target revenue
and 0 otherwise. Compared with maximization of expected revenue, this utility func-
tion is no longer linear. Moreover, it is also not separable among buyers. Due to the
lack of linearity and buyer-separability, the auctioneer must consider the optimization
problem in a global way instead of considering each buyer separately.
1.4 Trading Broker
With the explosion of Internet economy, numerous industry e-marketplaces aim at
conducting trading transactions between potential consumers and commodity retailers
or service providers. Important practical applications include online trading platforms
(e.g. eBay, Amazon), advertisement exchange services (e.g., Google, Yahoo). In fact,
these online business-to-business marketplaces can be regarded as trading brokers in
bilateral exchange environments.
In the economic theory, this trading broker problem is modeled as double auctions
where the market maker would like to maximize its total revenue by buying low from
the sellers and selling high to the buyers. It would be interesting to study the following
question in this setting. How does a mechanism decide the optimal prices or payments
for the participating sellers or buyers? How can a mechanism explicitly take into
account the truthfulness and incentive issues arising from both sellers and buyers?
Unlike the classical auction where only buyers are strategically playing, in double
auctions, both sellers and buyers are selfish and aim at maximizing their own utilities.
Recall that in the one-side auction setting, an important technique to make auction
truthful is to use other buyers’ bids to decide a buyer’s payment. However, in double
auction, we also need to use the seller’s cost to set buyers’ payments. A simple example
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is that the broker should not make a trade if the buyer’s valuation is lower than the
seller’s reported cost. This is a clearly a new ingredient added into the model. So
designing truthful auctions for both sides does require much more carefully analysis.
It would be more challenging to extend recent remarkable progress on multi-item rev-
enue maximizing auctions to the settings with double auctions. More aggressively, one
may expect a general framework for reducing the problems in two-side market (double
auctions) to the corresponding ones in one-side market (traditional auctions).
1.5 Crowdsourcing Contest
The term “crowdsourcing” is used to refer to the methods of soliciting solutions to tasks
via open calls to large-scale communities. Many crowdsourcing sites are developed to
complete tasks like graphical design of logos, labeling of an image data-set, answering
of an individuals question and programming for a specific problem. A common feature
among these crowdsourcing competitions is the monetary or non-monetary rewards,
which are provided to the best submission or a set of selected good submissions.
Crowdsourcing competitions can be modeled as all-pay auctions where all players,
even the losers, pay their bids. This type of auction is widely used to model the
competitions that agents make irreversible investments without knowing the outcome.
In a crowdsourcing contest, the payments correspond to the effort that players make
in order to win the reward and the private value is the rate at which the contestant
works.
Clearly, this all-pay auctions are not truthful since all players are required to pay
their bids even if they get nothing at the end of the auction. So in order to study the
incentive issues arising from all-pay auctions, we should examine the Nash equilibria
in the games induced from the auctions. It would be interesting to study the economic
efficiency of the Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions. That is to compare the social
welfare extracted from all-pay auctions and other auctions (e.g., first-price auctions,
second price auctions). Actually, this can be examined via adopting the famous notion
called Price of Anarchy (PoA)[56]. PoA is defined as the ratio between the social
welfare in the worst Nash equilibrium and the optimal social welfare without strategic
behaviors. It is also challenging to extend the analysis of all-pay auction from single-
item setting to multi-item setting. Besides social welfare, one can also investigate other
objectives like revenue and the quality of the best submission.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we introduce basic definitions and essential concepts needed in the rest
of this thesis. We also present a description of the common notations used in the thesis.
Noting that the settings studied in next chapters are different from each other, we only
introduce the most general notations and concepts here and leave the specific ones to
the preliminaries of each chapter separately.
2.1 Auction Design
An auction setting consists of n bidders/buyers and m items to be sold. Each bidder
has a private interest of the items, represented by a valuation function vi. We use bi
to denote a pure strategy (a bid) of buyer i and it might be a single value or a vector,
depending on the auction. We denote by b−i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn) the strategies
of all players except for i. Any mixed strategy Bi of player i is a probability distribution
over bi.
An auction/mechanism can be viewed as a pair of rules: allocation rule x and
payment rule p. Given a buyers’ bidding profile b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn), the allocation of
buyer i is xi(b) and his payment is pi(b). Throughout this thesis, we assume buyers
have quasi-linear utilities, i.e. ui(b) = vi(xi(b)) − pi(b). We also assume the buyers
are fully rational in the auction, i.e. every buyer aims at maximizing his own utility. In
different settings, buyers’ allocations are subject to various constraints. For example,
in the unit-demand setting, each buyer can be assigned at most one item. We say an
auction setting is single-parameter if each buyer’s valuation can be represented by a
single parameter, otherwise we say it is multi-parameter setting.
In most of the remaining chapters, we assume that all buyers’ values are distributed
independently according to publicly known bounded distributions following the work
of [65]. The distribution of each buyer i is represented by a Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) Fi and a Probability Density Function (PDF) fi. The auction design
in this Bayesian model will take these distributions of buyers’ valuations as input and
output an auction represented by allocation and payment rules.
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Given a specific auction and bidding profile, we consider two important benchmarks
in this auction, i.e. social welfare and revenue. More precisely, the social welfare is the
sum of all buyers’ valuations, SW (x) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(xi(b)). and the revenue equals the
sum of the payments, REV (p) =
∑
i pi(b) where x = (x1, . . . , xn) and p = (p1, . . . , pn).
For simplicity, if the allocation rule X is clear from the context, we use SW (b),
vi(b) and ui(b) instead of SW (X(b)), vi(Xi(b)) and ui(X(b)), to express social welfare,
valuation and utility of player i for the allocation X(b).
We use the standard notation [s] to denote the set of integers from 1 to s, i.e.
[s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}. We sometimes use ∑i instead of ∑i∈[n] to denote the summation
over all buyers and
∑
j instead of
∑
j∈[m] for items, and the terms Ev and Ev−i denote,
respectively, an expectation over buyer valuation vectors v sampled from the prior, and
an expectation over valuation vectors v−i, representing buyers other than i. The vector
v of all the buyers’ values is sometimes written as (vi, v−i), vi being the i-th entry of v
and v−i the joint bids of all buyers other than i.
2.2 Incentive Compatibility
One of the most important criteria in auction design is incentive compatibility. That
is, truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for any buyer participating the auction.
Formally,
Definition 2.1. A mechanism M is called Incentive Compatible (IC) iff the following
inequalities hold for all i, vi, v
′
i.
ui(vi, v−i) ≥ ui(v′i, v−i) (2.1)
Similarly, we can define a weak notion called Bayesian Incentive Compatibility.
Definition 2.2. A mechanism M is called Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) iff the
following inequalities hold for all i, vi, v
′
i.
Ev−i [ui(vi, v−i)] ≥ Ev−i [ui(v′i, v−i)] (2.2)
Clearly, any Incentive compatible mechanism is also Bayesian Incentive Compatible.
2.3 Myerson’s Optimal Auction
In the single-parameter settings, we review the seminal work by Myerson [65] in the
following lemmas.
Lemma 2.3 (From [65]). A mechanism M = (x,p) is Bayesian Incentive Compatible
if and only if, letting vi be a lower bound on values taken by vi:
a) Ev−i [xi(vi, v−i)] is monotone non-decreasing as a function of vi for any agent i,
b) Ev−i [pi(vi, v−i)] = viEv−i [xi(vi, v−i)]−
∫ vi
vi
Ev−i [xi(z, v−i)]dz.
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Lemma 2.4 (From [65]). For any BIC mechanism M = (X,p), the expected revenue
Ev[
∑
i pi(v)] is equal to the virtual surplus Ev[
∑
i φi(vi)xi(v)] where φi(vi) = vi −
1−Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
denote the virtual value of buyer i when his valuation is vi.
2.4 Nash Equilibrium
For auctions that are not incentive compatible, we analyze strategic behavior and in-
centive issues by studying the Nash equilibrium in the induced game.
Definition 2.5. (Nash equilibria) A bidding profile b forms a pure Nash equilibrium
if for all bids b′i and every player i, ui(b) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i). Similarly, a mixed bidding
profile B = ×iBi is a mixed Nash equilibrium if for all bids b′i and every player i,
Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ Eb−i∼B−i [ui(b′i,b−i)]. Clearly, any pure Nash equilibrium is also a
mixed Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.6 (Price of anarchy). Let I([n], [m],v) be the set of all instances, i.e.
I([n], [m],v) includes the instances for every set of bidders and items and any possible
valuations that the bidders might have for the items. The mixed price of anarchy, PoA,
of a mechanism is defined as
PoA = max
I∈I
max
B∈E(I)
SW (O)
Eb∼B[SW (b)]
,
where E(I) is the class of mixed Nash equilibria for the instance I ∈ I and O is the
optimal allocation that maximizes the social welfare. The pure PoA is defined as above
but restricted in the class of pure Nash equilibria.
2.5 Fairness and Envy-freeness
Besides incentive issues, we also consider the fairness of the auction. In this thesis, we
study a widely used fairness concept called envy-freeness.
Definition 2.7. (Envy-freeness) An auction (x,p) is envy-free if no bidders can im-
prove his utility by swapping his allocation and payments with another player. For-
mally, for all buyer i and i′, ui(b) ≥ vi(xi′(b))− pi′(b).
Another similar concept for fairness in auction design is called competitive equilib-
rium or market equilibrium.
Definition 2.8. (Competitive Equilibrium) We say an outcome of the market (x,p) is
a competitive equilibrium if it is envy-free and all unallocated items are priced at zero.
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Chapter 3
Rich Media Advertising: Auction
Design with Consecutive Demand
In this chapter, we consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media
advertisement market, that has other related applications. In this market, there are
multiple buyers (advertisers), and items (slots) that are arranged in a line such as a
banner on a website. Each buyer desires a particular number of consecutive slots and
has a per-unit-quality value vi (dependent on the ad only) while each slot j has a
quality qj (representing j’s click-through rate, in the context of position auctions). The
valuation that buyer i has for item j is the product viqj . Our interest in buyers who
demand multiple consecutive slots is motivated by modeling buyers who may require
these to display a large size ad; thus we extend (and generalize) the traditional position
auction model. We want to decide the allocations and the prices in order to maximize
the total revenue of the market maker.
We study three major pricing mechanisms, the Bayesian pricing model, the maxi-
mum revenue market equilibrium model and an envy-free solution model. Under the
Bayesian model, we design a polynomial-time computable truthful mechanism that op-
timizes the revenue. For the market equilibrium paradigm, we find a polynomial-time
algorithm to obtain the maximum revenue market equilibrium solution. In the envy-
free setting, an optimal solution is presented for the case where the buyers have the
same demand for the number of consecutive slots.
This chapter is based on a joint work [30] with Paul Goldberg, Xiaotie Deng, Yang
Sun and Jinshan Zhang, which appears in SAGT 2013.
3.1 Overview
Ever since the pioneering studies on pricing protocols for sponsored search advertise-
ment, especially with the generalized second price auction (GSP), by Edelman, Os-
trovsky, and Schwarz [37], as well as Varian [77], market making mechanisms have
attracted much attention from the research community in understanding their effec-
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tiveness for the revenue maximization task facing platforms providing Internet adver-
tisement services. In the traditional advertisement setting, advertisers negotiate ad
presentations and prices with website publishers directly. An automated pricing mech-
anism simplifies this process by creating a bidding game for the buyers of advertisement
space over an IT platform. It creates a complete competition environment for the price
discovery process. Accompanying the explosion of the online advertisement business,
there is a need for a complete picture of the pricing methods that may be used by
advertisers and ad space providers.
In addition to search advertisements, display advertisements have been widely used
in commercial webpages. They have a rich format of displays such as text ads and
rich media ads. Compared with sponsored search, there is a lack of systematic studies
of the associated mechanism design issues. The market maker faces a combinatorial
problem of whether to assign a large space to one large rich media ad or multiple small
text ads, as well as how to decide on the prices charged for them. We present a study
of the allocation and pricing mechanisms for displaying slots in this environment where
some buyers would like to have one slot and others may want several consecutive slots
in a display panel. In addition to webpage ads, another motivation for our study is TV
advertising where inventories of a commercial break are usually divided into slots of a
few seconds each, and slots have various qualities measuring their expected number of
viewers and the corresponding attractiveness.
We discuss three types of mechanisms and consider the revenue maximization prob-
lem under these mechanisms, and compare their effectiveness in revenue maximization
under a dynamic setting where buyers may change their bids to improve their utilities.
Our results make an important step towards understanding the advantages and disad-
vantages of their uses in practice. Assume the ad supplier divides the ad space into
small enough slots (pieces) such that each advertiser is interested in a position with a
fixed number of consecutive pieces. In modeling values to the advertisers, we modify
the position auction model from the sponsored search market [37, 77] where each ad
slot is measured by the Click Through Rates (CTR), with users’ interest expressed by
a click on an ad. Since display advertising is usually sold on a per impression (CPM)
basis instead of a per click basis (CTR), the quality factor of an ad slot stands for
the expected impression it brings per unit of time. Unlike in the traditional position
auctions, people may have varying demands (need different spaces to display their ads)
in a rich media ad auction for the market maker to decide on slot allocations and their
prices.
3.1.1 Main Results
We have a set of buyers (advertisers) and a set of items to be sold (the ad slots on a
web page). We address the challenge of computing prices that satisfy certain desirable
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properties. Next we describe the elements of the model in more detail.
Items. Our model considers the geometric organization of ad slots, which commonly
has the slots arranged in some sequence (typically, from top to bottom in the right-hand
side of a web page). The slots are of variable quality. In the study of sponsored search
auctions, a standard assumption is that the quality (corresponding to click-through
rate) is higher at the beginning of the sequence and then monotonically decreases.
Here we consider a generalization where the quality may go down and up, subject to
a limit on the total number of local maxima (which we call peaks), corresponding to
focal points on the web page. As we will show later, without this limit the revenue
maximization problem is NP-hard.
Buyers. A buyer (advertiser) may want to purchase multiple slots, so as to display
a larger ad. Such slots should be consecutive in the sequence. Each buyer i has a fixed
demand di, the number of slots she needs for her ad. Two important aspects of this are
• sharp multi-unit demand, that is, buyer i should be allocated di items, or none
at all; there is no point in allocating any fewer
• consecutiveness of the allocated items, in the pre-existing sequence of items.
These constraints give rise to a new and interesting combinatorial pricing problem.
Valuations. We assume that each buyer i has a parameter vi representing the value
she assigns to a slot of unit quality. Valuations for multiple slots are additive, so that a
buyer with demand di would value a block of di slots to be their total quality, multiplied
by vi. This is an extension of the valuation model considered by Edelman et al. [37]
and Varian [77] in their seminal work for keywords advertising where the buyers are
unit-demand.
Pricing mechanisms. Given the valuations and demands from the buyers, the mar-
ket maker decides on a price vector for all slots and an allocation of slots to buyers, as
an output of the market. The question is one of which output the market maker should
choose to achieve certain objectives. We consider three approaches:
• Truthful mechanism whereby the buyers report their demands (publicly known)
and values (private) to the market maker; then prices are set so as to ensure that
the buyers have no incentive to report incorrect valuations. We give a revenue-
maximizing approach (i.e., maximizing the total price paid), within this frame-
work.
• Competitive equilibrium whereby we prescribe certain constraints on the prices
so as to guarantee certain well-known notions of fairness and envy-freeness.
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• Envy-free solution whereby we prescribe certain constraints on the prices and
allocations so as to achieve envy-freeness, as explained below.
The mechanisms we exhibit are computationally efficient. We also perform experi-
ments to compare the revenues obtained from these three mechanisms.
3.1.2 Literature Review
The theoretical study of position auctions (of single slots) under the generalized second
price auction was initiated in [37, 77]. There has been a series of studies of position
auctions in deterministic settings [59]. Our consideration of position auctions in the
Bayesian setting fits in the general one-dimensional auction design framework. Our
study considers continuous distributions on buyers’ values. For discrete distributions,
Cai et al. [11] presents an optimal mechanism for budget constrained buyers without
demand constraints in multi-parameter settings and subsequently they also give a gen-
eral reduction from revenue to welfare maximization in [9]; for buyers with both budget
constraints and demand constraints, 2-approximate mechanisms [1] and 4-approximate
mechanisms [6] exist in the literature.
There are extensive studies on multi-unit demand in economics, see for exam-
ple [12, 38]. Chen et al. [17] first considered sharp multi-unit demand, where a buyer
with demand d should be allocated d items or none at all, but with no further combi-
natorial constraint, such as the consecutiveness constraint that we consider here. The
sharp demand setting is in contrast with a “relaxed” multi-unit demand (in which one
can buy a subset of at most d items), where it is well known that the set of competitive
equilibrium prices is non-empty and forms a distributive lattice [45, 73]. This imme-
diately implies the existence of an equilibrium with maximum possible prices, that
consequently maximizes the revenue. Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor [29] proposed a
combinatorial dynamics which always converges to a revenue maximizing (or minimiz-
ing) equilibrium for unit demand; their algorithm can be easily generalized to relaxed
multi-unit demand. A strongly related work to our consecutive settings is the work of
Rothkopf et al. [70], where the authors presented a dynamic programming approach to
compute the maximum social welfare of consecutive settings when all the qualities are
the same. Hence, our dynamic programming approach for general qualities in Bayesian
settings is a non-trivial generalization of their setting.
Organization This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe the
details of our rich media ads model and the related solution concepts. In Section 3.3,
we study the problem under the Bayesian model and provide a Bayesian Incentive
Compatible auction with optimal expected revenue for the special case of the single
peak in quality values of advertisement positions. Then in Section 3.4, we extend the
optimal auction to the case with limited peaks/valleys and show that it is NP-hard
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to maximize revenue without this limit. Next, in Section 3.5, we turn to the full
information setting and propose an algorithm to compute the competitive equilibrium
with maximum revenue. In Section 3.6, NP-hardness of envy-freeness for consecutive
multi-unit demand buyers is shown. We also design a polynomial time solution for the
special case where all advertisers demand the same number of ad slots.
3.2 Preliminaries
In our model, a rich media advertisement instance consists of n advertisers and m
advertising slots. Each slot (or item) j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is associated with a (publicly
known) number qj which can be viewed as the quality or the desirability of the slot.
Each advertiser (or buyer) i wants to display her own ad that occupies di consecutive
slots on the webpage. In addition, each buyer has a private number vi representing her
valuation and thus, the i-th buyer’s value for item j is vij = viqj .
In this chapter, we will say that slot j is assigned to a set of buyers B, to denote
that j is assigned to some buyer in B. We call the set of all slots assigned to B the
allocation to B. In addition, a buyer will be called a winner if he succeeds in displaying
his ad and a loser otherwise.
We represent a feasible assignment by a vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn), where Xi is the
set of items allocated to buyer i, i.e. j ∈ Xi denotes item j is assigned to buyer i. Thus
we have {Xi} is pairwise disjoint, which can be viewed as a partition of items. Given
a fixed assignment X, we use ti to denote the total quality that buyer i is assigned,
precisely, ti =
∑
j∈Xi qj . In general, when X is a function of buyers’ bids v, we define
ti to be a function of v such that ti(v) =
∑
j∈Xi(v) qj .
When we say that slot qualities have a single peak, we mean that there exists a
peak slot k such that for any slot j ≤ k on the above side of k, qj ≥ qj−1 and for any
slot j ≥ k on the below side of k, qj ≥ qj+1.
3.2.1 Bayesian Mechanism Design
In Section 3.3 and 3.4, we assume that all buyers’ values are distributed independently
according to publicly known bounded distributions following the work of [65]. The dis-
tribution of each buyer i is represented by a Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
Fi and a Probability Density Function (PDF) fi. In addition, we assume that the con-
cave and convex closure and integration of those functions can be computed efficiently.
An auction M = (X,p) consists of an allocation function X and a payment function
p. More precisely, X specifies the allocation of items to buyers and p = (pi)i specifies
the buyers’ payments, where both X and p are functions of the reported valuations
v. Our objective is to maximize the expected revenue of the mechanism Rev(M) =
Ev [
∑
i pi(v)] by using Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms. For completeness,
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we restated the definition of BIC in Chapter 2.
Definition 3.1. A mechanism M is called Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) iff the
following inequalities hold for all i, vi, v
′
i.
Ev−i [viti(v)− pi(v)] ≥ Ev−i
[
viti(v
′
i; v−i)− pi(v′i; v−i)
]
(3.1)
Furthermore, we say M is Incentive Compatible if M satisfies a stronger condition that
viti(v)− pi(v) ≥ viti(v′i; v−i)− pi(v′i; v−i), for all v, i, v′i,
To put it in words, in a BIC mechanism, no player can improve her expected utility
(expectation taken over other players’ bids) by misreporting her value. An IC mecha-
nism satisfies the stronger requirement that no matter what the other players declare,
no player has incentives to deviate.
3.2.2 Competitive Equilibrium and Envy-free Solution
In Section 3.5, we study the revenue maximizing competitive equilibrium and envy-free
solution in the full information setting instead of the Bayesian setting. An outcome of
the market is a pair (X,p), where X specifies an allocation of items to buyers and p
specifies prices paid. Given an outcome (X,p), recall vij = viqj , let ui(X,p) denote
the utility of i.
Definition 3.2. A tuple (X,p) is a consecutive envy-free pricing solution if every
buyer is consecutive envy-free, where a buyer i is consecutive envy-free if the following
conditions are satisfied:
• if Xi 6= ∅, then (i) Xi is di consecutive items. ui(X,p) =
∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj) ≥ 0,
and (ii) for any other subset of consecutive items T with |T | = di, ui(X,p) =∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj) ≥
∑
j∈T
(vij − pj);
• if Xi = ∅ (i.e., i wins nothing), then, for any subset of consecutive items T with
|T | = di,
∑
j∈T
(vij − pj) ≤ 0.
In the literature, there have been two other notions of envy-free allocation, namely,
sharp item envy-freeness [17] and bundle envy-freeness [39]. Sharp item envy-free re-
quires that no buyer should envy any bundle of items whose size equals her demand,
while bundle envy-free is the (weaker) stipulation that no-one should envy the bundle
bought by any other buyer. Note that Definition 3.2 is about item envy-freeness; a
weaker notion of consecutive bundle envy-freeness would require that no buyer should
envy a bundle allocated entirely to some other buyer having the same demand.
Example 3.1 (Three types of envy-freeness). Suppose there are two buyers i1 and i2
with per-unit-quality vi1 = 10, vi2 = 8 and demands di1 = 1, di2 = 2. Three items j1,
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j2, j3 have quality qj1 = qj3 = 1 and qj2 = 3. The optimal solution of the three types of
envy-freeness are as follows:
• The optimal consecutive envy-free solution, Xi1 = {j3}, Xi2 = {j1, j2} and pj1 =
pj3 = 6 and pj2 = 26 with total revenue 38;
• Optimal sharp item envy-free solution, Xi1 = {j2}, Xi2 = {j1, j3} and pj1 = pj3 =
8 and pj2 = 28 with total revenue 44;
• Optimal (relaxed) bundle envy-free solution, Xi1 = {j2}, Xi2 = {j1, j3} and pj1 =
pj3 = 8 and pj2 = 30 with total revenue 46;
Definition 3.3. (Competitive Equilibrium) We say an outcome of the market (X,p)
is a competitive equilibrium if it satisfies two conditions.
• (X,p) must be consecutive envy-free (Definition 3.2).
• The unsold items must be priced at zero.
We are interested in the revenue maximizing competitive equilibrium and envy-
free solutions. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium always exists for unit
demand buyers (even for general vij valuations) [73]. For our consecutive multi-unit de-
mand model, however, a competitive equilibrium may not always exist as the following
example shows.
Example 3.2 (Competitive equilibrium may not exist). There are two buyers i1, i2
with values vi1 = 10 and vi2 = 9, respectively. Let their demands be di1 = 1 and
di2 = 2, respectively. There are two items j1, j2, both with unit quality qj1 = qj2 = 1.
If i1 wins an item, without loss of generality, say j1, then j2 is unsold and pj2 = 0;
by envy-freeness of i1, we have pj1 = 0 as well. Thus, i2 envies the bundle {j1, j2}.
On the other hand, if i2 wins both items, then pj1 + pj2 ≤ vi2j1 + vi2j2 = 18, implying
that pj1 ≤ 9 or pj2 ≤ 9. Therefore, i1 is not envy-free. Hence, there is no competitive
equilibrium in the given instance.
In the unit demand case, it is well-known that the set of equilibrium prices forms a
distributive lattice; hence, there exist extremes which correspond to the maximum and
the minimum equilibrium price vectors. In our consecutive demand model, however,
even if a competitive equilibrium exists, maximum equilibrium prices may not exist.
Example 3.3 (Maximum equilibrium need not exist). There are two buyers i1, i2 with
values vi1 = 1, vi2 = 10 and demands di1 = 1, di2 = 2, and two items j1, j2 with unit
quality qj1 = qj2 = 1. It can be seen that allocating the two items to i2 at prices (19, 1)
or (1, 19) are both revenue maximizing equilibria; but there is no equilibrium price vector
that is at least both (19, 1) and (1, 19).
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Because of the consecutive multi-unit demand, it is possible that some items are
‘over-priced’; this is a significant difference between consecutive multi-unit and unit
demand models. Formally, in a solution (X,p), we say an item j is over-priced if there
is a buyer i such that j ∈ Xi and pj > viqj . That is, the price charged for item j is
larger than its contribution to the utility of its winner.
Example 3.4 (Over-priced items). There are two buyers i1, i2 with values vi1 =
20, vi2 = 10 and demands di1 = 1 and di2 = 2, and three items j1, j2, j3 with qualities
qj1 = 3, qj2 = 2, qj3 = 1. We can see that the allocations Xi1 = {j1}, Xi2 = {j2, j3} and
prices (45, 25, 5) constitute a revenue maximizing envy-free solution with total revenue
75, where item j2 is over-priced. If no items are over-priced, the maximum possible
prices are (40, 20, 10) with total revenue 70.
3.3 Optimal Auction for the Single Peak Case
The goal of this section is to present our optimal auction for the single peak case
that serves as an elementary component in the general case later. En route, several
principal techniques are examined exhaustively to the extent that they can be applied
directly in the next section. With these techniques, we show that the optimal Bayesian
Incentive Compatible auction can be represented by a simple Incentive Compatible
one. Furthermore, this optimal auction can be implemented efficiently. Given some
mechanism, let Ti(vi) = Ev−i [ti(v)] and Pi(vi) = Ev−i [pi(v)]. We also use φi(vi) =
vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) to denote the virtual value of buyer i when his valuation is vi. Similar to
Myerson [65], we suppose Pi(vi) = viTi(vi) otherwise the revenue can be improved by
increasing Pi(vi). From Myerson [65], we obtain the following three lemmas.
Lemma 3.4 (From [65]). A mechanism M = (X,p) is Bayesian Incentive Compatible
if and only if, letting vi be a lower bound on values taken by vi:
a) Ti(vi) is monotone non-decreasing for any agent i,
b) Pi(vi) = viTi(vi)−
∫ vi
vi
Ti(z)dz.
Lemma 3.5 (From [65]). For any BIC mechanism M = (X,p), the expected revenue
Ev[
∑
i Pi(vi)] is equal to the virtual surplus Ev[
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v)].
We assume φi(·) is monotone increasing, i.e. the distribution is regular. If not,
Myerson’s ironing technique can be applied to make φi(·) monotone — it is here that
we invoke our assumption that we can efficiently compute the convex closure of a
continuous function and integration. Lemma 3.6 follows directly from Lemmas 3.4
and 3.5.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that X is the allocation function that maximizes Ev[φi(vi)ti(v)]
subject to the constraints that Ti(vi) is monotone non-decreasing for any fixed profile v−i
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of the other bidders, and any agent i is assigned either di consecutive slots or nothing.
Suppose also that
pi(v) = viti(v)−
∫ vi
vi
ti(v−i, si)dsi (3.2)
Then (X,p) represents an optimal mechanism for the consecutive multiple-slot ad auc-
tion problem.
We will use dynamic programming to maximize the virtual surplus in Lemma 3.5.
First we show the following useful lemma which states that all the allocated slots are
consecutive (see Figure 3.1).
Lemma 3.7. Suppose that ad slot qualities have the single-peak property. There exists
an optimal allocation X that maximizes
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v), having the following property.
For any unassigned slot j, it must be that either ∀j′ > j, slot j′ is unassigned or ∀j′ < j,
slot j′ is unassigned.
Proof. Let X be an allocation maximising the sum of the virtual values. If X does not
satisfy the property in the statement of the lemma, we show how to modify X so as
to satisfy the property while preserving optimality. Let j be a slot that violates the
property, in that there are allocated slots to either side of j. Letting k be a maximum-
quality slot, assume j ≥ k (where the case j ≤ k is similar). Modify X by taking all
buyers allocated slots to the right of j, and moving their allocation one position to the
left. The sum of virtual valuations cannot decrease, since any buyer’s allocation is to
slots having at least as high quality. Also, the modification reduces the number of slots
violating the condition, so if applied repeatedly, we end up with an optimal allocation
having the claimed property.
Unassigned
Slot j Slot j'
Buyer i
Buyer i Unassigned
Slot j Slot j'
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the Proof of Lemma 3.7
By reassigning i the slots from j, we make the set of assigned slots consecutive.
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By renumbering the bidders in the order of the virtual values, we can assume all
the buyers are sorted in a non-increasing order according to their virtual values. Next,
we prove that the consecutiveness of allocated slots holds for any buyers sets [s] ⊆ [n].
That is, Lemma 3.8 says that there exists an optimal allocation that always allocates
the first s buyers consecutive slots, for s ∈ [n].
Lemma 3.8. Suppose that ad slot qualities have the single-peak property. There exists
an optimal allocation X having the following property. For any slot j not allocated to
buyers in [s], we either have ∀j′ > j, slot j′ is not allocated to any member of [s], or
∀j′ < j, slot j′ is not allocated to any member of [s].
Proof. The idea is to pick an arbitrary optimal allocation X and modify it to the desired
one. Suppose X does not satisfy the property on a subset [s]. By Lemma 3.7, there is
no unassigned slots in the middle of allocations to set [s]. Then there must be a slot
assigned to a buyer i not in the set [s] that separates the allocations to [s]. We use
Wi to denote the allocated slots of buyer i. Suppose slot k is the peak. There are two
cases to be considered:
Case 1. k /∈Wi. Let j and j′ be the leftmost and rightmost slot in Wi respectively. We
consider two cases qj ≥ qj′ and qj < qj′ . We only prove for the first case and the proof
for the other case is symmetric. If qj ≥ qj′ , we find the leftmost slot j1 > j′ assigned
to [s] and the rightmost slot j2 < j1 not assigned to [s]. In addition, let i1 ∈ [s] be
the buyer that j1 is assigned to and i2 > s be the buyer that j2 is assigned to. In
single peak case, it is easy to check qj ≥ qj′ implies that all the slots assigned to i2
have higher quality than i1’s. Thus swapping the positions of i1 and i2 will always
increase the virtual surplus,
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v) as illustrated in Figure 3.2. By continuing
to do this, we can eliminate all slots not allocated to [s] in the middle of allocation to
[s] and attain the desired optimal solution.
Case 2. k ∈ Wi. Suppose Wi = {ji1, ji2, · · · , jiui} with ji1 < ji2 < · · · < jiui and there
exists 1 ≤ e ≤ ui such that k = jie. Let a and b be the left and right neighbour
buyers of i winning slots next to Wi. As we know a, b ∈ [s], hence, φa(va) ≥ φi(vi)
and φb(vb) ≥ φi(vi). Let Wa = {ja1 , ja2 , · · · , jaua} and Wb = {jb1, jb2, · · · , jbub} denote
the allocated slots of buyer a and b respectively, where ja1 < j
a
2 < · · · < jaua and
jb1 < j
b
2 < · · · < jbub . As k ∈ Wi, then qji1 ≥ qjaua and qjiui ≥ qjb1 (note that j
a
ua and
jb1 are the indices of slots with the largest qualities in Wa and Wb respectively). We
will show that either swapping winning slots of i with a or with b will increase the
virtual surplus. To prove this, there four cases needed to be considered: (1). ui ≥ ua
and ui ≥ ub; (2). ui ≥ ua and ui < ub; (3). ui < ua and ui ≥ ub; (4). ui < ua and
ui < ub. We only prove the case (1) since the other cases can be proved similarly. Now,
suppose ui ≥ ua and ui ≥ ub, then we must have either (i).
∑ub
k=1 qjik
≥ ∑ubk=1 qjbk or
(ii).
∑ua
k=1 qjiui−k+1
≥ ∑uak=1 qjak . Suppose (i) is not true, that is ∑ubk=1 qjik < ∑ubk=1 qjbk ,
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if ub ≤ e, then we have qji1 ≤ qjiub , as a result
ubqji1
≤
ub∑
k=1
qjik
<
ub∑
k=1
qjbk
≤ ubqjb1 ≤ ubqjiui ,
thus, qji1
< qjiui
; otherwise ub > e, then it must also hold that qji1
≤ qjiui (otherwise,
for any 1 ≤ ` ≤ ub, qji` ≥ qjiui ≥ qjb1 implying that
∑ub
k=1 qjik
≥ ubqjb1 ≥
∑ub
k=1 qjbk
, a
contradiction). In both cases, it is obtained that qji1
≤ qjiui , therefore,
ua∑
k=1
qjiui−k+1
≥ uaqji1 ≥
ua∑
k=1
qjak
implying (ii) is true. Thus, if (i) is true, by simple calculations, swapping winning slots
of i with b will increase the virtual value (since φb(vb) ≥ φi(vi)), otherwise swapping
winning slots of i with a will increase the virtual surplus (since φa(va) ≥ φi(vi)). Then
keep doing it by the method of Case 1 until eliminating all slots not allocated to [s] in
the middle of allocation to [s] and attaining the desired optimal solution.
Buyer i Buyer i2
Slot j Slot j' Slot j2 Slot j1
Buyer i1
Buyer i Buyer i1 Buyer i2
Slot j Slot j' Slot j2 Slot j1
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the proof of Lemma 3.8
Slots with light color are assigned to [s]. By swapping the positions of i1 and i2, we
make the allocations to [s] consecutive.
Since there exists an optimal solution that assigns slots to [s] consecutively (Lemma
3.8), we can express the slots allocated to [s] as an interval [`, r]. Let g[s, `, r] denote
the maximized value of our objective function
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v) when we only consider the
first s buyers and the allocation of [s] is exactly the interval [`, r]. Then we have the
following recurrence.
g[s, `, r] = max

g[s− 1, `, r]
g[s− 1, `, r − ds] + φs(vs)
∑r
j=r−ds+1 qj
g[s− 1, `+ ds, r] + φs(vs)
∑`+ds−1
j=` qj
(3.3)
Our summary statement is as follows.
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Theorem 3.9. The mechanism that applies the allocation rule according to Dynamic
Programming (3.3) and payment rule according to Equation (3.2) is an optimal mech-
anism for the banner advertisement problem with single peak qualities.
Proof. To complete the proof, it suffices to prove that Ti(vi) is monotone non-decreasing.
More specifically, we prove a stronger fact, that ti(vi, v−i) is non-decreasing as vi in-
creases. Given other buyers’ bids v−i, the monotonicity of ti is equivalent to ti(vi, v−i) ≤
ti(v
′
i, v−i) if v
′
i > vi. Assuming that v
′
i > vi, the regularity of φi implies that φi(vi) ≤
φi(v
′
i). If φi(vi) = φi(v
′
i), then ti(vi, v−i) = ti(v
′
i, v−i) and we are done.
Consider the case that φi(vi) < φi(v
′
i). Let Q and Q
′ denote the total quantities
obtained by all the other buyers except buyer i in the mechanism when buyer i bids vi
and v′i respectively.
φi(v
′
i)ti(v
′
i, v−i) +Q
′ ≥ φi(v′i)ti(vi, v−i) +Q
φi(vi)ti(vi, v−i) +Q ≥ φi(vi)ti(v′i, v−i) +Q′.
The above inequalities are due to the optimality of allocations when i bids vi and v
′
i
respectively. It follows that
φi(v
′
i)(ti(vi, v−i)− ti(v′i, v−i)) ≤ Q′ −Q
φi(vi)(ti(vi, v−i)− ti(v′i, v−i)) ≥ Q′ −Q
By the fact that φi(vi) < φi(v
′
i), it must be ti(vi, v−i) ≤ ti(v′i, v−i).
3.4 Multiple Peaks Case
Suppose now that there are only h peaks (local maxima) in the qualities. Thus, there
are at most h − 1 valleys (local minima). Since h is a constant, we can enumerate all
the buyers occupying the valleys. After this enumeration, we can divide the sequence
of slots into at most h consecutive pieces, each of which is single-peaked. Theorem 3.10
shows, using similar properties as those in Lemma 3.7 and 3.8, how we can obtain a
larger size (polynomial-time) dynamic program similar to dynamic program (3.3) to
solve the problem.
Theorem 3.10. There is a polynomial algorithm to compute revenue maximization
problem in Bayesian settings where the qualities of slots have a constant number of
peaks.
Proof. Our proof is based on the single peak algorithm. Assume there are h peaks,
thus there must be h− 1 valleys. Suppose these valleys are indexed j1, j2, · · · , jh−1. In
an optimal allocation, for any jk, k = 1, 2, · · · , h−1, jk must be allocated to a buyer or
unassigned to any buyer. If jk is assigned to a buyer, say, buyer i, since i would buy di
consecutive slots, jk may appear in the `th position of these di consecutive slots. Hence,
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by this brute force, each jk will at most have
∑
i di + 1 ≤ mn + 1 possible positions
to be allocated. In all, all the valleys have (mn+ 1)h possible allocated positions. For
each of this allocation, the slots are broken into h single peak slots. We can obtain
similar properties to those in Lemma 3.7 and 3.8. Without loss of generality, suppose
the rest of the buyers are still the set [n], with non-increasing virtual value. Since the
optimal solution always assigns to [s] consecutively, we can express the allocations to [s]
as intervals denoted by [`i, ri], i = 1, 2, · · · , h, where [`i, ri] lies in the i-th single peak
slot. Let g[s, `1, r1, · · · , `h, rh] denote the maximized value of our objective function∑
i φi(vi)ti(v) when we only consider the first s buyers and the allocations of [s] are
exactly intervals [`i, ri], i = 1, 2, · · · , h. Then we have the following dynamic program:
g[s, `1, r1, · · · , `h, rh] can be evaluated as
max
i∈[d]

g[s− 1, `1, r1, · · · , `h, rh]
g[s− 1, `1, r1, · · · , `i, ri − ds, · · · , `h, rh] + φs(vs)
∑ri
j=ri−ds+1 qj
g[s− 1, `1, r1, · · · , `i + ds, ri, · · · , `h, rh] + φs(vs)
∑`i+ds−1
j=`i
qj
Note that the dynamic programming runs in polynomial time provided that the number
of peaks is constant.
Now we consider the case without the constant peak assumption and prove the
following hardness result.
Theorem 3.11. The revenue maximization problem for allocating consecutive ad slots
(with unrestricted qualities) to buyers with fixed demands, is NP-hard.
Proof. We prove the NP-hardness by reducing from the 3-Partition problem, which
is to decide whether a given multi-set of integers can be partitioned into triplets that all
have the same sum. More precisely, given a multi-set S of 3n positive integers, can S be
partitioned into n triplets S1, . . . , Sn such that the sum of the numbers in each subset is
equal? We use the fact that 3-Partition remains NP-complete in a strong sense [42],
meaning that it remains NP-complete even when the integers in S are bounded above
by a polynomial in n.
Given an instance of 3-Partition (a1, a2, . . . , a3n), we construct an instance of the
advertising problem with 3n advertisers and m = n +
∑
i ai slots. Note that m is
polynomial in n due to the fact that all ai are bounded by a polynomial in n. In the
advertising instance, the valuation vi for each advertiser i is 1 and his demand di is
defined as ai. Moreover, for any advertiser, his valuation distribution is that vi = 1
with probability 1. Then everyone’s virtual value is exactly 1. Maximizing revenue is
equivalent to maximizing the simplified function
∑
i
∑
j∈Xi qj .
Let B =
∑
i ai/n. We define the quality of slot j to be 0 if j is a multiple of B + 1,
otherwise qj = 1. That can be illustrated as follows.
1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
0 1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
0 . . . 1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
0
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It is not hard to see that the optimal revenue is
∑
i ai iff there is a solution to this
3-Partition instance.
3.5 Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we study the revenue maximizing competitive equilibrium in the full
information setting. To simplify the following discussions, we sort all buyers in non-
increasing order of their values, i.e., v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn. (By contrast, in Section 3.3,
we sorted them in non-increasing order of virtual values, which are not relevant to
competitive equilibrium.)
We say that an allocation Y = (Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn) is efficient if Y maximizes the total
social welfare, that is,
∑
i
∑
j∈Yi vij is maximized over all the possible allocations. We
call p = (p1, p2, · · · , pm) an equilibrium price if there exists an allocation X such that
(X,p) is a competitive equilibrium. The following lemma is implicitly stated in [45];
for completeness, we give a proof below.
Lemma 3.12. If allocation Y is efficient, then for any equilibrium price p, (Y,p) is
a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Since p is an equilibrium price, there exists an allocation X such that (X,p) is
a competitive equilibrium. As a result, by envy-freeness, ui(X,p) ≥ ui(Y,p) for any
i ∈ [n]. Let T = [m]\ ∪i Yi, then we have
∑
i
∑
j∈Yi
vij −
m∑
j=1
pj ≥
∑
i
∑
j∈Xi
vij −
m∑
j=1
pj =
∑
i
∑
j∈Xi
vij −
∑
i
∑
j∈Xi
pj
=
∑
i
ui(X,p) ≥
∑
i
ui(Y,p) =
∑
i
∑
j∈Yi
vij −
∑
i
∑
j∈Yi
pj
=
∑
i
∑
j∈Yi
vij −
m∑
j=1
pj +
∑
j∈T
pj (3.4)
where the first inequality is due to Y being efficient and first equality due to ui(X,p)
being competitive equilibrium (unallocated item priced at 0). Therefore,
∑
j∈T pj = 0
and the above inequalities are all equalities. ∀i : ui(X,p) = ui(Y,p). Further, because
the price is the same, we have
• For every loser i and every set Z of consecutive items with |Z| = di, we have
ui(Z) ≤ 0.
• For every winner i and every set Z of consecutive items with |Z| = di, we have
ui(Yi) = ui(Xi) ≥ ui(Z).
Therefore, (Y,p) is a competitive equilibrium.
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By Lemma 3.12, to find a revenue maximizing competitive equilibrium, we can
first find an efficient allocation and then use linear program to settle the prices. We
develop the following dynamic program to find an efficient allocation. We first only
consider there is one peak in the quality order of items. The case with constant peaks is
similar to the above approaches, for general peak case, as shown in above Theorem 3.11,
finding one competitive equilibrium is NP-hard if the competitive equilibrium exists,
and determining existence of competitive equilibrium is also NP-hard. This is because
that considering the instance in the proof of Theorem 3.11, it is not difficult to see the
constructed instance has an equilibrium if and only if 3 Partition has a solution.
Recall that all the values are sorted in non-increasing order, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn.
g[s, `, r] denotes the maximized value of social welfare when we only consider first s
buyers and the allocation of s is exactly the interval [`, r]. Then we have the following
recurrence.
g[s, l, r] = max

g[s− 1, `, r]
g[s− 1, `, r − ds] + vs
∑r
j=r−ds+1 qj
g[s− 1, `+ ds, r] + vs
∑`+ds−1
j=` qj
(3.5)
By tracking procedure 3.5, an efficient allocation denoted by X∗ = (X∗1 , X∗2 , · · · , X∗n)
can be found. The price p∗ such that (X∗,p∗) is a revenue maximization competi-
tive equilibrium can be determined from the following linear program. Let Ti be any
consecutive number of di slots, for all i ∈ [n].
max
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈X∗i
pj
s.t. pj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ [m]
pj = 0 ∀ j /∈ ∪i∈[n]X∗i∑
j∈X∗i
(viqj − pj) ≥
∑
j′∈Ti
(viqj′ − pj′) ∀ i ∈ [n]∑
j∈X∗i
(viqj − pj) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
Clearly there is only a polynomial number of constraints. The constraints in the first
line represent that all the prices are non negative (no positive transfers). The constraint
in the second line means unallocated items must be priced at zero (market clearance
condition). And the constraint in the third line contains two aspects of information.
First, for any loser k with Xk = ∅, the utility that k gets from any consecutive number
of dk is no more than zero, which makes all the losers envy-free. The second aspect
is that any winner i with Xi 6= ∅ must receive a bundle with di consecutive slots
maximizing its utility over all di consecutive slots, which together with the constraint
in the fourth line (winner’s utilities are non negative) guarantees that all winners are
envy-free.
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Theorem 3.13. Under the condition of a constant number of peaks in the qualities of
slots, there is a polynomial time algorithm to decide whether there exists a competitive
equilibrium or not and to compute a revenue maximizing revenue market equilibrium if
one does exist. If the number of peaks in the qualities of the slots is unbounded, both
the problems are NP-complete.
Proof. Clearly the above linear program and procedure (3.5) run in polynomial time. If
the linear program output a price p∗, then by its constraint conditions, (X∗,p∗) must be
a competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, if there exist a competitive equilibrium
(X,p) then by Lemma 3.12, (X∗,p) is a competitive equilibrium, providing a feasible
solution of above linear program. By the objective of the linear program, it must be a
revenue maximizing one.
The NP-hardness follows from Theorem 3.11.
3.6 Consecutive Envy-freeness
We first prove a negative result on computing the revenue maximization problem in
general demand case. We show it is NP-hard even if all the qualities are the same.
Theorem 3.14. The revenue maximization problem for allocating consecutive ad slots
to envy-free buyers is NP-hard, even if all slot qualities are the same.
Proof. Using similar ideas in the proof of Theorem 3.11, we prove the NP-hardness by
reducing from the 3-Partition problem. Given an instance of 3-Partition (a1, a2, . . . , a3n).
Let B =
∑
i ai/n. We construct an instance for advertising problem with 3n+ 1 adver-
tisers and m = B + 1 + n+
∑
i ai slots. It should be mentioned that m is polynomial
of n due to the fact that all ai are bounded by a polynomial of n. In the advertising
instance, the valuation vi for each advertiser i is 1 and his demand di is defined as ai
and there is another buyer with valuation 2 for each slot and with demand B+ 1. The
quality of each slot j is 1. It is not hard to see that the optimal revenue is nB+2(B+1)
if and only if there is a solution to this 3-Partition instance, the optimal solution is
illustrated as follows.
1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B+1
1︸︷︷︸
unassigned
1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
1︸︷︷︸
unassigned
1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
1︸︷︷︸
unassigned
. . . 1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
Although the hardness in Theorem 3.14 indicates that finding the optimal revenue
for general demand in polynomial time is impossible, it does not however rule out the
important special case where the demand is uniform, that is, di = d. If in addition
we have slots that are arranged in non-increasing order of their qualities, that is, q1 ≥
q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qm, then we have the following computational positive result.
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Theorem 3.15. There is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the consecutive envy-
free solution in the case where all the buyers have the same demand and slots are
arranged in non-increasing order of quality.
The proof of Theorem 3.15 is based on bundle envy-free solutions; in fact we will
prove the bundle envy-free solution is also a consecutive envy-free solution by defining
price of items properly. Thus, we first need to give the result on bundle envy-free
solutions. Suppose d is the uniform demand for all the buyers. Let Ti be the slot set
allocated to buyer i, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Let Pi be the total payment of buyer i and pj be
the price of slot j. Let ti denote the total qualities obtained by buyer i, ti =
∑
j∈Ti qj ,
and αi = ivi − (i− 1)vi−1, ∀i ∈ [n].
Theorem 3.16. The revenue maximization problem of bundle envy-freeness is equiva-
lent to solving the following optimization problem.
Maximize:
n∑
i=1
αiti
s.t. t1 ≥ t2 ≥ · · · ≥ tn
Ti ⊂ [m], Ti ∩ Tk = ∅ ∀i, k ∈ [n]
(3.6)
Proof. Recall Pi denotes the payment of buyer i, and we next prove that the linear
program (3.6) actually gives an optimal solution of bundle envy-free pricing. By the
definition of bundle envy-free, where buyer i would not envy buyer i+1 and vice versa,
we have
viti − Pi ≥ viti+1 − Pi+1 (3.7)
vi+1ti+1 − Pi+1 ≥ vi+1ti − Pi (3.8)
By summing up the above two inequalities, we have (vi − vi+1)(ti − ti+1) ≥ 0. Hence,
if vi > vi+1, then ti ≥ ti+1. From (3.7), we get Pi ≤ vi(ti− ti+1) +Pi+1. The maximum
payment of buyer i is
Pi = vi(ti − ti+1) + Pi+1, (3.9)
Together with ti ≥ ti+1, the above equation implies (3.7) and (3.8). Furthermore, the
maximum payment of n is Pn = tnvn. (3.9) together with ti ≥ ti+1 and Pn = tnvn
would make everyone bundle envy-free, the arguments are as follows.
All the buyers must be bundle envy free. By (3.9), we have Pi−Pi+1 = vi(ti− ti+1),
hence Pi =
∑n−1
k=i vk(tk − tk+1) +Pn. Noticing that if ti = 0, then Pi = 0, which means
i is a loser. For any buyer j < i, we have
Pj − Pi =
i−1∑
k=j
vk(tk − tk+1) ≤
i−1∑
k=j
vj(tk − tk+1) = vj(tj − ti)
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By rearranging the terms, we have vjti−Pi ≤ vjtj −Pj , that means buyer j would not
envy buyer i. Similarly,
Pj − Pi =
i−1∑
k=j
vk(tk − tk+1) ≥
i−1∑
k=j
vi(tk − tk+1) = vi(tj − ti)
We have viti − Pi ≥ vitj − Pj that implies i would not envy buyer j.
Now we are ready to calculate
∑n
i=1 Pi based on (3.9) and tn+1 = 0.
n∑
i=1
Pi =
n∑
i=1
[
n−1∑
k=i
vk(tk − tk+1) + Pn
]
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
k=i
vk(tk − tk+1)
=
n∑
k=1
k∑
i=1
vk(tk − tk+1) =
n∑
k=1
kvk(tk − tk+1)
=
n∑
k=1
kvktk −
n∑
k=1
(k − 1)vk−1tk =
n∑
i=1
αiti
We know the revenue maximizing problem of bundle envy-freeness can be formalized
as (3.6).
Since consecutive envy-free solutions are a subset of (sharp) bundle envy-free solu-
tions, hence the optimal value of the optimization problem (3.6) gives an upper bound of
optimal objective value of consecutive envy-free solutions. Note that the optimization
problem (3.6) can be solved by dynamic programming. Let g[s, j] denote the optimal
objective value of the following LP with some set in [j] allocated to all the buyers in [s]:
Maximize:
s∑
i=1
αiti
s.t. t1 ≥ t2 ≥ · · · ≥ ts
Ti ⊂ [j], Ti ∩ Tk = ∅ ∀i, k ∈ [s]
We can derive the following equations since the monotonicity of the envy-free allocation
guarantees that the players with higher value should get better positions.
g[s, j] = max
{
g[s, j − 1]
g[s− 1, j − d] + αs
∑j
u=j−d+1 qu
Next, we show how to modify the (sharp) bundle envy-free solution to consecutive
envy-free solutions by properly defining the slot price of Ti, for all i ∈ [n]. Suppose the
optimal winner set of bundle envy-free solution is [L]. Assume the optimal allocation
and price of bundle envy-free solution are Ti = {ji1, ji2, · · · , jid} with ji1 ≥ ji2 ≥ · · · ≥ jid
and Pi respectively, for all i ∈ [L].
Proof of Theorem 3.15. Define the price of Ti iteratively: pjLk
= vLqjLk
, for all k ∈ [d];
pjik
= vi(qjik
− qji+1k ) + pji+1k for k ∈ [d] and i ∈ [n]. Now we observe that the price
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defined by the above procedure is still a bundle envy-free solution. This is because by
induction, we have Pi =
∑d
k=1 pjik
. Hence, we need only to check the prices defined as
above and allocations Ti constitute a consecutive envy-free solution. In fact, we prove
a strong version: suppose Ti’s are consecutive from top to bottom in a line S, we will
show each buyer i would not envy any consecutive sub line of S comprising d slots. For
any i, we consider two cases.
Case 1. Buyer i would not envy the slots below his slots.
for any consecutive line T below i with size d, suppose T comprises of slots won by
buyer k (denoted such slot set by Uk) and k+ 1 (denoted such slot set by Uk+1 and let
` = |Uk+1|) where k ≥ i. Recall that ti =
∑
j∈Ti qj , then∑
j∈Ti
pj −
∑
j∈T
pj = vi(ti − ti+1) + Pi+1 −
∑
j∈Uk∪Uk+1
pj
= vi(ti − ti+1) + vi+1(ti+1 − ti+2) + · · ·+ Pk −
∑
j∈Uk∪Uk+1
pj
= vi(ti − ti+1) + vi+1(ti+1 − ti+2) + · · ·+
∑
j∈Tk\Uk
pj −
∑
j∈Uk+1
pj
= vi(ti − ti+1) + vi+1(ti+1 − ti+2) + · · ·+
∑`
u=1
vk(qjku − qjk+1u )
≤ vi(ti − ti+1) + vi(ti+1 − ti+2) + · · ·+
∑`
u=1
vi(qjku − qjk+1u )
= viti − vi
∑
j∈T
qj .
By rewriting
∑
j∈Ti pj −
∑
j∈T pj ≤ viti − vi
∑
j∈T qj as viti −
∑
j∈Ti pj ≥ vi
∑
j∈T qj −∑
j∈T pj , we get the desired result.
Case 2. Buyer i would not envy the slots above his slots. For any consecutive line T
above i with size d, suppose T comprises of slots won by buyer k (denoted such slot
set by Uk) and k − 1 (denoted such slot set by Uk−1 and let ` = |Uk−1|) where k ≤ i.
Recall that ti =
∑
j∈Ti qj , then∑
j∈T
pj −
∑
j∈Ti
pj =
∑
j∈Uk−1∪Uk
pj −
∑
j∈Ti
pj
=
d∑
u=d−`+1
vk−1(qjk−1u − qjku) +
∑
j∈Tk
pj −
∑
j∈Ti
pj
=
d∑
u=d−`+1
vk−1(qjk−1u − qjku) + vk(tk − tk+1) + · · ·+ vi−1(ti−1 − ti)
≥
d∑
u=d−`+1
vi(qjk−1u − qjku) + vi(tk − tk+1) + · · ·+ vi(ti−1 − ti)
= vi
∑
j∈T
qj − viti.
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By rewriting
∑
j∈T pj −
∑
j∈Ti pj ≥ vi
∑
j∈T qj − viti as viti −
∑
j∈Ti pj ≥ vi
∑
j∈T qj −∑
j∈T pj we get the desired result.
3.7 Conclusion
The rich media pricing models for consecutive demand buyers in the context of Bayesian
truthfulness, competitive equilibrium and envy-free solution paradigm are investigated
in this chapter. As a result, an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism is
proposed for various settings such as single peak and multiple peaks. In addition, to
incorporate fairness e.g. envy-freeness, we also present a polynomial-time algorithm to
decide whether or not there exists a competitive equilibrium and to compute a revenue
maximized market equilibrium if one does exist. For envy-free settings, though the
revenue maximization of general demand case is shown to be NP-hard, we still provide
optimal solution of common demand case. Besides, our simulation shows a reasonable
relationship of revenues among these schemes and a generalized GSP for rich media
ads.
Even though our main motivation arises from the rich media advert pricing problem,
our models have other potential applications. For example TV ads can also be modeled
under our consecutive demand adverts where inventories of a commercial break are
usually divided into slots of fixed sizes, and slots have various qualities measuring their
expected number of viewers and corresponding attractiveness. With an extra effort
to explore the periodicity of TV ads, we can extend our multiple peak model to one
involved with cyclic multiple peaks.
Besides single consecutive demand where each buyer only has one demand choice,
the buyer may have more options to display his ads, for example select a large picture
or a small one to display them. Our dynamic programming algorithm (3.3) can also be
applied to this case (the transition function in each step selects maximum value from
2k + 1 possible values, where k is the number of choices of the buyer).
Another reasonable extension of our model would be to add budget constraints for
buyers, i.e., each buyer cannot afford the payment more than his budget. By relaxing
the requirement of Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) to one of approximate BIC,
this extension can be obtained by the recent milestone work of Cai et al. [9]. It remains
an open problem how to do it under the exact BIC requirement. It would also be
interesting to handle it under the market equilibrium paradigm for our model.
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Chapter 4
Fund Raising: Auction Design
with a Revenue Target
In many fund-raising situations, a revenue target is specified. This suggests that the
fund-raiser is interested in maximizing the probability to achieve this revenue target,
rather than in maximizing the expected revenue. We study this topic from the per-
spective of Bayesian mechanism design, in a setting where a seller has a certain good
that he can supply at no cost, and there are buyers whose joint valuation for the good
comes from some given prior distribution. We present an algorithm to find an optimal
truthful auction for two buyers with independent valuations via a direct characteriza-
tion of the optimal auction. In contrast, we show the problem is NP-hard when the
number of buyers is arbitrary or the distributions are correlated. Both negative results
can be modified to show NP-hardness of designing auctions for risk-averse sellers.
Furthermore, we investigate the design of simple auctions for multiple buyers, again
in the context of a revenue target. For Sequential Posted Price Auctions, we provide
a FPTAS to compute the optimal posted prices for a given sequence of buyers. For
Monopoly Price Auctions, we apply the results of [25] on sparse covers of distributions
to obtain a PTAS in a setting where the seller has a constraint on discriminatory
pricing, consisting of a fixed set of prices he may use.
This chapter is based on a joint work [44] with Paul Goldberg, which appears in
SAGT 2015.
4.1 Overview
There is a considerable literature on the algorithmic challenge of designing auctions
that maximise the expected revenue obtained from a set of buyers. In this chapter
we consider a related objective where instead of maximising the expected revenue, the
auctioneer has been given some revenue target T , and wishes to maximise the proba-
bility of raising at least T . This objective gives rise to new and interesting algorithmic
challenges, and has some plausible real-world motivations, discussed below.
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We work in the classical Bayesian setting of a collection of buyers whose valuations
(prices they are willing to pay) for items being sold, are assumed to be drawn from
some known prior distribution D. We are interested in designing mechanisms that are
incentive compatible and individually rational. D in combination with a mechanism
M results in a distribution over the revenue R obtained. A standard objective is to
choose M to maximise the expected value of R. A more general setting assumes a
non-decreasing “utility of money” function u, and aims to maximize the expectation
of u(R). In this revenue-target setting, u is a shifted Heaviside function, equal to 0 for
R < T and 1 for R ≥ T . Certain concave functions u have been used to model risk
aversion, however the functions u considered here are not concave.
In this chapter we focus on the “digital goods” setting, where the seller can supply
unlimited copies of some good, at no cost. We also assume that the buyers have unit
demand, so that a buyer’s type is represented by a probability distribution over his
valuation for a copy of the item. This special case is a simplified model of the fund-
raising situations mentioned below. In the context of digital goods and unit demands,
maximisation of the expected revenue can be decomposed into revenue-maximisation
from each buyer independently. In contrast, when we switch to a revenue target, we
find that the deal offered to a buyer should depend on the outcomes of the deals offered
to other buyers.
This revenue-target setting is motivated by various real-world scenarios. Charitable
fund-raising typically identify a target revenue to be raised. Similarly, in Internet
crowd-sourcing platforms that support fund-raising for business start-ups (Kickstarter,
Indiegogo, RocketHub etc.), it is typical to aim for some amount of money, and if
that target is not reached, the would-be investors get their money back. (Our model
doesn’t properly capture this situation; we mention it to emphasise the importance of
revenue targets in practice.) While a fund-raising effort is not the same thing as an
auction, to some extent it can be modelled as one: an approach to a donor (or investor)
corresponds to an attempt to sell an item to a would-be buyer. In cases where goods
are sold at auction, it may be more desirable to raise a particular amount of money
than to maximise the expected revenue. For example, in a bankruptcy situation, the
administrator may wish to sell a collection of items so as to prioritise repaying the
top-tier creditors. And while the FCC spectrum auction wants to raise as much money
as possible, it is also required to cover its costs.
4.1.1 Main Results
We consider the problem parametrised by the number of buyers n, and the support size
m of their value distributions. With multiple buyers, it is #P-complete to compute
the exact success probability (probability to achieve revenue target T ) for a given
auction (Proposition 4.2). Given this obstacle, in Section 4.3 we consider a basic case
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of two buyers having independent valuations. We exhibit a polynomial-time algorithm
to exactly compute the optimal truthful auction that maximises the probability to
achieve T , given as input any discrete prior distributions. We do this via a structural
characterisation of auctions that optimise the probability of achieving a given revenue
target. This characterisation totally differs from the one maximising expected revenue
and allows us to restrict to auctions with a geometric property that makes the problem
tractable.
We show contrasting hardness results for correlated valuations or n buyers with
independent distributions. Specifically, it is shown to be NP-complete to compute the
optimal auction for three buyers having correlated valuations and NP-hard for n buyers
with independent distributions. Note that, in the latter case, a truthful auction may
not necessarily be succinctly representable. We overcome the obstacle via proving the
hardness for a class of succinct auctions and showing there exists a truthful auction with
good performance if and only if there exists a good succinct auction in the constructed
instance.
Our main algorithmic results are in Section 4.6, for two prevalent auctions fol-
lowing the trend of designing simple auctions. The first one is the Sequential Posted
Price Auction introduced by Chawla et al. [14] to approximate the expected revenue
in multi-dimensional Bayesian mechanism design. In this auction, the seller offers a
take-it-or-leave-it price to each buyer sequentially. Given a sequence of buyers, we are
able to provide a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) to compute
an approximately optimal sequential posted price auction that maximizes the success
probability with an additive error. Second, we consider the Monopoly Price Auction
where the seller offers take-it-or-leave-it prices to buyers simultaneously. This type of
auctions was studied in [47] for selling goods with limited supply. We apply results
of [25] on sparse covers of Poisson binomial distributions to obtain a PTAS when the
seller has a limitation on discriminatory pricing, i.e., is only allowed to use few distinct
prices.
4.1.2 Literature Review
There has been a long line of research on maximizing expected revenue in Bayesian
mechanism design starting from the seminal work by Myerson [65]. Recently, Cai et
al. [9] developed a general framework reducing revenue maximization to social welfare
maximization. They also applied the framework to optimize certain non-linear functions
[10]. However, the mechanisms they derived are randomized and Bayesian truthful, not
deterministic truthful mechanisms studied in this chapter.
Another line of research studied auction design for risk-averse sellers that can be
regarded as maximizing a concave function of the revenue (cf. [71]). Sundararajan
and Yan [75] studied the auction design problem for a risk averse seller and gave ro-
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bust mechanisms (without knowledge of the concave function) which achieve constant
approximations when buyers’ distributions are independent. The approximation ratio
has been improved to e/(e − 1) by Bhalgat et al. [5] by using the knowledge of con-
cave functions. Our work complements their results by providing some corresponding
intractability results.
We mention several negative results on revenue maximization in deterministic mech-
anism design. Diakonikolas et al. [33] showed that it is NP-hard to maximize revenue
given a welfare constraint. Chen et al. [19] proved that it is NP-hard to maximize
revenue in a multi-dimensional setting with a single unit-demand buyer when the val-
uations of items are independently distributed. For correlated buyers, Papadimitriou
and Pierrakos [67] proved that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal expected
revenue for a single-item auction. However, in digital goods setting, the revenue maxi-
mizing auction can be constructed easily by computing the optimal price for each bidder
separately based on their distributions conditioned on others’ bids.
The study of digital goods auctions was initiated by Goldberg et al. [43]. Recently,
Chen et al. [18] derived the optimal competitive auction with the benchmark defined
to measure worst-case over all buyer profiles. In contrast, our benchmark measure is
the average cases based on the prior distribution.
Threshold probability maximization is a classical objective in stochastic optimiza-
tion and has been studied for several combinatorial optimization problems (cf. [60] and
references therein). However no incentive issues were considered before when optimiz-
ing this objective. The technique we apply to approximate the optimal monopoly price
auction is based on [25]. These results have been shown helpful in computing Nash
Equilibria [26] and learning sums of random variables [24]. But to our knowledge, our
result is their first application in auction design.
4.2 Preliminaries
Auction Setting We study an auction environment where a seller want to sell n
copies of an item to n bidders. Each bidder/buyer i is interested in a single copy of the
item and values it at a privately known value vi. A valuation profile v is the vector of
all bidders’ valuations, i.e. v = (v1, . . . , vn). We consider a deterministic single-round
sealed-bid auction where each bidder submits a bid bi to express how much he is willing
to pay for the item. After soliciting submitted bids b = (b1, . . . , bn), the seller must
decide whether each bidder i wins an item and how much he needs to pay. Bidder i’s
utility is the difference between his value vi and his payment if he wins a item; otherwise
he pays 0 and gets utility 0 to guarantee the individual rationality, that is no bidders
will get a negative utility in the auction.
We assume every bidder in the auction is rational and aims to maximize his own
utility by choosing the best bidding strategy. An auction is said to be truthful if for
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each bidder i, bidding his true valuation (i.e. bi = vi) is a dominant strategy no matter
what the other bidders bid. It is known that truthful auctions can be characterized
by bid-independent auctions where for each bidder i, the auction computes a threshold
price pi that does not depend on bi but may depend on the bids of the other bidders
b−i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn). In other words, there exists a pricing function for
bidder i such that pi = fi(b−i) and i wins the item iff bi ≥ pi and his payment is pi
if he wins. So it suffices to consider bid-independent auctions when designing truthful
auctions.
Thus any truthful or bid-independent auction A can be represented by n pricing
functions (f1, . . . , fn) where fi is the pricing function for bidder i which maps other
bidders’ valuations v−i to the threshold price pi. For convenience, we use xi(v) to
denote the allocation rule of the auction, i.e. xi(v) = 1 if bidder i wins an item when
the valuation profile is v; otherwise xi(v) = 0. Hence, the revenue of A on profile v is
RA(v) =
∑
i∈[n] xi(v)fi(v−i) where [n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n}. We also use RAi (v)
to denote the revenue of the auction A from bidder i, i.e., RAi (v) = xi(v)fi(v−i). We
will omit A from the notation if the auction is clear from the context.
Auction Design with a Revenue Target We assume the seller has prior knowledge
of the bidders’ valuations, which is represented by a distribution on the valuation profile
v. In particular, we use D to denote the distribution on the valuation profile and V
to denote the support of D. We denote the probability that the valuation profile is v
by Pr[v] for all v ∈ V . Obviously, the distribution D can be represented in the size
of V (denoted by |V | or |D|) by explicitly describing Pr[v] for all v ∈ V . We also use
Vi = {v1i , . . . , vmii } to denote the set of all possible value of vi in D, where mi is |Vi|
and v1i < v
2
i < · · · < vmii . For convenience, we define v0i = 0 and assume 0 ∈ Vi.
We say the bidders’ valuations are independently distributed if D is a product
distribution, i.e. D = ×i∈[n]Di where Di is the distribution on buyer i’s valuations;
otherwise they are correlated. For convenience, we say the bidders are independent (or
correlated) according to whether their valuations are independently distributed. For
independent bidders, D can be represented using space O(n ·m) where m = maximi.
We consider a seller who is endowed with a revenue target T and his utility is 1
if the revenue raised in the auction is at least T ; otherwise his utility is 0. Given an
instance I = (D,T ) with the profile distribution D and revenue target T , the seller’s
utility in an auction A is Prv∼D[RA(v) ≥ T ]. We also call this value the performance
of auction A on instance I. So an auction is an optimal truthful auction for an instance
I if no truthful auction can outperform A on the instance I. Similarly, we say A is
c-additive approximately optimal if no truthful auction can perform better than the
performance of A plus a parameter c. It is without loss of generality to assume the
range of pricing function for bidder i is Vi as shown in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.1. For any distribution profile D and truthful auction A, there exists
another truthful auction A′ such that the range of pricing functions for bidder i in A′
is Vi for all i ∈ [n] and RA′(v) ≥ RA(v) for all profiles v.
Proof. Let f1, . . . , fn be the pricing functions used in A. Recall that Vi = {v1i , . . . , vmii }
is the set of all possible values of vi in D. It is w.l.o.g. to assume that fi(v−i) ≤ vmii ;
otherwise we can set fi(v−i) = vmii without decreasing the revenue. Given pricing func-
tions f1, . . . , fn, we construct f
′
1, . . . , f
′
n such that f
′
i(v−i) = v
j
i if f
′
i(v−i) ∈ (vj−1i , vji ].
It is easy to see that for any profile v, if bidder i wins an item in A, he also wins an
item in A′, i.e., x′i(v) ≥ xi(v). By the construction of f ′i , we have f ′i(v−i) ≥ fi(v−i)
for all v. Thus, RA
′
(v) =
∑
i x
′
i(v)f
′
i(v−i) ≥
∑
i xi(v)fi(v−i) = R
A(v) for any profile
v.
Simple Auctions We consider two types of simple auctions called monopoly price
auctions and sequential posted price auctions. A monopoly price auction is a truthful
auction with pricing functions (f1, . . . , fn) where each function fi depends only on the
prior distribution D and not on the other bids b−i. We say an auction is a sequential
posted price auction with respect to an order σ if fi may depend on D together with
the bids of buyers who precede i in σ, i.e. (b1, . . . , bi−1) if buyers are indexed according
to σ. The following proposition shows the hardness of evaluating the performance of a
given monopoly price auction.
Proposition 4.2. Given a monopoly price auction for independent bidders, it is #P-
complete to compute the probability of achieving a revenue target.
Proof. The proposition follows from the following theorem proved in [54].
Theorem 4.3 (Theorem 2.1 in [54]). Given Bernoulli trials X1, . . . , Xn, where Xi
takes the value si with probability qi and the value 0 with 1 − qi, it is #P-complete to
compute Pr[
∑
iXi > 1].
To see it, given the monopoly prices p1, . . . , pn, the revenue from each bidder is a
Bernoulli trial taking value pi when vi ≥ pi and the value 0 otherwise.
4.3 Optimal auction for two independent bidders
In this section, we describe our optimal truthful auction for two independent bidders.
We first give a high-level idea for the proof. First of all, we show that it is w.l.o.g. to
assume the bidders’ valuations are in {0, 1, . . . ,m} and the revenue target is m. Then
we show that the mechanism which can be described as two pricing function f1, f2 must
have non-increasing f1 and f2. After that, we show instead of searching all possible f1
and f2, one can only compute the optimal f1 and the values of f2 follows by a direct
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calculation. Finally, we give a geometric characterization of the optimal f1, which
allows us to find the optimal solution by an elaborate dynamic program.
Recall that any truthful auction for two bidders can be represented by two pricing
functions f1 and f2. By Proposition 4.1, we only need to consider f1 : V2 → V1 which
maps bidder 2’s valuations to bidder 1’s threshold prices and f2 : V1 → V2. First of
all, we show that the general problem reduces to a restricted version where bidders’
distributions have support {0, . . . ,m} × {0, . . . ,m} and the target revenue is m, for
some positive integer m. The intuition is mapping values of one agent to indices and
mapping values of the second agent to intervals of T − v1.
Lemma 4.4. Given any instance I = (D,T ) with an independent profile distribution
D = D1 × D2 (Di having support Vi) and a target revenue T , there exists an integer
m ≤ min{|V1|, |V2|}+ 1 and another instance I ′ = (D′, T ′) such that
(a) D′ = D′1 ×D′2 has the support {0, . . . ,m} × {0, . . . ,m} and T ′ = m
(b) Given an instance I, the instance I ′ can be found in time linear in m
(c) Given any optimal truthful auction for I ′, it is possible to construct an optimal
truthful auction for I in time linear in m.
Proof. Given an instance I = (D,T ), it is w.l.o.g. to assume |V1| ≤ |V2|. We define m
to be the index such that m − 1 is the maximal index i ∈ [|V1|] such that vi1 < T . It
follows that m ≤ |V1| + 1. For convenience, we add the valuation T into V1 if for all
v1 ∈ V1, v1 < T and the same modification for V2 as well. Recall that v01 = v02 = 0. We
construct the following two mappings g1 : V1 → [0, . . . ,m] and g2 : V2 → [0, . . . ,m] as
follows: g1(v
i
1) = min{i,m} and g2(vj2) = k if vj2 ∈ [T − vm−k1 , T − vm−k−11 ). It is easy
to see g1 and g2 are monotone non-decreasing. Then we define the inverse function for
g1 and g2 as follows. Define g
−1
1 (i) = v
i
1. Define g
−1
2 (j) to be the smallest v2 ∈ V2 such
that v2 ≥ T −vm−j1 . Note that g−12 is well-defined since there always exists v2 ∈ V2 such
that v2 ≥ T after the modification described above. It is easy to check the following
properties hold: v1 ≥ g−11 (g1(v1)) for all v1 ∈ V1, v2 ≥ g−12 (g2(v2)) for all v2 ∈ V2,
i = g1(g
−1
1 (i)) for all i = 0, . . . ,m and j = g2(g
−1
2 (j)) for all j ∈ {0, . . . ,m} such that
there exists v2 ∈ V2, g2(v2) = j.
Now we consider the instance I ′ = (D′,m) where D′ is the modified distribution
by replacing vi1 and v
j
2 by g1(v
i
1) and g2(v
j
2) respectively in D. Note that we may
map different valuations in V1 to the same v
′
1 ∈ {0, . . . ,m}. In this case, we set the
probability of v′1 in D′1 to be the sum of the probabilities of all valuations in V1 such
that g1(v1) = v
′
1. Similar modifications will be applied to D
′
2 as well. Given D
′
2, we
have j = g2(g
−1
2 (j)) for all j with positive probability in D
′
2 since there exists v2 ∈ V2,
g2(v2) = j for such j.
It is clear that I ′ satisfies (a) and (b) in the lemma. In order to prove (c), we
first show that there exists a mapping from any truthful auction A′ for I ′ to a truthful
auction A for I such that A and A′ have the same performance. More specifically,
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given any truthful auction A′ = (f ′1, f ′2) for I ′, let A = (f1, f2) be a truthful auction
for I such that f1(v2) = g−11 (f ′1(g2(v2))) for all v2 ∈ V2 and f2(v1) = g−12 (f ′2(g1(v1)))
for all v1 ∈ V1. We will show that Prv∼D[RA(v) ≥ T ] = Prv′∼D′ [RA′(v′) ≥ m]. It is
sufficient to show that for any profile v ∈ V with positive probability in D, RA(v) ≥ T
if and only if RA′(v
′) ≥ m where v′ = (g1(v1), g2(v2)) ∈ V ′. Suppose RA(v) ≥ T , by
definition we have x1(v)f1(v2) + x2(v)f2(v1) ≥ T . Recall that x1(v) is the allocation
rule of A for bidder 1. We can show x′1(v′) = x1(v) by the following deduction.
x1(v) = 1⇔ v1 ≥ f2(v2)⇔ g1(v1) ≥ g1(f2(v2))
⇔ g1(v1) ≥ g1(g−11 (f ′1(g2(vj2))))⇔ g1(v1) ≥ f ′1(g2(vj2))⇔ x′1(v′) = 1
The second equivalence follows by the monotonicity of g1 and the fourth one is due to
the fact that i = g−1i (g1(i)). By similar arguments, we also have x
′
2(v) = x2(v). In
order to show RA′(v
′) ≥ m, consider the following cases: Case (1): x1(v)f1(v2) ≥ T ,
then we have g1(f1(v2)) = m. So RA′(v
′) ≥ m follows from x′1(v′) = x1(v). Case (2):
x2(v)f2(v1) ≥ T , the analysis for this case is similar to previous case by changing from
bidder 1 to bidder 2. Case (3): x1(v)f1(v2) < T and x2(v)f2(v1) < T , then it must
be the case that x1(v) = x2(v) = 1 and f1(v2) + f2(v1) ≥ T since RA(v) ≥ T . Thus
it is sufficient to show that g1(f1(v2)) + g2(f2(v1)) ≥ m. Let i be the index such that
vi1 = f1(v2). Since f1(v2) < T and f2(v1) ≥ T − f1(v2), we have g1(f1(v2)) = i and
g2(f2(v1)) ≥ m− i. Combine both cases, we get RA(v) ≥ T implies RA′(v′) ≥ m. The
other part of the proof follows by similar arguments.
Given an instance I and g1, g2 defined as above, we say a truthful auction with
pricing functions (f1, f2) for I is regular if g1(vi1) = g1(vk1 ) implies f2(vi1) = f2(vk1 ) for all
i, k ∈ {0, . . . , |V1|} and g2(vj2) = g2(v`2) implies f1(vi1) = f1(v`1) for all j, ` ∈ {0, . . . , |V2|}.
To put it in words, if two valuations have the same image in g1 or g2, then the pricing
functions take the same value on them.
Next we show that there always exists a regular optimal truthful auction. Given an
optimal auction A = (f1, f2), it is w.l.o.g. to assume that f1(v2) ≤ T and f2(v1) ≤ T
for all v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈ V2 otherwise we can decrease the value of f1 or f2 to T without
decreasing the probability to get the target revenue T . Suppose that g1(v
i
1) = g1(v
k
1 )
and f2(v
i
1) 6= f2(vk1 ) for some i, k. W.l.o.g. we assume Pr[v1 = vi1] > 0 and Pr[v1 =
vk1 ] > 0 otherwise we can made them equal without decreasing the probability. Since
g1(v
i
1) = g1(v
k
1 ), we have v
i
1 ≥ T and vk1 ≥ T by the definition of g1. Now we modify A to
a new auction B by only changing the value of f2(v
i
1) to f2(v
k
1 ). It suffices to show that
the performance should be the same. Recall that RA1 (v) and R
A
2 (v) denote the revenue
of A from bidder 1 and bidder 2 respectively when the profile is v. Since f1(v2) ≤ T ,
we have RA1 (v
i
1, v2) = R
A
1 (v
k
1 , v2) for any v2 ∈ V2. Moreover, RA1 (v) = RB1 (v) since the
pricing function for bidder 1 are the same in A and B. Also note that RA2 (v
k
1 , v2) =
RB2 (v
i
1, v2) since the pricing function of bidder 2 in B has value f2(v
k
1 ) on v
i
1. Suppose
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to the contrary that the probability to get revenue T decreases in B. Since we only
change the value of f2(v
i
1), it is Pr[R
B(v) ≥ T |v1 = vi1] < Pr[RA(v) ≥ T |v1 = vi1].
Since the bidders are independent, we get∑
j≤|V2|
Pr[v2 = v
j
2] · 1RA1 (vi1,vj2)+RA2 (vi1,vj2)≥T >
∑
j≤|V2|
Pr[v2 = v
j
2] · 1RB1 (vi1,vj2)+RB2 (vi1,vj2)≥T
where 1cond is the indicator function of the condition cond, i.e. it is 1 if cond is true and
0 otherwise. Since RB1 (v
i
1, v2) = R
A
1 (v
i
1, v2) = R
A
1 (v
k
1 , v2) and R
A
2 (v
k
1 , v2) = R
B
2 (v
i
1, v2),∑
j≤|V2|
Pr[v2 = v
j
2] · 1RA1 (vi1,vj2)+RA2 (vi1,vj2)≥T >
∑
j≤|V2|
Pr[v2 = v
j
2] · 1RA1 (vk1 ,vj2)+RA2 (vk1 ,vj2)≥T
which contradicts with the optimality of A since we can set f2(v
k
1 ) = f2(v
i
1) in A and
increase the probability of getting T . So we can modify A to satisfy that g1(v
i
1) = g1(v
k
1 )
implies f2(v
i
1) = f2(v
k
1 ). For the other part that g2(v
j
2) = g2(v
`
2) implies f1(v
i
1) = f1(v
`
1),
we can use similar arguments. The only difference is that if g2(v
j
2) = g2(v
`
2), we cannot
get R2(v
i
1, v
j
2) = R2(v
i
1, v
`
2). But since R1(v) will only take values in V1, we have
R1(v
i
1, v
j
2) + R2(v
i
1, v
j
2) ≥ T ⇔ R1(vi1, v`2) + R2(vi1, v`2) ≥ T by the definition of g2.
Roughly speaking, vj2 and v
`
2 have no difference, if we only care whether the revenue is
at least T or not. Then existence of regular optimal truthful auctions follows by using
above arguments for f2 on f1.
After that, we will show there exists a mapping from any regular truthful auction
A for I to a truthful auction A′ for I ′ such that A and A′ have the same performance.
Formally, for any regular truthful auction A = (f1, f2) for I, let A′ = (f ′1, f ′2) be
a truthful auction for I ′ such that f ′1(j) = g1(f1(g−12 (j)) for all j = 0, . . . ,m and
f ′2(i) = g2(f2(g
−1
1 (i)) for all i = 0, . . . ,m. We will show that Prv∼D[RA(v) ≥ T ] =
Prv′∼D′ [RA′(v′) ≥ m]. Note that unlike the previous mapping, we require the regularity
of A in this mapping. The proof of this mapping follows from similar arguments in the
proof of the previous mapping by using regular condition for the valuations that have
the same image in g1 or g2.
Finally, we prove (c) by using above two mappings. Given an optimal truthful
auction A′ for I ′, we use the first mapping to get a truthful auction A. Suppose to
the contrary that A is not optimal for I, then there exits a regular optimal truthful
auction B which has better performance than A. We use the second mapping on B to
get a truthful auction B′ for I ′. By the property of these two mappings, we have the
performance of B and B′ are the same and better than A and A′ which contradicts
with the optimality of A′.
For the rest of this section, we assume V1 = V2 = {0, . . . ,m} and T = m. We
also use qi1 and q
j
2 to denote probabilities Pr[v1 = i] and Pr[v2 = j] respectively and
R(i, j) to be the revenue from the profile (i, j). Regarding pricing functions, we can
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assume f1(0) = m and f2(0) = m, since otherwise we can increase f1(0) or f2(0) to
m without loss of the objective. In the following lemmas, we show that there exists
an optimal auction with several nice properties. The first one is monotonicity of f1
and f2. Intuitively, the lemma says once one bidder’s valuation increases, the seller
will get more revenue from this bidder and set a lower price for the other bidder as a
consequence.
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(a) The dotted line shows the mod-
ified form of f2 by setting f2(i) =
k + 1 if R(i, k) < m. Otherwise, if
R(i, k) ≥ m, the dashed line shows
the modification by setting f2(i +
1) = k.
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(b) The illustration of partitions Ui
and profiles with revenue at least m
in A (marked by shaded squares).
The vertical and horizontal bold
lines are f1 and f2 respectively.
Figure 4.1: Illustrations of the proof of Lemma 4.5.
We use a grid to illustrate all the profiles in D. The square (i, j) is the profile v1 = i
and v2 = j. The bold lines in the grid denote the value of pricing functions f1 or f2. If
square (i, j)’s left (or bottom) boundary is bold, that means f1(j) = i (or f2(i) = j).
Lemma 4.5. There exists an optimal truthful auction for two independent bidders such
that the pricing functions are monotonically non-increasing.
Proof. Let A = (f1, f2) be an optimal auction. Suppose that f1 and f2 are not non-
increasing. We exhibit a procedure to modify f2 to be non-increasing without changing
f1 or the performance of A. A similar procedure can then be used to modify f1, so the
lemma follows by applying the procedure to f1 and f2. Before presenting the proof, we
introduce a new notation S(i, j) defined as {j′ ∈ {0, . . . ,m}|R1(i, j′) + 1j′≥j · j ≥ T}.
Intuitively, the set S(i, j) includes all the valuations of bidder 2 such that the revenue
is at least T when v1 = i and f2(i) is re-set to j. Recall that q
j
2 is the probability
of v2 = v
j
2. We claim that
∑
j∈S(i,f2(i)) q
j
2 ≥
∑
j∈S(i,j′) q
j
2 for any i, j
′ ∈ {0, . . . ,m}.
Otherwise, the performance of A can be increased by changing f2(i) to j
′.
Suppose f2 is increasing for some i, i.e., f2(i) < f2(i+ 1). For simplicity of presen-
tation, we use k and t to be the values of f2(i) and f2(i + 1). So when we use f2(i)
or f2(i+ 1) below, we are referring the modification of f2, not the values of them. By
Proposition 4.1 and the hypothesis that f2 is increasing at i, we know k < t ≤ m.
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We describe our procedure as illustrated in Figure 4.1(a). If R(i, k) < m, equiva-
lently k + R1(i, k) < m, we increase f2(i) to k + 1. Obviously, this modification will
only decrease the revenue for profile (i, k). Since R(i, k) < m before the adjustment,
this modification dose not decrease the objective, i.e. the probability to get the target
revenue m.
If R(i, k) ≥ m, equivalently k + R1(i, k) ≥ m, we decrease f2(i + 1) from t to
k. We will show that the objective will not decrease after this adjustment. By the
independence of D and the definition of S, it is sufficient to prove
∑
j∈S(i+1,k) q
j
2 ≥∑
j∈S(i+1,t) q
j
2. In order to prove this, we partition the set {0, . . . ,m} into three parts
associated with the value k: U1 = {j|j < k}, U2 = {j|j ≥ k and f1(j) = i + 1} and
U3 = {j|j ≥ k and f1(j) 6= i+ 1}. See Figure 4.1(b) for an illustration.
If j ∈ U1, we get j < k < t since f2 is increasing on i. Thus, the revenue from
bidder 2 is 0 when v1 = i or v1 = i+ 1, i.e. R2(i, j) = R2(i+ 1, j) = 0. Then we have
R1(i, j) + R2(i, j) ≥ m iff R1(i, j) ≥ m that will not be effected by changing f2(i). So
we can see S(i, k) ∩ U1 = S(i, t) ∩ U1 and similarly S(i+ 1, k) ∩ U1 = S(i+ 1, t) ∩ U1.
If j ∈ U2, we get R1(i, j) = 0 and R1(i + 1, j) = i + 1 by f1(j) = i + 1. Then we
have R1(i+ 1, j) +1j≥k ·k = i+ 1 +k > R1(i, k) +k ≥ m since the revenue from bidder
1 cannot be higher than his valuation. Thus, S(i + 1, k) ∩ U2 = U2 ⊇ S(i + 1, t) ∩ U2.
On the other hand, R1(i, j) +R2(i, j) = R2(i, j) = k < m. So S(i, k) ∩ U2 = ∅.
If j ∈ U3, we have R1(i, j) = R1(i + 1, j) by f1(j) 6= i + 1. So S(i + 1, k) ∩ U3 =
S(i, k) ∩ U3 and S(i+ 1, t) ∩ U3 = S(i, t) ∩ U3. So by optimality of f2, we have∑
j∈S(i+1,k)∩U3
qj2 =
∑
j∈S(i,k)∩U3
qj2 =
∑
j∈S(i,k)
qj2 −
∑
j∈S(i,k)∩U1
qj2
≥
∑
j∈S(i,t)
qj2 −
∑
j∈S(i,t)∩U1
qj2 ≥
∑
j∈S(i,t)∩U3
qj2 =
∑
j∈S(i+1,t)∩U3
qj2
The second equality is due to S(i, k) ∩ U2 = ∅ and the first inequality follows from the
optimality of f2 and S(i, k) ∩ U1 = S(i, t) ∩ U1.
Combining all together, we have shown that
∑
j∈S(i+1,k) q
j
2 ≥
∑
j∈S(i+1,t) q
j
2 by
considering each partition separately. Thus, setting f2(i+1) = k when k+R1(i, k) ≥ m
will not decrease the objective function. Therefore, f2 can be made non-increasing by
repeating this procedure.
By Lemma 4.4 we assume the valuations of both bidders are in {0, . . . ,m} and the
target revenue is m. So for any profile v such that v1 < m and v2 < m, the seller must
sell items to both bidders to achieve the target revenue. Based on this observation, we
are able to show another property of f1 and f2.
Lemma 4.6. There exists an optimal truthful auction A = (f1, f2) for two independent
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bidders such that f1 is non-increasing and for any i ∈ {0, . . . ,m},
f2(i) =

m if ∀j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, i < f1(j)
j if ∃j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, f1(j) ≤ i < f1(j − 1)
f2(m− 1) if ∀j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, i ≥ f1(j), i.e. i = m since f1(0) = m
Proof. Given an optimal auction A = (f1, f2) that satisfies Lemma 4.5. We describe
how to modify A to satisfy the conditions in this lemma. If i < f1(m), for any j, we
have i < f1(m) ≤ f1(j) by the monotonicity of f1. Thus R1(i, j) = 0 then setting
f2(i) = m is the only choice to raise revenue m. For i such that f1(j) ≤ i < f1(j − 1)
for some j, we consider the following two cases if f2(i) 6= j.
Case (1): f2(i) < j. Then for all i
′ ≤ i such that f2(i′) < j, we change f2(i′) to
j as shown in Figure 4.2(a). It is clear that f2 is still monotone. By doing this, we
only decrease the revenue for profiles (i′, j′) with i′ described above and j′ such that
f2(i) ≤ j′ ≤ j − 1. We claim that the seller cannot raise a revenue m in A for these
profiles. This is because f1(j
′) ≥ f1(j − 1) > i ≥ i′, equivalently R1(i′, j′) = 0 and
f2(i
′) ≤ f2(i) < j ≤ m equivalently R2(i′, j′) < m by the monotonicity of f2. That is,
the seller didn’t sell the item to bidder 1 in A and raised a revenue at most f2(i
′) < m
from bidder 2.
Case (2): f2(i) > j. Then we change f1(j) to i + 1 as shown in Figure 4.2(b). It
is easy to check it is still monotone since i + 1 ≤ f1(j − 1). By doing this, we only
decrease the revenue for the profile (i′, j) with i′ such that f1(j) ≤ i′ ≤ i. Similarly,
we claim that the seller cannot raise the target revenue in A for these profiles since
f2(i
′) ≥ f2(i) > j and f1(j) < f1(j − 1) ≤ m.
If i ≥ f1(j) for all j, it must be i = m since f1(0) = m. So setting f2(m) = f2(m−1)
is well defined. Obviously, the modified f2 is monotone. It is also optimal because
for i = m − 1, by above result, we have f1(f2(m − 1) − 1) > m − 1. So for all
f2(m) ≤ j < f2(m − 1), we have f1(j) ≥ f1(f2(m − 1) − 1) > m − 1, i.e. f1(j) = m.
Hence, increasing f2(m) to f2(m − 1) will not effect the seller to get the revenue m
from these profiles.
Combining all these together, we define the procedure and the lemma follows by
repeating it.
Intuitively, the optimal auction described in the above lemma divides all profiles
into four areas. In area one, the auction allocates nothing and in area two it sells both
items. In area three (or four), the auction only sells a single copy with a price m to
bidder 1 (or bidder 2). In addition, as shown in Figure 4.3, the values of f2 in this
auction only depend on f1. Thus, in order to design the optimal auction, we only need
to find the optimal f1, then a suitable f2 follows by Lemma 4.6. Before characterizing
the optimal f1, we introduce some new notations. Given a non-increasing function f1,
let J ⊆ [m] be the set of indices such that f2(j) < f2(j − 1). We denote the set J by
{j1, j2, . . . , j|J |} with an increasing order, i.e. j` < j`+1. Let i` = f1(j`) as illustrated
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(b) Modification when f2(i) > j.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of the proof of Lemma 4.6
in Fig 4.4. We also define i0 = j|J |+1 = m+ 1 for simplicity. Then for all ` = 1, . . . , |J |
and j` ≤ j < j`+1, f1(j) = i` by the definition of j`. In addition, for all ` = 1, . . . , |J |
and i` ≤ i < i`−1, f2(i) = j` by Lemma 4.6. This is because j` is the j such that
f1(j) ≤ i < f1(j − 1). Then we can prove the following lemma.
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of the compu-
tation of f2 for a given f1 based on
Lemma 4.6.
Again, the vertical bold lines are f1
and the horizontal dashed lines are the
resulting f2. We also mark the four
areas mentioned in the text.
bidder 1 value
b
id
d
er
2
va
lu
e
i1i2i3
j1
j2
j3
Figure 4.4: Illustration of the definition
of the set J .
The values j` and i` when the pricing
functions f1 and f2 are given as
vertical and horizontal bold lines
respectively. The shawed squares
illustrate the profiles with revenue at
least m.
Lemma 4.7. There exists an optimal auction A = (f1, f2) such that i` + j` = m for
all ` = 1, . . . , |J | where i` and j` are defined by f1 as above.
Proof. Given an optimal auction A = (f1, f2) satisfying Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6,
we define a procedure to change A to satisfy this lemma as well. If i` + j` < m for
some ` ∈ [|J |], it is easy to see that R(i`, j`) = i` + j` < m. So increasing f1(j`) by 1
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will not decrease the objective. Obviously, after this modification, f1 is still monotone
since f1(j` − 1) > f1(j`) by the definition of j`. After repeating this modification, we
get an auction such that i` + j` ≥ m for all ` ∈ [|J |].
Now we describe the procedure by induction on `. For the basic case ` = 1, we
make i1 + j1 = m by setting f1(j) = m − j1 for all j ≥ j1 such that f1(j) > m − j1
and changing f2 according to Lemma 4.6 as shown in Figure 4.5(a). It is obvious that
the resulting f1 is still non-increasing. Then it suffices to show this modification will
not decease the objective. We prove this by two steps. In the first step, we show
that the changes of f1 (without changing f2) will not decrease the objective. By the
calculation above this lemma, f2(i) ≥ f2(m) = j1 for all i. If A get the revenue m
for any profile (i, j) with j ≥ j1 and f1(j) > m − j1, we must have R2(i, j) ≥ j1 since
R1(i, j) ≤ f1(j) ≤ f1(j1) < f1(j1−1) ≤ m. So by setting f1(j) to m−j1, the seller could
also get the revenue m for these profiles. This completes the first step. In the second
step, we show that after changing f1, the changes of f2 according to Lemma 4.6 will
not decrease the objective. Note that the changes we made on f2 are setting f2(i
′) = j1
for all m − j1 ≤ i′ < i1. For all such i′, the revenue from bidder 1 did not change for
the case when v1 = i1 and v1 = i
′, i.e. R1(i1, j′) = R1(i′, j′) for all j′ ∈ {0, . . . ,m}. So
setting f2(i
′) = j1 is also an optimal choice by the independence of the distribution and
the optimality of A (the arguments are identical to the ones for proving the existence
of regular auctions in the proof of Lemma 4.4).
Inductive step: similar with the modification in base, we make i` + j` = m by
setting f1(j) = m− j` for all j ≥ j` such that f1(j) > m− j` and changing f2 according
to Lemma 4.6 as shown in Figure 4.5(b). It is obvious that the resulting f1 is still
non-increasing and this modification will not change the value of {j1, . . . , j`−1} and
{i1, . . . , i`−1}. So it suffices to show this modification will not decease the objective.
First, we show that for all i ≥ i`−1 and j ≥ j`, the seller cannot get the target revenue
from (i, j). By the calculation before this lemma and the induction hypothesis, we have
R2(i, j) ≤ f2(i) ≤ j`−1 = m− i`−1. On the other hand R1(i, j) ≤ f1(j) ≤ f1(j`) = i` <
i`−1. So the revenue R(i, j) is R1(i, j) +R2(i, j) < m. Then the inductive step follows
from similar arguments in the base case by ignoring all the profiles (i, j) with i ≥ i`−1
and j ≥ j`.
Therefore, we can get the desired auction by applying this procedure from ` = 1 to
|J | and complete the proof of the Lemma.
By the above lemma, we can characterize the optimal auction by only using the
set J , i.e. the values of {j1, . . . , j|J |}. Given the set J , we can compute f1 and f2 by
Lemma 4.7 and 4.6 respectively. Based on this characterization, we are able to show
the main theorem in this section.
Theorem 4.8. Given a distribution D = D1 ×D2 for two independent bidders and a
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of the proof of Lemma 4.7
target revenue for the seller, an optimal truthful auction can be found in time O(m3)
where m = min{|D1|, |D2|}.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, it suffices to show the result for the case of V1 = V2 = {0, . . . ,m}
and T = m. Then, by Lemma 4.7, we only need to consider the auctions satisfying the
conditions in Lemma 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. Actually, any such auction can be represented
by a set J ⊆ {0, . . . ,m} denoted by {j1, . . . , j|J |} such that 0 < j1 <, . . . , < j|J | < m.
Then we can set i` = m − j` by Lemma 4.7 and compute the non-decreasing pricing
function f1 according to {i`} and {j`}, and the other function f2 by Lemma 4.6. Note
that if J = ∅, that is f1(j) = f2(i) = m for all i, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}.
Given an auction defined by a set J , for any profile (i, j) such that R(i, j) ≥ m, it
should be in one of the three cases: (1) R1(i, j) = m (2) R2(i, j) = m (3) R1(i, j) < m
and R2(i, j) < m. For the case (1), it must be j = m and f2(i) = m. By Lemma 4.7,
we have i < f1(j1) = i1. For the case (2), it must be i = m and f1(j) = m. By the
definition of j`, we have j > j|J |. For the case (3), there must exists ` ∈ [|J |] such that
f1(j) = i` and f2(i) = j`. Then we have i` ≤ i < i`−1 and j` ≤ j < j`+1. Therefore
given J , we can mark all the profiles where the raised revenue is at least m as shown
in Figure 4.4.
The above analysis allow us to express the probability of getting the target revenue
as a function of {j1, . . . , j|J |} if J 6= ∅. For convenience, let q(i−, i+, j−, j+) be the
probability that i− ≤ v1 < i+ and j− ≤ v2 < j+ and i` = m − j`. We also use J<`
(or J≥`) to denote the subset of J where the elements are less than j` (or at least j`).
Then the probability Prv∼D[R(v) ≥ T ] can be expressed as
q(m,m+ 1, 0, j1) + q(0, i|J |,m,m+ 1) +
∑
`∈[|J |]
q(i`, i`−1, j`, j`+1) (∗)
So to design the optimal auction is equivalent to maximizing above formula. Note that
any term in Formula (∗) that contains j` as a variable, only contain j`−1 and j`+1 as
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other variables. This allows us to show the optimal substructure of this problem. That
is, if J maximizes formula (∗), J≥` also maximize the part of formula (∗) that only
contains J≥` as variables given the value of j`−1. This is because otherwise we can
improve the value of formula (∗) by setting J≥` optimally without changing J<`.
Based on this observation, we are able to develop a dynamic programming for this
problem. For any i ∈ [m] and k ∈ [i−1] we define W [i, k] to be the optimal probability
you can get when v1 < i, v2 > m− i, f2(i) = m− i and f2(i− 1) = m− k. Intuitively,
we solve the optimal auction for all profiles by breaking it down into the sub-problems
for profiles with v1 < i and v2 > m − i and the values i and k satisfies f2(i) = m − i
and f2(i − 1) = m − k. That is j`−1 = m − i and j` = m − k for some `. If we only
consider the profiles with v1 < i, v2 > m− i, the probability is the part of Formula (∗)
that only contains J≥` as variables. So we can compute W [i, k] recursively as follows
based on the optimal substructure of Formula (∗).
W [i, k] = max
{
q(0, k,m,m+ 1) + q(k, i,m− k,m+ 1)
W [k, t] + q(k, i,m− k,m− t) 1 ≤ t < k
The first line in the maximum is to consider the case that k = m− j|J |, i.e. k is the last
element in J and the second line is for the other case that j` = m−k and j`+1 = m− t.
Then the final solution is
max

q(m,m+ 1, 0,m+ 1) + q(0,m,m,m+ 1)
q(m,m+ 1, 0,m− i) + q(0, i,m,m+ 1) + q(i,m+ 1,m− i,m+ 1) 1 ≤ i < m
W [i, k] + q(m,m+ 1, 0, i) + q(i,m+ 1,m− i,m− k) 1 ≤ k < i < m
The first line is to consider the case that J = ∅, that is f1(j) = f2(i) = m for all
i, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}. The second line is to consider the case that J is a singleton, i.e.
|J | = 1. The last line is for the other case, i.e. |J | ≥ 2. The correctness of the dynamic
programming follows from the optimal substructure of Formula (∗). Since the number
of states is at most m2 and the time of computing each state is O(m), the running time
is O(m3)
4.4 NP-Completeness for three correlated bidders
In this section, we show that in the case of three correlated bidders, it is NP-complete
to decide whether there exists a truthful auction such that the probability of getting
revenue T is at least Q for the given distribution D and target revenue T . Specifically,
the input of the problem is the distribution D expressed explicitly as its probability
mass function in the size of D, the target revenue T and a probability Q. We state our
main theorem in this section.
Theorem 4.9. It is NP-complete to compute an optimal auction for three correlated
bidders.
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Figure 4.6: Illustration of the dynamic programming.
Proof. Membership in NP follows from noting that any truthful auction A can be
expressed by three pricing functions f1, f2, f3, that use space polynomial in the input
size. So we can guess the values of f1(v2, v3), f2(v1, v3) and f3(v1, v3) for all (v1, v2, v3) ∈
V and then compute the probability of getting revenue T by considering the profiles
one by one.
We show NP-hardness by reducing from the problem Vertex Cover. Given a
graph with G with n vertices labeled {1, 2, . . . , n} and m edges, we construct an instance
with three bidders where the support of the valuation distributions of bidder 1 and
bidder 2 are [n] and bidder 3’s valuation are taken from [n] ∪ {1.5}1. We also set the
target revenue T to be n + 2. Then NP-hardness will be shown in two steps. First
we show NP-hardness for finding an optimal auction for bidders 1 and 2, where bidder
3 has his valuation fixed at v3 = n, but contributes revenue according to a pricing
function h(v1, v2), where h is part of the input. Next we construct a distribution for
v3 < n that endogenizes h in the sense that any truthful auction with good performance
must use h as the pricing function for bidder 3. First of all, we define the particular
function h as follows.
h(v1, v2) =

0 if v1 + v2 ≤ n
1 if v1 + v2 = n+ 1
v1 + v2 − n− 1 if v1 + v2 > n+ 1
Now we consider the profiles with v3 = n. Since h(v1, v2) < n, the revenue from bidder
1Technically the value 1.5 used here can be replaced by any value between 1 and 2.
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Figure 4.7: An example for the construction of the distribution for v3 = n when n = 6.
The numbers 1 and n in the (v1, v2)-pair boxes are proportional to their probabilities.
The corresponding auction is shown on the left if the vertex cover of the graph is
{1, 4, 5} shown as gray nodes on the right.
3 is exactly given by h, i.e. R3(v1, v2, n) = h(v1, v2) for all v1, v2. So the revenue needed
from bidder 1 and 2 to achieve the target revenue n+ 2 is n+ 2−h(v1, v2). Recall that
Pr[v] denotes the probability when the profile is v. For simplicity of presentation, we
work with probabilities higher than 1 that can be normalized by dividing by the sum of
all probabilities later. Given the graph G, we define a correlated distribution as follows
(illustrated in Figure 4.7).
Pr[(v1, v2, n)] =

0 if v1 + v2 ≤ n
1 if v1 + v2 = n+ 1
n if v1 + v2 > n+ 1 and (v1, n+ 1− v2) ∈ E
0 if v1 + v2 > n+ 1 and (v1, n+ 1− v2) 6∈ E
We will show that G has a vertex cover with size at most k < n iff there exists an
auction whose probability to achieve the target revenue is at least m ·n+n−k where m
is the number of edges in G. For necessity, suppose S is a vertex cover for G and |S| ≤ k.
We construct an auction such that f1(v2, n) = n + 2 − v2 if n + 1 − v2 ∈ S otherwise
f1(v2, n) = n+1−v2 and f2(v1, n) = n+2−v1 if v1 ∈ S otherwise f2(v1, n) = n+1−v1.
Moreover we set the pricing function f3 for bidder 3 to be the particular h defined
above. Then for any (v1, v2) such that v1 + v2 > n+ 1 and Pr[(v1, v2, n)] > 0, we have
(v1, n+ 1− v2) ∈ E by the construction of Pr[(v1, v2, n)]. Since S is a vertex cover for
G, we have v1 ∈ S or n + 1 − v2 ∈ S. So the revenue from the profile (v1, v2, n) is
f1(v1, n)+f2(v2, n)+f3(v1, v2) that is at least n+1−v2+n+1−v1+v1+v2−n−1+1 =
n + 2. Thus the probability that these profiles contribute to the event of raising the
target revenue is m · n. On the other hand, for any (v1, v2) such that v1 + v2 = n + 1
and v1 6∈ S, the revenue of the profile (v1, v2, n) is n+ 1− v1 + n+ 1− v2 + 1 = n+ 2.
Therefore the total probability is at least m · n+ n− k.
For the sufficiency, suppose A is an auction whose probability is at least m·n+n−k.
Note that we assume A use h as the pricing function for bidder 3. Let S be the set of
vertices v1 such that A doesn’t get the target revenue from the profile (v1, n+ 1− v1).
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Since the probability achieved by A is at least m·n+n−k and k < n, it is easy to see that
|S| ≤ k and A achieves the target revenue for all profile (v1, v2) with Pr[v1, v2, n] = n.
For any edge (v1, n+ 1− v2) ∈ E, it is w.l.o.g. to assume v1 > n+ 1− v2, i.e., v1 + v2 >
n + 1. Then we have Pr[v1, v2, n] = n by the construction. So the revenue obtained
from this profile by A is at least n+ 2, i.e. f1(v2, n) + f2(v1, n) + f3(v1, v2) ≥ n+ 2. So
we have f1(v2, n) > n+1−v2 or f2(v1, n) > n+1−v1. That is v1 ∈ S or n+1−v2 ∈ S.
Therefore S is a vertex cover of G.
Next, we show how to construct the distribution for v3 < n such that any auction
with good performance must use h be the pricing function for bidder 3. We divide all
profiles into n+1 layers according to the value of v3. In layer 0, v3 = 1; in layer 1, v3 =
1.5; and for all k = 2, . . . , n, v3 = k. The general idea is to use layer k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}
to make f3 equal to h on the profiles (v1, v2) such that v1 + v2 = n+ 1 + k. Finally, we
use the last layer n (when v3 = n) to encode the vertex cover instance as described
above.
We present the inductive construction of the layers from 1 to n − 1. For layer 0,
only the profiles on the diagonal have positive probabilities, i.e. Pr[(v1, v2, 1)] = n iff
v1 + v2 = n + 1. So in order to get all the probabilities in this layer, the auction
must set the pricing function for bidder 3 as f3(v1, v2) = 1 for all (v1, v2) such that
v1 + v2 = n+ 1.
For layer 1, we first set Pr[(v1, n+2−v1, 1.5)] = n for all v1 ∈ [n] and Pr[(v1, n+1−
v1, 1.5)] = n for all odd v1. We will show in order to get all the positive probabilities
from layer 0 and layer 1, the auction must set f3(v1, v2) = 1 for all v1 +v2 = n+2. Note
that for any (v1, v2) such that v1 + v2 = n+ 2, either v1 is odd or n+ 1− v2 = v1 − 1
is odd. That is either Pr[(v1, v2 − 1, 1.5)] = n or Pr[(v1 − 1, v2, 1.5)] = n by the
construction. Since f3(v1, v2 − 1) = f3(v1 − 1, v2) = 1 by the construction of layer 0,
we have either f2(v1, n) = v2 − 1 or f1(v2, n) = v1 − 1 to guarantee the auction get all
probabilities in layer 1. That is f1(v2, n) + f2(v1, n) = v1 + v2 − 1 = n+ 1. So we need
to set f3(v1, v2) ≥ 1 to get the target revenue. Since v3 = 1.5 in this layer, the value
of f3(v1, v2) cannot be higher than 1.5. By Proposition 4.1, it is w.l.o.g. to set it 1
because the target revenue and the valuations of the other bidders are integers.
Finally, for layer k ≥ 2, we set Pr[(v1, v2, 1.5)] = n for all v1 + v2 = n + 1 + k.
Then We construct a graph G′ with n vertices labeled by [n] and a set of edges denoted
by E such that (v1, v2) ∈ E iff v1 + n + 1 − v2 = n + 1 + k as shown in Figure 4.8.
Since the graph consists of k chains, there exists an exact cover S′ for this graph. That
is for each (v1, v2) ∈ E, one and only one of {v1, v2} is in S′. Actually this can be
proven constructively by setting S′ = {1, 2, . . . , k, 2k+ 1, 2k+ 2, . . . , 3k, . . . } as labeled
in Figure 4.8. Given this exact cover S′, we define the distribution for layer k as follows:
Pr[(v1, n+ 1− v1, k)] = n for all v1 ∈ S′ and Pr[(v1, n+ 2− v1, k)] = n if n+ 1− v2 6∈ S′
or v1 6∈ S′ as shown in Figure 4.8. Intuitively, we construct the distribution such
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Figure 4.8: An illustration for the construction of layer k.
The gray vertices form the exact cover S when n is a multiple of k and n/k is even.
The left graph shows the construction and optimal auction when n = 8 and k = 4.
that for any (v1, v2) with v1 + v2 = n + 1 + k, either Pr[(v1, n + 1 − v1, k)] = n and
Pr[(n+2−v2, v2, k)] = n or Pr[(v1, n+2−v1, k)] = n and Pr[(n+1−v2, v2, k)] = n. These
profiles will restrict the values of f1(v2, k) and f2(v1, k). Furthermore, we require for any
(v1, n+2−v1) with positive probability, not both (v1, n+1−v1) and (v1−1, n+2−v1)
have positive probabilities to guarantee that f2(v1, k) + f1(n+ 2− v1, k) ≥ n+ 1.
Now we prove that in order to get all the probabilities in first n layers from layer
0 to layer n − 1, the auction must set h to be the pricing function for bidder 3. Let
A = (f1, f2, f3) be the auction that gets the target revenue for all profiles with positive
probabilities. It suffices to show f3(v1, v2) = h(v1, v2) for all (v1, v2) such that v1 +v2 ≥
n + 1 since no profile with v1 + v2 < n + 1 has positive probability. Recall that we
have shown f3(v1, v2) = h(v1, v2) for all v1 + v2 = n + 1 + k when k = 0 and k = 1.
We will prove this for any k ∈ {2, . . . , n} base on the results for k = 0 and k = 1.
If the auction get the revenue n + 2 for the profile (v1, n + 1 − v1, k), it must be
f1(n + 1 − v1, k) = v1 and f2(v1, k) = n + 1 − v1 since f3(v1, v2) = 1. Similarly, since
f3(v1, n+2−v1) = 1, if the auction get the revenue n+2 for the profile (v1, n+2−v1, k),
it must be f1(n+2−v1, k) ≤ v1 and f2(v1, k) ≤ n+2−v1. By the construction of layer
k and the property of exact cover, for any (v1, v2) such that v1 + v2 = n+ 1 + k, either
Pr[(v1, n + 1− v1, k)] = n and Pr[(n + 2− v2, v2, k)] = n or Pr[(v1, n + 2− v1, k)] = n
and Pr[(n + 1 − v2, v2, k)] = n. So the revenue from bidder 1 and bidder 2 is at most
n+ 1− v1 + n+ 2− v2 = n+ 2− k. To achieve the target revenue n+ 2, the price for
bidder 3 must be k. Therefore, we show that f3(v1, v2) = h(v1, v2) for all (v1, v2) such
that v1 + v2 ≥ n+ 1.
Combining the construction for v3 = n and v3 < n, we can easily show that the
graph G has a vertex cover with size at most k iff there exists a truthful auction can
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get the probability m · n + n − k + s · n where s is the total number of profiles with
positive probabilities when v3 < n.
We are able to show a similar NP-completeness result for risk-averse sellers
Theorem 4.10. It is NP-complete to compute the optimal utility auction to maximize
a concave function of the revenue for three correlated bidders.
Proof. Its membership in NP is obvious by similar arguments in the proof of The-
orem 4.9. We prove NP-hardness by reducing from the following 3D-point-cover
problem.
Problem 1 (Problem 6.3 in [49]). Given a set S of n points (xi, yi, zi)(i = 1, ..., n)
and an integer k, recognize whether there exist k lines parallel to the axes whose union
contains S.
Given an instance of 3D-point-cover problem in [2..n]3, we construct the fol-
lowing valuation distribution and concave utility function. u(x) = x if x ≤ 4 and
u(x) = 4 otherwise. Pr[(1, 1, 1)] = n9, Pr[(x, 1, 1)] = Pr[(1, y, 1)] = Pr[(1, 1, z)] = n7
and Pr[(1, y, z)] = Pr[(x, 1, z)] = Pr[(x, y, 1)] = 1. In addition, Pr[(x, y, z)] = n3
if (x, y, z) ∈ S and 0 otherwise. It is easy to see that the optimal auction will set
f1(1, 1) = f2(1, 1) = f3(1, 1) = 1 to get utility 3 from (1, 1, 1) and f1(1, z) = f1(y, 1) =
f2(x, 1) = f2(1, z) = f3(x, 1) = f3(1, y) = 1 to get utility 3 from (x, 1, 1), (1, y, 1) and
(1, 1, z) for any x, y, z ≥ 2.
We will show that the optimal utility for this instance is at least 3n9 + 3n7(n −
1) + 4n3 · |S|+ 9(n− 1)2− k iff there exists a k cover for the corresponding 3D-point-
cover instance. For sufficiency, suppose there exists a k cover K for the instance. We
construct the following auction where f1(x, y) = 2 if the line of (x, y) is in the cover,
and f1(x, y) = 1 otherwise. It is easy to check for any (x, y, z) with positive probability,
at least one of (x, y), (y, z), (x, z) is 2, so the revenue is at least 4. So the total utility is
3n9 + 3n7(n− 1) + 4n3 · |S|+ 9(n− 1)2− k. For necessity, if there exists an auction has
utility 3n9 + 3n7(n− 1) + 4n3 · |S|+ 9(n− 1)2 − k, let K be the set of all f1(y, z) > 1.
It is easy to check this is a point cover for the instance.
4.5 NP-hardness for n independent bidders
In this section, we show that in the case of independent bidders, it is NP-hard to
decide whether there exists a truthful auction such that the probability of getting the
revenue T is at least Q for the given distribution D. More specifically, the input is the
independent distribution D = ×iDi with each Di expressed explicitly, a target revenue
T and a probability Q. In contract with Section 4.4, a truthful auction for n bidders
cannot necessarily be represented succinctly in space polynomial in the input size even
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if each bidder has only two possible valuations. The following is our main theorem in
this section.
Theorem 4.11. It is NP-hard to compute the optimal auction for independent bidders
even when each bidder has only two possible valuations, i.e. |Vi| = 2.
Proof. We prove this theorem in two steps. First, we show that it is NP-hard to compute
the optimal monopoly pricing auction. Then we show that in the hard instance for
optimal monopoly pricing, the existence of a truthful auction with good performance
is equivalent to the existence of a monopoly pricing auction with good performance.
Recall that in the monopoly pricing auction, the seller specifies a threshold price
for each bidder independent of any other buyers’ bids. So this type of auction can be
represented by a pricing vector (p1, . . . , pn) where pi denotes the monopoly price for
bidder i. We reduce from the subset-sum problem. That is given a set of positive
integers denoted by a1, . . . , an, ask if there is a subset S such that
∑
i∈S ai = K for
some positive integer K.
Given an instance of subset-sum, we construct the following instance for optimal
auction design. Let H =
∑
i ai + 1 and W = maxi{ai}. It is w.l.o.g. to assume
K ≤ nW . For each integer ai in the subset-sum instance, we construct a bidder i
whose valuation is H with probability qi = ai · ε and H + ai with probability 1 − qi
where ε = 2−n/W 2. We also set the target revenue T to be nH +K. Since H >
∑
i ai,
the revenue reaches the target only if every bidder wins an item and pays at least H.
By Proposition 4.1, the value of pi should be either H or H + ai. We will show that
there exists a subset with sum K if and only if there exists a truthful auction with
performance at least 1−Kε in the constructed instance.
For necessity, given a set S such that
∑
i∈S ai = K. We set pi = H+ai for all i ∈ S.
Then the performance of the auction is
∑
i∈S(1− qi) ≥ 1− ε ·
∑
i∈S ai ≥ 1−Kε. For
sufficiency, given a monopoly pricing auction A with performance at least 1−Kε. Let
S be the set of bidders such that pi = H + ai. Since
∑
i pi ≥ T , we have
∑
i∈S ai ≥ K.
On the other hand, the probability of getting revenue
∑
i pi is∏
i∈S
(1−qi) ≤ 1−ε ·
∑
i∈S
ai+
∑
i 6=j
qiqj ≤ 1−ε ·
∑
i∈S
ai+O(n
2 ·(ε ·W )2) ≤ 1−ε ·
∑
i∈S
ai+o(ε).
Thus, we have 1 − ε ·∑i∈S ai + o(ε) ≥ 1 −Kε since the performance of A is at least
1−Kε. Hence, ∑i∈S ai ≥ K since K is an integer.
To prove the hardness for any truthful auctions, it suffices to show in the above
instance, there exists a truthful auction with performance at least 1−Kε if and only if
there must exist a monopoly pricing auction whose performance is at least 1−Kε. The
sufficiency is trivial since monopoly pricing auctions are truthful. For the necessity,
given a truthful auction A with performance at least 1 − Kε, since the profile that
all bidders have high values (vi = H + ai) appears with a relatively high probability
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i.e.
∏
i∈[n](1 − qi), the revenue of A should reach the target on this profile. Let S
be the set of bidders who pays strictly higher than H on this profile. Then we have∑
i∈S ai ≥ K. Since A is truthful, we know every bidder i ∈ S cannot wins an items
in the profile that vi = H and vj = H + aj for all j 6= i. So the performance of A is
at most 1−∑i∈S qi∏j 6=i(1− qj) = 1−∑i∈S qi + o(ε). Since the performance of A is
at least 1 −Kε, we have 1 −Kε ≤ 1 −∑i∈S qi + o(ε). By the assumption that K is
an integer, we have
∑
∈S qi ≤ Kε. We construct a monopoly pricing auction by setting
pi = H + ai iff i ∈ S. So its performance is
∏
i∈S(1− qi) ≥ 1−
∑
i∈S qi ≥ 1−Kε since∑
i∈S ai ≥ K.
We are able to show a similar NP-hardness result for risk-averse sellers.
Theorem 4.12. It is NP-hard to compute the optimal utility auction to maximize a
concave function of the revenue for independent bidders.
Proof. We prove the theorem by reducing from subset-sum. That is given a set of
positive integers denoted by a1, . . . , an, we ask if there is a subset S such that
∑
i∈S ai =
K for some positive integer K. Let H =
∑
i ai + 1, W = maxi{ai} and T = n ·H +K.
Consider the following concave function, f(x) = x if x ≤ T , otherwise f(x) = T . We use
the similar distribution in the proof of Theorem 4.11. That is every bidder has valuation
H with probability qi and H+ai with probability 1− qi. We set qi = ε ·ai/(K+ai+1)
where ε = 2−n/(W 2 · T ).
Now we show that there exists a subset with sum K if and only if there exists
a truthful auction with performance at least T − ε · (K + 1/2). For the sufficiency,
suppose there exists a truthful auction A with performance at least T − ε ·W . Let
h denote the profile when all bidders have high values and hi be the profile when all
bidders except i have high values. Since the profile h has a relatively high probability,
i.e. 1 − O(ε), the revenue of A should be at least T on this profile. Otherwise the
performance of A is at most T − 1 + n · ε · T ·K < T − 1 + 2−2n < T − ε · (K + 1/2)
since K ≤ n ·W . Let S be the set of bidders who pays strictly higher than H on the
profile h. We have
∑
i∈S ai ≥ K. Then for each profile hi with i ∈ S, the revenue is
at most (n− 1)H +∑j 6=i aj = nH − ai − 1 = T −K − ai − 1 since H = ∑i ai + 1 and
T = nH + K. So the performance of A is at most T −∑i∈S Pr[hi] · (K + ai + 1) ≤
T −∑i∈S qi ·(K+ai+1)+o(ε). Since the performance of A is at least T −ε ·(K+1/2),
we have
∑
i∈S ai ≤ K by the definition of qi and the fact that {ai}ni=1 and K are
integers. Therefore,
∑
i∈S ai = K.
For the necessity, given a set S such that
∑
i∈S ai = K. We construct a truthful
auction A = (f1, . . . , fn) with performance at least T − ε · (K + 1/2) where fi is
the pricing function for bidder i. Recall that h denotes the profile when all bidders
have high values and hi is the profile when all bidders except i have high values.
In order to define the pricing function fi, we also use h−i to denote the vector of
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valuations except bidder i in profile h. Similarly we also define hi−j to be the vector
of valuations except bidder j in profile hi. Then we set fi(h
j
−i) = H + ai for all
j 6= i and fi(h−i) = H + ai if i ∈ S, otherwise fi(h−i) = H. For the profile h, the
revenue is
∑
i fi(h−i) = nH+
∑
i∈S ai = T . For the profile hi with i 6∈ S, the revenue is∑
j 6=i fj(h
i−j)+fi(h−i) = nH+
∑
j 6=i ai ≥ nH+
∑
j∈S aj = T since h
i
−i = h−i. For the
profile hi with i ∈ S, the revenue is
∑
j 6=i fj(h
i−j) = (n−1)H+
∑
j 6=i aj = T−K−ai−1
since fi(h
i
−i) = fi(h−i) = H + ai > vi. Combining all these together, the performance
of A is at least
(Pr[h] +
∑
i 6∈S
Pr[hi]) · T +
∑
i∈S
Pr[hi] · (T − (K + ai + 1))
=
∏
i∈[n]
(1− qi) +
∑
i 6∈S
qi
∏
j 6=i
(1− qj)
 · T +∑
i∈S
qi
∏
j 6=i
(1− qj) · (T − (K + ai + 1))
≥
1−∑
i∈[n]
qi +
∑
i 6∈S
qi(1−
∑
j 6=i
qj)
 · T +∑
i∈S
qi(1−
∑
j 6=i
qj) · (T − (K + ai + 1))
≥ T −
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j 6=i
qi · qj · T −
∑
i∈S
qi · (K + ai + 1)
= T −
∑
i∈S
ai − o(ε) ≥ T − (K + 1/2) · ε
The first inequality comes from the fact that
∏
i∈[n](1− qi) ≥ 1−
∑
i∈[n] qi and the last
equality is due to qi = ε · ai/(K + ai + 1) and ε = 2−n/(W 2 · T ). Therefore, we prove
the correctness of the reduction and the theorem follows.
4.6 Optimal simple auctions for n independent bidders
In this section, we study the following simple auctions for sellers with a target revenue
when the bidders are independent. In Section 4.6.1, we present an additive FPTAS
for computing approximately optimal sequential posted price auctions with respect to
a fixed order σ. Then in Section 4.6.2 we show an additive PTAS for optimal monopoly
price auctions, in a setting where the seller is restricted to using a constant number of
distinct prices.
4.6.1 Optimal Sequential Posted Price Auction
We first present a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute optimal sequential
posted prices via dynamic programming. Then we show that this algorithm can be
modified to be a FPTAS with respect to additive error. We order the bidders with
respect to the fixed order σ.
Recall that in a sequential posted price mechanism, the seller offers take-it-or-leave-
it prices to the buyers sequentially with respect to a given order σ and the computation
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of the price for buyer i is based on the results of all buyers preceding i, together with the
valuation distributions. Note that the optimal sequential posted price for any sequence
of buyers, performs at least as well as the optimal monopoly price auction. In contrast
with the objective of expected revenue maximization, our objective of a target revenue
means that the price offered to bidder i may depend on the revenue gained from the first
i− 1 bidders. This allows us to solve the problem by the following dynamic program.
Let Q[i, r] be the maximal probability to achieve revenue r by selling items to buyers
from i to n. By Proposition 4.1, it is sufficient to consider the case that pi ∈ Vi where
Vi is the support of buyer i’s valuation distribution. It is easy to see Q[i, r] = 1 if r ≤ 0
and Q[i, r] = 0 if i > n and r > 0. For the other cases when i ≤ n and r > 0 we have
Q[i, r] = max
pi∈Vi
{Q[i+ 1, r − pi] · Pr[vi ≥ pi] +Q[i+ 1, r] · (1− Pr[vi ≥ pi])}.
Thus the maximal probability to achieve target revenue T from all buyers is Q[1, T ].
Note that solving the above dynamic program gives a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm
for the problem. Actually, we can get an additive FPTAS by rounding the dynamic
program properly.
Theorem 4.13. There exists an additive FPTAS for computing approximately optimal
sequential posted price auctions with respect to a fixed order of the buyers. In particular,
given  ∈ (0, 1), an instance I = (D,T ) with n independent buyers and a buyer sequence
σ, an -additive approximately optimal sequential posted price auction with respect to σ
can be computed in time O(m2n2 log n · 1/ log(1/)) where m is the maximal support
size, i.e. maxi∈[n]{|Di|}.
Proof. Recall that in the dynamic program, we use Q[i, r] to denote the maximum
probability to achieve revenue r by selling items to buyers from i to n. Note that
Q[i, r] is a monotone function of r, i.e. Q[i, r] ≥ Q[i, r′] if r ≤ r′. So we are able
to store Q[i, r] in another data structure. Let R[i, q] be the maximum revenue the
seller can get by selling items to buyers from i to n with probability at least q. The
relationship between R[i, q] and Q[i, r] is
R[i, q] = max
r≥0
{r|Q[i, r] ≥ q} and Q[i, r] = max
q∈[0,1]
{q|R[i, q] ≥ r}.
Given a parameter  > 0, let δ = /n and K = b1/δc. We set R[n + 1, kδ] to be
equal to 0 for all k ∈ [K]. Our FPTAS is based on the computation of R[i, kδ] for all
i ∈ [n] and k ∈ [K]. Let QA[i, r] be the value of Q[i, r] output by our algorithm by
making queries to the computed R[i, kδ]. Given the values of R[i, kδ], we can query the
value of QA[i, r] = maxk∈[K]{kδ|R[i, kδ] ≥ r} by using binary search in time logK. If
R[i, kδ] < r for all k ∈ [K], we set QA[i, r] = 0. We say R[i, kδ] determines the value
of QA[i, r] if QA[i, r] = kδ and R[i, kδ] ≥ r. We compute R[i, q] based on R[i + 1, q]
as follows. For any revenue r such that there exists k ∈ [K] and pi ∈ Vi such that
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R[i + 1, kδ] = r or R[i + 1, kδ] = r − pi, we compute Q[i, r] by using the transition
equation in the dynamic program and making queries to R[i + 1, kδ]. Note that this
Q[i, r] is different from QA[i, r] since we have not constructed R[i, kδ] yet. We use
QB[i, r] to denote it. By the transition equation in the dynamic program, we have
QB[i, r] = max
pi∈Vi
{QA[i+ 1, r − pi] · Pr[vi ≥ pi] +QA[i+ 1, r] · (1− Pr[vi ≥ pi])}
We also save two pointers from QB[i, r] to the entries of R[i + 1, kδ] which determine
the values of the corresponding QA[i + 1, r − pi] and QA[i + 1, r]. After that, we use
all values of QB[i, r] to construct R[i, kδ] by setting R[i, kδ] = maxr{r|QB[i, r] ≥ kδ}.
We also save a pointer from R[i, kδ] to QB[i, r] if R[i, kδ] = r. Then we can construct
the sequential posted price auction by tracking back from the entry of R[1, kδ] which
determines the value of QA[1, T ]. Since we are rounding down, it is clear that the
performance of this auction is at least QA[1, T ]. To prove the approximation guarantee
of the algorithm, it suffices to show that QA[1, T ] ≥ QO[1, T ] − n · δ where QO[i, r] is
the original value of Q[i, r] in the instance without rounding.
We first show that QA[i, r] ≥ QB[i, r] − δ for all i ∈ [n] and revenue r such that
there exists k ∈ [K] and pi ∈ Vi such that R[i + 1, kδ] = r or R[i + 1, kδ] = r − pi.
Let k′ ∈ [K] such that k′δ ≤ QB[i, r] < (k′ + 1)δ. Note that R[i, k′δ] ≥ r by the
construction of R[i, kδ]. So by the process of binary search, we have QA[i, r] ≥ k′δ.
Thus, QA[i, r] ≥ QB[i, r]− δ.
Then we are able to show that QA[i, r] ≥ QO[i, r]− (n+ 1− i) · δ for all i ∈ [n] and
r ≥ 0 by induction on i. Base case i = n: For any r ≥ 0, let j be the index such that
vjn ≤ r < vj+1n . By defining v0n = 0 and v|Vn|+1n = +∞, there always exists such j. It is
easy to see QO[n, r] = Pr[vn ≥ r] = Pr[vn ≥ vj+1n ] and
QA[n, r] = QA[n, vj+1n ] ≥ QB[n, vj+1n ]− δ = Pr[vn ≥ vj+1n ]− δ = QO[n, r]− δ.
The second equality is due to the computation of QB[n, vj+1]. That completes the
proof of the base case. For the inductive step from i + 1 to i, given any r > 0, let
pi ∈ Vi be the price for bidder i used in the optimal sequential posted price auction,
i.e.,
QO[i, r] = QO[i+ 1, r − pi] · Pr[vi ≥ pi] +QO[i+ 1, r] · (1− Pr[vi ≥ pi]).
Let r1 be the value R[i + 1, kδ] which determines the value of Q
A[i + 1, r] and r2 be
the value R[i+ 1, k′δ] which determines the value of QA[i+ 1, r− pi]. We consider two
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cases. Case 1: r1 ≤ r2 + pi then we have
QO[i, r] = QO[i+ 1, r − pi] · Pr[vi ≥ pi] +QO[i+ 1, r] · (1− Pr[vi ≥ pi])}
≤ (QA[i+ 1, r − pi] + (n− i)δ) · Pr[vi ≥ pi] + (QA[i+ 1, r] + (n− i)δ) · (1− Pr[vi ≥ pi])}
= QA[i+ 1, r2] · Pr[vi ≥ pi] +QA[i+ 1, r1] · (1− Pr[vi ≥ pi])}+ (n− i)δ
≤ QA[i+ 1, r1 − pi] · Pr[vi ≥ pi] +QA[i+ 1, r1] · (1− Pr[vi ≥ pi])}+ (n− i)δ
≤ QB[i, r1] + (n− i)δ ≤ QA[i, r] + (n+ 1− i)δ
The first inequality is by the induction hypothesis and the equality on the third line
is by the definitions of r1 and r2 and the process of binary search. The second last
inequality comes from the computation of QB[i, r1] and the last inequality are from
QB[i, r1] ≤ QA[i, r1] + δ and the monotonicity of QA. Case 2: r1 > r2 + pi, the
argument are similar by replacing r1 by r2 + pi. Therefore we prove the approximation
guarantee of the algorithm.
Finally, we consider the running time of the algorithm. For each layer i, the total
number of values of revenue r we computed QB[i, r] for is at most m · K. For each
QB[i, r], we need time O(m logK) to enumerate pi ∈ Vi and make queries to R[i+1, kδ].
By summing over all layers, the total running time is O(m2n·K logK) = O(m2n2 log n·
1/ log(1/)).
Remark 1. It should be mentioned that our hardness results in previous sections do
not imply any hardness results here. So our FPTAS might not be tight.
4.6.2 Optimal Monopoly Price Auction
In this section, we present a PTAS for computing the optimal monopoly price auction
when the seller is restricted to a given constant-sized set of distinct prices, and for each
buyer has to select one of those prices for that buyer. Recall that in a monopoly price
auction, the seller offers those take-it-or-leave-it prices to the buyers simultaneously,
and the prices are only based on the valuation distributions. Our PTAS uses results
of [25] on Poisson Binomial Distributions. First of all, we review the definitions and
results. For any two random variables X and Y supported on a finite set A, their total
variation distance is defined as
dTV(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
a∈A
|Pr[X = a]− Pr[Y = a]|.
We use the following result in the proof of Theorems 4.17 and 4.18.
Lemma 4.14 (Lemma 2 in [25]). Let X1, . . . , Xn be mutually independent random
variables, and let Y1, . . . , Yn be mutually independent random variables. Then
dTV(
n∑
i=1
Xi,
n∑
i=1
Yi) ≤
n∑
i=1
dTV(Xi, Yi).
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A distribution is said to be a Poisson Binomial Distribution (PBD) of order n if it
is a discrete probability distribution consisting of the sum of n independent indicator
random variables. The distribution is parameterized by a vector (ri)
n
i=1 ∈ [0, 1]n of
probabilities and is denoted by PBD(r1, . . . , rn). Let Sn be the set of all PBDs of order
n. We review a construction of an efficient and proper -cover for Sn.
Theorem 4.15 (Theorem 1 in [25]). For all n,  > 0, there exists a set Sn, ⊂ Sn such
that
1. Sn, is an -cover of Sn in total variation distance; that is, for all D ∈ Sn, there
exists some D′ ∈ Sn, such that dTV(D,D′) ≤ ,
2. |Sn,| ≤ n2 + n · (1 )O(log
2 1/),
3. Sn, can be computed in time O(n
2 log n) +O(n log n) · (1 )O(log
2 1/).
Moreover, all distributions PBD(r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Sn, in the cover satisfy at least one of
the following properties, for some positive integer t = t() = O(1/).
• (t-sparse form) there is some ` ≤ t3 such that, for all i ≤ `, ri ∈ { 1t2 , 2t2 , . . . , t
2−1
t2
}
and for all i > `, ri ∈ {0, 1}; or
• ((n, t)-Binomial form) there is some ` ∈ [n] and q ∈ { 1n , 2n , . . . , nn} such that, for
all i ≤ `, ri = q and for all i > `, ri = 0; moreover ` and q satisfy `q ≥ t2 and
`q(1− q) ≥ t2 − t− 1.
In words, every PBD can be approximated by either a sparse PBD or a binomial
distribution. Moreover, the following theorem tells us that if the first O(log 1/) mo-
ments of two PBDs are the same, then the total variation distance between them is at
most .
Theorem 4.16 (Theorem 3 in [25]). Let P := (pi)ni=1 ∈ [0, 1/2]n and Q := (qi)ni=1 ∈
[0, 1/2]n be two collections of probability values. Let also X := (Xi)ni=1 and Y := (Yi)ni=1
be two collections of mutually independent indicators with E[Xi] = pi and E[Yi] = qi, for
all i ∈ [n]. If for some d ∈ [n] the following condition is satisfied: ∑ni=1 p`i = ∑ni=1 q`i
for all ` = 1, . . . , d, then
dTV(
∑
i
Xi,
∑
i
Yi) ≤ 13(d+ 1)1/42−(d+1)/2.
It is easy to see that Theorem 4.16 holds if we replace [0, 1/2] with [1/2, 1]. Moreover,
by setting d = O(log 1/), this bound becomes at most . Theorem 4.15 shows that
there exists an efficient cover for the set of all PBDs. However, we cannot directly apply
this theorem to our problem, since (given prices and prior distributions of a problem
instance) the set of associated PBDs (call it S) is a proper subset of Sn, and we need
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to find a cover that consists of a subset of S. Theorem 4.17 is intended to overcome
this obstacle. Given n finite sets W1, . . . ,Wn where Wi ⊂ [0, 1] for all i ∈ [n], let
W = ×ni=1Wi, and let Sn(W ) denote the set of all PBDs such that the probability of
the indicator i is in Wi for all i ∈ [n]. That is Sn(W ) = {PBD(r1, . . . , rn)|(ri)ni=1 ∈W}.
Theorem 4.17. For all n,  > 0 and any n finite subsets of the unit interval W1, . . . ,Wn
let W = ×ni=1Wi. Then there exists a set Sn,(W ) ⊂ Sn(W ) such that
1. Sn,(W ) is an -cover of Sn(W ) in total variation distance; that is, for all D ∈
Sn(W ), there exists some D′ ∈ Sn,(W ) such that dTV(D,D′) ≤ ,
2. Sn,(W ) can be computed in time (n )O(log
2 1/) and has size at most (n )
O(log2 1/).
Proof. For any i ∈ [n] and ri ∈ Wi, we round ri down to a multiple of /n denoted by
r′i. By Lemma 4.14, the total variation distance between the distributions before and
after this rounding is at most . Let d satisfy 13(d+ 1)1/42−(d+1)/2 <  (the expression
is from Theorem 4.16) so that d = O(log 1/). For any PBD(r1, . . . , rn), we define its
moment profile (µ, ν) = (µ1, . . . , µd, ν1, . . . , νd) to be the 2d-dimensional vector such
that µ` =
∑
i:r′i∈[0,1/2](r
′
i)
` and ν` =
∑
i:r′i∈(1/2,1](r
′
i)
`. Since r′is are multiples of /n,
µ`, ν` ∈ {0, (/n)`, 2(/n)`, . . . , n} for all ` ∈ [d]. By Theorem 4.16 and the triangle
inequality, if the moment profiles of two PBDs are the same, the total distance between
them is at most 3. So instead of considering all the PBD in Sn(W ), we only need
to examine PBDs with different moment profiles. Note that the number of possible
moment profiles is at most (n/)O(d
2) = (n/)O(log
2 1/). Thus we establish the existence
of a cover for Sn(W ) with size (n/)O(log2 1/). In order to get a cover that’s a subset
of Sn(W ), we need to check, for any moment profile (µ, ν) if there exists a probability
vector (ri)
n
i=1 ∈ W such that PBD(r′1, . . . , r′n) has such moment profile. This can be
computed by the following dynamic program (a similar dynamic program was used in
the proof of Claim 1 in [25]).
LetA(i, µ, ν) be the indicator such thatA(i, µ, ν) = 1 iff there exists r1 ∈W1, . . . , ri ∈
Wi such that
∑
j≤i:r′i∈[0,1/2](r
′
i)
` = µ` and
∑
j≤i:r′i∈(1/2,1](r
′
i)
` = ν` for all ` ∈ [d] where
r′ is the /n rounding of r defined at the beginning of the proof. We initialize all entries
to value 0 except A(0,0,0) = 1. Then the transition equation is A(i, µ, ν) = 1 iff there
exists ri ∈Wi such that r′i ∈ [0, 1/2] and A(i− 1, (µ` − (r′i)`)d`=1, ν) = 1 or there exists
ri ∈Wi such that r′i ∈ (1/2, 1] and A(i−1, µ, (ν`−(r′i)`)d`=1) = 1. We also save a pointer
to the entry A[i, µ, ν] from the corresponding entry for buyer i−1. It is easy to see that
the overall running time to compute A is maxi{|W ′i |}·n·(n/)O(log
2 1/) ≤ (n/)O(log2 1/)
where |W ′i | is the number of possible r′i that is at most n/. Note that given a moment
profile (µ, ν) such A(n, µ, ν) = 1, we can compute the corresponding probability vector
r by tracing the pointers from this cell of A back to level 1. Therefore, we can define
the cover Sn, to be the set of all PBDs with such probability vectors.
61
Given the above theorem, we are able to obtain an additive PTAS for computing
approximately optimal monopoly price auctions, given a fixed set of allowed prices.
Theorem 4.18. There exists an additive PTAS for computing approximately optimal
monopoly price auctions when the seller is restricted to a fixed number of distinct prices.
In particular, given  ∈ (0, 1), an instance with n independent bidders and k distinct
prices the seller may use, an -additive approximately optimal monopoly price auction
can be computed in time (nk )
O(k log2 1/).
Proof. We use a1, . . . , ak to denote the k distinct prices the seller may use. Given a
monopoly price auction with price vector (p1, p2, . . . , pn), we use an indicator random
variable Hij to indicate that the seller gets revenue aj from buyer i, that is Hij = 1
iff pi = aj and vi ≥ aj . Let Hj =
∑
i∈[n]Hij and H =
∑
j∈[k] ajHj . Note that H
is the random variable for the total revenue raised in this auction. Since the Hij are
indicator random variables, the Hj are Poisson Binomial random variables due to the
independence among bidders. So H can be viewed as a weighted sum of k Poisson
Binomial random variables. Let rij denote the probability of getting revenue exactly
aj from buyer i. Then the distribution of Hj is PBD(r1j , · · · , rnj). The distribution of
H can be represented by the vector r = (rij)i∈[n],j∈[k]. Let Wi be the set of all possible
(ri1, . . . , rik) such that rij = Pr[vi ≥ aj ] if the seller use price aj for bidder i and rij = 0
otherwise . It is clear that the set W = ×i∈[n]Wi is the set of all probability vector r
corresponding to a feasible pricing vector p.
Note that for any two random variables X,Y and any value T ,
|Pr[X ≥ T ]− Pr[Y ≥ T ]| ≤ dTV(X,Y ).
So if there exists an -cover for the set of all possible distribution of H parameterized
by r ∈ W , we can explore the pricing rules in the cover instead of all possible pricing
rules to find a sequence of monopoly prices which approximately maximize Pr[H ≥ T ].
In order to get such a cover, we need to modify the dynamic program used in the proof
of Theorem 4.17 to be k-dimensional. The moment profile (µ1, . . . , µk, ν1, . . . , νk) is
defined as µj = (µj1, . . . , µ
j
d), ν
j = (νj1, . . . , ν
j
d) and µ
j
` , ν
j
` ∈ {0, ( nk )`, 2( nk )`, . . . , n} for
all ` ∈ [d] and j ∈ [k]. By a similar argument to Theorem 4.17 and Lemma 4.14, all the
possible moment profiles is already an -cover. Define A[i, µ1, . . . , µk, ν1, . . . , νk] to be
the indicator such that it is equal to 1 iff there exists r1 ∈ W1, . . . , ri ∈ Wi such that
for all j ∈ [k] and ` ∈ [d],∑
i′≤i:r′
i′j∈[0,1/2]
(r′i′j)
` = µj` and
∑
i′≤i:r′
i′j∈(1/2,1]
(r′i′j)
` = νj`
where r′ is a nk -rounding of r such that r
′
ij is a multiple of

nk and rij − nk < r′ij ≤ rij
for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [k].
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Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.17, A can be computed by the following dynamic
program. Inductively, to compute layer i + 1, we consider all the non-zero entries of
layer i and for every such non-zero entry and every possible prices aj , we find which
entry of layer i + 1 we would transition to if we choose pi = aj , i.e. rij = Pr[vi ≥ aj ]
and rij′ = 0 for all j
′ 6= j. It is easy to see the overall running time to compute A
is (nk )
O(k log2 1/). In addition, we can find the corresponding monopoly prices for any
distribution in this cover by tracing the pointers in the computation of A. Therefore, we
can enumerate all possible pricing rules in this cover with size at most (nk )
O(k log2 1/)
to find the optimal pricing which maximizes Pr[H ≥ T ].
The final step is to compute Pr[H ≥ T ] given a price vector p. By Theorem 4.15,
we know any PBD can be approximated by a sparse PBD or a binomial distribution.
For the given price vector, we can get the corresponding Hj for all j ∈ [k]. We use
Theorem 4.15 to compute H ′j from Hj such that H
′
j is either a k/-sparse PBD or
a binomial distribution and dTV(H
′
j , Hj) ≤ /k for all j ∈ [k]. Then we compute
Pr[H ′j = Tj ] for any value Tj ∈ [0, . . . , n] and j ∈ [k]. This computation can be
done efficiently since H ′j is either a k/-sparse PBD or a binomial distribution. By
Lemma 4.14, we have dTV(H
′, H) ≤  where H ′ = ∑j ajH ′j . Finally we compute
Pr[H ′ ≥ T ] = ∑(Tj)j :∑j ajTj≥T ∏j Pr[H ′j = Tj ] by enumerating all possible T1, . . . , Tk.
Since the distance between H and H ′ is at most , we have Pr[H ≥ T ] ≥ Pr[H ′ ≥
T ] − . Combine all these together, we get the additive PTAS with running time
(nk )
O(k log2 1/).
Remark 2. It should be mentioned that our hardness results in previous sections do
not imply our PTAS is tight.
4.7 Illustrative Examples
Claim 4.19. Monopoly price auctions cannot guarantee a c-multiplicative approxima-
tion of the optimal truthful auction with any c < n even for two independent bidders.
As shown in Example 4.1, the monopoly price auction can perform extremely badly
with respect to multiplicative error even in the case of two independent bidders.
Example 4.1. The two bidders have the same distribution, that is vi = k with proba-
bility k for k = 1, . . . , n. It is not hard to see that the seller can get the revenue n+ 1
with probability at least n · n+1 by setting f2(i) = n+ 1− i and f1(j) = n+ 1− j for all
i, j = 1, . . . , n. However, no monopoly price auction can do better than n+1 + o(n+1)
when  is small enough. So the multiplicative approximation ratio is at least n.
Claim 4.20. For independent bidders, monopoly price auctions cannot guarantee a
c-additive approximation of the optimal truthful auction with any c < 1/e where e ≈
2.718 is the Euler’s number.
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Example 4.2. For each bidder i, we construct the distribution such that vi = 2 with
probability 1/n and vi = 1 with probability 1 − 1/n. It is easy to check the seller can
get revenue n + 1 with probability (1 − 1/n)n−1 ≈ 1/e by setting fi(1, . . . , 1) = 2 and
fi(1, . . . , 1, 2, 1, . . . , 1) = 1. However no monopoly price auction can do better than 2/n.
To see this, suppose the auction sets the threshold price to be 2 for k bidders. So the
revenue is the n − k + R where R is the random variable denoting the revenue from
the bidders with pi = 2. Since E[R] = 2k/n, Pr[R ≥ k + 1] ≤ 2k/nk+1 ≤ 2/n by Markov
inequality. So the probability of getting revenue n+ 1 is at most 2/n.
Claim 4.21. Lemma 4.5 does not hold for two correlated bidders.
As shown in Example 4.3, there exists an instance with two correlated bidders,
where no optimal truthful auction consists of non-increasing pricing functions.
Example 4.3. Bidder 1’s valuations are 1, 2, . . . ,m and bidder 2’s valuations are 1
and 2. The probability of v1 = i and v2 = j is 1/m if i+ j is odd, otherwise it is 0. It
is not hard to see the optimal auction can get the revenue 3 with probability 1 by setting
setting f1(1) = 2, f1(2) = 1 and f2(i) = 1 if i is odd otherwise f2(i) = 2. However, no
truthful auction with non-increasing pricing functions can do better than 1/2.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study auction design with a revenue target in the Bayesian setting
and provide computational positive and negative results in terms of the number of
buyers and whether valuations are independently distributed. We see several promis-
ing directions for future work. For independent buyers, a direct open problem is to
generalize our characterization to three or more buyers. That may be achievable via an
induction on the number of buyers, characterizing the optimal auction for three buyers
by using the case with two buyers as a substructure. Another direction is to approxi-
mate the optimal auction via designing simple auctions. We find several examples to
show the lower bounds but the upper bound is still open. Finally, we point out an
interesting problem of computing optimal monopoly prices without the limitation on
distinct prices. This problem seems to be hard; we just know that it is contained in
NP#P .
64
Chapter 5
Trading Broker: Double Auction
Design
We study double auction market design where the market maker wants to maximize its
total revenue by buying low from the sellers and selling high to the buyers. We consider
a Bayesian setting where buyers and sellers have independent probability distributions
on the values of products on the market.
For the simplest setting, each seller has the same kind of indivisible good with a
bounded (integer) amount that can be sold to a buyer, who may demand a bounded
number of copies. We develop an optimal mechanism for the market maker to maximize
its own revenue.
For the more general case where each seller’s product may be different, we consider
a number of varieties in terms of constraints on supplies and demands. For each of
them, we develop a polynomial time computable truthful mechanism for the market
maker to achieve a revenue at least a constant α times the revenue of any other truthful
mechanism.
This chapter is based on a joint work [31] with Paul Goldberg, Xiaotie Deng, and
Jinshan Zhang, which appears in ISAAC 2012.
5.1 Overview
We consider a double auction market maker who collects valuations from buyers and
sellers about a certain product to decide on the prices each seller gets and each buyer
pays. The buyers may want to buy many units and the sellers may have many units
to part with. The buyers and sellers may have different valuations of the product, and
the probability distributions of the valuations are public knowledge but each valuation,
sampled from its distribution, is known only to its own buyer or seller. For simplicity, we
assume that the probability distributions are independent. For the sellers and buyers,
they know their own private values exactly. The market maker purchases the products
from the sellers and sells them to the buyers. Our goal is to design a market mechanism
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Table 5.1: Results
Dimension Demand Supply Distribution Results
Sec. 5.3 Single Arbitrary Arbitrary Continuous (Discrete) Optimal
Sec. 5.4 Multi Arbitrary Arbitrary Continuous 1/4-Approx
Sec. 5.4 Multi Arbitrary Arbitrary Discrete 1/4-Approx
Sec. 5.5 Multi Unlimited Arbitrary Discrete Optimal
Sec. 5.5 Multi Arbitrary Unlimited Discrete Optimal
For the demand column, “Arbitrary” refers to the case where buyers can buy at most
di items where di can be an arbitrary number and “Unlimited” means di = +∞. The
supply column is similar.
that maximizes the revenue of the market maker. In other words, the market maker is
to buy the same amount of products from the sellers as the amount sold to the buyers
with the objective of maximizing the difference of its collected payment from the buyers
and the total amount paid to the sellers. When in addition we assume public knowledge
of distributions of buyers’ private values from the previous sales, we call it a revenue
maximizing Bayesian double auction market maker.
There have been many double auction institutions, each of which may be suitable
for one type of market environment [41]. Ours is motivated by the growing use of
discriminative pricing models over the Internet such as one that is studied in [32]
for the prior-free market environment. A possible realistic setting for applications of
our model could be Google’s ad exchange where Google could play a market maker
for advertisers and webpage owners [63]. One may also use it for a market model
of Groupon. Our use of the Bayesian model is justified by the repeated uses of a
commercial system by registered users. It allows the market maker to gain Bayesian
information of the users’ valuations of the products being sold. Therefore, the Bayesian
model adequately describes the knowledge of the market maker, buyers and sellers for
the optimal mechanism design.
5.1.1 Main Results
We provide optimal or constant approximate mechanisms for various settings for double
auction design. The parameters considered in our discussion are related to important
market design issues. Those include one or multi dimensional problems (meaning, one
product or multiple different types of products). The buyers can have demand con-
straints or not. The sellers can be supply constrained or not. Players’ values may be
drawn from a continuous or from a discrete distribution. The results are summarized in
Table 5.1.1. In the Bayesian Mechanism Design problems, there are two computational
processes involved. The first one is to design an optimal or approximate mechanism
which can be viewed as a function mapping bidders’ profiles to allocation and payment
66
outcomes. Since the function maps potentially exponentially many profiles to out-
comes, a succinct representation of the function is an important part in the Bayesian
mechanism design. The second process is the implementation of the mechanism, i.e.,
given a bid profile, we run the mechanism to compute the outcome allocation and pay-
ment scheme. Our results imply that all mechanisms described in the table can be
represented in polynomial size and can be found and implemented in polynomial time.
5.1.2 Literature Review
Auction design plays an important role in economics in general and especially in elec-
tronic commerce [55]. Of particular interest, is the problem of maximizing the auction-
eer’s revenue, referred as the optimal auction design problem. A number of research
works have focused on this issue. Myerson, in his seminal paper [65], characterized
the optimal auction for the single-item setting in the Bayesian model. Recently, efforts
have been made on extending Myerson’s results to border settings [35, 67, 69].
Unlike Myerson’s optimal auction result, finding the optimal solution is not easy
for multi-dimensional settings. Recent research interest has turned toward approximate
mechanisms [1, 15]. Cai et al. [9] presented a characterization of a rather general multi-
dimensional setting and proposed an efficient mechanism for the special case where no
bidders are demand constrained. Using similar ideas, Alaei et al. [2] present a general
framework for reducing multi-agent service problems to single-agent ones.
The double auction design problem becomes more complicated since the market
maker acts as the middle man to bring buyers and sellers together. A guide to the
literature in micro-economics on this topic can be found in [41]. The profit maximiza-
tion problem for the single buyer/single seller setting has been studied by Myerson
and Satterthwaite [64]. Our optimal double auction is a direct extension of their work
and, to our best knowledge, fills a clear gap in the economic theory of double auctions.
Deshmukh et al. [32], studied the revenue maximization problem for double auctions
where the auctioneer has no prior knowledge about bids. Their prior-free model is
essentially different from ours. More auction mechanism design problems were stud-
ied by many researchers in recent years, but as far as we know, not in the context
of optimal double auction design in the Bayesian setting. The most related one is
by Jain and Wilkens [50], where they studied the market intermediation problem in
a setting with a single unit-demand buyer and a group of sellers. They gave several
constant approximate mechanisms with various buyer behaviour assumptions. While
our setting assumes the existence of a monopoly platform, Rochet and Tirole [68] and
Armstrong [3] introduced several different models for the two-sided market and studied
the platform competition problem.
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5.2 Preliminaries
Throughout the chapter we focus on Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms only.
Informally, a mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible if it is optimal (in the ex-
pected utility) for each buyer and each seller to bid its true value of the items. We will
formally define this concept later. As a consequence, we should consider their bids to
be their true valuations and restrict our discussion to (direct revelation) mechanisms
that result in less or equal utility if one deviates to report a false value.
Therefore, we will use the notation vij to represent the ith buyer’s (true) bid for one
of the jth seller’s items and wj for the jth seller’s (true) bid. We will drop the “(true)”
subsequently as deviations of bids from the true valuations will be clearly stated. The
ith buyer’s bid can be denoted by a vector vi and bids of all buyers can be denoted by
v or sometimes (vi; v−i) where v−i is the joint profile of all other bidders. Similarly, we
use w and (wj ;w−j) for the sellers’ bid. 1
In our model, all players’ bids are assumed to be distributed independently accord-
ing to publicly known distributions, V for buyers, W for sellers. Note that we also
assume that V and W should be bounded, i.e. vij ∈ [vij , vij ] and wj ∈ [wj , wj ].
Before introducing the formal notations of double auction, we recall some prelimi-
naries for Myerson’s auction [65] as mentioned in Chapter 2. In Myerson’s auction, there
is one item to sell and there are n buyers, whose valuations are drawn independently
from some distributions, each of whom are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers,
bidding for the item. The auctioneer of the auction is the seller who would like to
find a mechanism consisting of an allocation rule and payment rule given the bids of
buyers such that the mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible and individual ra-
tionality and the expected revenue of the seller is maximized. Myerson characterized
the Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism as monotonicity of allocation rule and
payment rule and based on this, he converted the revenue maximization problem into
social welfare maximization problem and resolved the problem completely. This is also
called one dimensional one side Bayesian mechanism design since each buyer’s valuation
is single dimensional.
The idea of double auction design is similar to Myerson’s auction while maintain-
ing some differences. First, the auctioneer is not the item holder but intermediary
agent who buys items from sellers and sells the items to buyers while simultaneously
maximizing his own revenue. We will still adopt Bayesian settings and assume all the
participators are selfish, e.g. risk-neutral expected utility maximizers. Second, we need
to clarify the utility of sellers and not only to make sure that buyers are Bayesian in-
centive compatible and individual rational but also to guarantee these two properties
for sellers. Third, the mechanism we considered includes the single dimension case
1We use semi-colon to separate the profile of a special player with others and use comma to separate
the buyers’ profiles with sellers’.
68
where sellers hold the same items, similar to Myerson’s result, the optimal mechanism
for single dimension is resolved. We extended to the analysis of single dimension to
multi dimension by employing recent elegant techniques developed for one side multi di-
mensional mechanism design. More precise notations and definitions will be presented
bellow.
The outcome of a mechanism M consists of four random variables (x, p, y, q) where
x and p are the allocation function and payment functions for buyers, y and q for
sellers. That is, buyer i receives item j with probability xij(v, w) and pays pi(v, w);
seller j sells her item with probability yj(v, w) and gets a payment qj(v, w). Thus, the
expected revenue of the mechanism is R(M) = Ev,w[
∑
i pi(v, w) −
∑
j qj(v, w)] where
Ev,w is short for Ev∼V,w∼W .
In general, a buyer may buy more than one item from the mechanism. We assume
buyers’ valuation functions are additive, i.e. vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vij . For each buyer i, let
di denote the demand constraint for buyer i, i.e. buyer i cannot buy more than di
items. Similarly, let kj be the supply constraint for seller j, i.e. seller j cannot sell
more than kj items. By the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem [52, 35, 27], it suffices to
satisfy
∑
j xij ≤ di and yj =
∑
i xij ≤ kj .
Let Ui(v, w) =
∑
j xij(v, w)vij−pi(v, w) be the expected utility of buyer i when the
profile of all players is (v, w), which is identical to usual definition of utility for buyers
[65]. Similarly, the expected utility of sellers is the expected selling price of his item
minus the multiplication of his true valuation for the item and the probability that item
is sold, and we use Tj(v, w) = qj(v, w)−yj(v, w)wj to be the expected utility of seller j
when the profile of all players is (v, w). We proceed to formally define the concepts of
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility of mechanisms and ex-interim Individual Rationality
of the buyers and sellers:
Definition 5.1. A double auction mechanism M is said to be Bayesian Incentive
Compatible (BIC) iff the following inequalities hold for all i, j, v, w.
Ev−i,w[Ui(v, w)] ≥ Ev−i,w[Ui((v′i; v−i), w)]
Ev,w−j [Tj(v, w)] ≥ Ev,w−j [Tj(v, (w′j ;w−j))]
(5.1)
We note that, if Ui(v, w) ≥ Ui((v′i; v−i), w) and Tj(v, w) ≥ Tj(v, (w′j ;w−j)) for all
v, w, v′i, w
′
j , we say M is Incentive Compatible.
To illustrate incentive compatibility, two well-known auctions are sufficient, one
is first price auction, that is, the bidder with highest bid wins and pays his bids, the
other one is second price auction, that is, the bidder with highest bid wins and pays the
second highest bids. The first price auction is not incentive compatible, for example,
the second highest bids is $8 and his true value is $10, if he bids $10, he wins, but
pays $10 getting utility 0, however, if he lies to bid $9, he still wins and pay $9, getting
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utility $1 > 0, therefor, he has incentive to lie. The truthfulness of second price auction
is well known [78].
Besides Bayesian incentive compatibility, another important concept is individual
rationality, which requires each participant’s (expected) utility is non negative, ensuring
his participation into the game since no participation guarantees his utility is zero.
Definition 5.2. A double auction mechanism M is said to be ex-interim Individual
Rational (IR) iff the following inequalities hold for all i, j, v, w.
Ev−i,w[Ui(v, w)] ≥ 0
Ev,w−j [Tj(v, w)] ≥ 0
(5.2)
Similarly, we note that, if Ui(v, w) ≥ 0 and Tj(v, w) ≥ 0 for all v, w, we say M is
ex-post Individual Rational.
We say a mechanism is feasible if each buyer and seller are Bayesian incentive
compatible and ex-interim individual rational, and simultaneously demand and supply
constraints are satisfied.
Not all the mechanisms are individual rational, for example, fixed price auction,
there is one item to be sold and the price is set to be $10, however, some buyer may
value the item $8 and the item will be allocated to him and charge him $10 if he
participates, hence, he will not participate in this auction.
Finally, we present the formal definition of approximate mechanism.
Definition 5.3 (α-approximate Mechanism [69]). Given a set M of any mechanisms,
we say mechanism M ∈M is an α-approximate mechanism in M iff for each mechanism
M ′ ∈M, for any set of buyers and sellers α ·R(M ′) ≤ R(M). A mechanism is optimal
in M if it is an 1-approximate mechanism in M.
5.3 Optimal Single-Dimensional Double Auction
In this section, we consider the single-dimensional double auction design problem where
all sellers sell identical items, that is for all j, j′ ∈ [m], vij = vij′ . Moreover, as shown
in Table 5.1.1, in this section we assume the bidders’ bids are drawn from continuous
distributions2. Let fi, Fi be the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative
distribution function (CDF) for buyer i’s value, gj , Gj be the PDF and CDF for seller
j’s value.
Our mechanism can be viewed as a generalization of the classical Myerson’s Optimal
Auction [65]. We show that a similar optimal double auction can be found in this single-
dimensional setting. In addition, in Section 5.4 this optimal mechanism will be used to
construct a constant approximate mechanism for a multi-dimensional setting.
2The case for discrete distributions is the same as continuous distribution [79]
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Recall that Myerson’s virtual value function is defined as ci(vi) = vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) for
each buyer. In the double auction, we define the virtual value functions for buyers and
sellers as ci(vi) = vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) and rj(wj) = wj +
Gj(wj)
gj(wj)
. If ci(vi) is not an increasing
function of vi or rj is not decreasing, by Myerson’s ironing technique, we can use
the ironed virtual value function c¯i and r¯j . W.l.o.g, we assume the buyers are sorted
in decreasing order with respect to c¯i(vi) and all sellers are in increasing order with
respect to r¯j(wj). Let D = maxi,j{min{
∑i
s=1 ds,
∑j
t=1 kj}|c¯i(vi) > r¯j(wj)}. Thus, we
can define the optimal auction in the spirit of maximizing virtual surplus.
xi(v, w) =

di if
∑
s≤i ds ≤ D
D −∑s<i ds if ∑s<i ds < D <∑s≤i ds
0 otherwise
yj(v, w) =

kj if
∑
t≤j kt ≤ D
D −∑s<j ks if ∑t<j kt < D <∑t≤j kt
0 otherwise
pi(v, w) = xi(v, w)vi −
∫ vi
vi
xi((s; v−i), w)ds
qj(v, w) = yj(v, w)wj +
∫ wj
wj
yj(v, (t;w−j))dt
Theorem 5.4. The above mechanism is an optimal (revenue) mechanism for the single-
dimensional double auction setting. Under the assumption that the integration and
convex hull of f , g can be computed in polynomial time, the mechanism can be found
and implemented. Moreover, the mechanism is deterministic, incentive compatible and
ex-post Individual Rational.
Proof. Let Uˆi(x, p, vi) be the expected utility for buyer i when his bid is vi and the mech-
anism uses allocation function x and payment function p. Similarly, we use Tˆj(y, q, w)
to denote seller j’s expected utility.
Uˆi(x, p, vi) = Ev−i,w[vixi(v, w)− pi(v, w)]
Tˆj(y, q, wj) = Ev,w−j [qj(v, w)− wjyj(v, w)]
Similarly, the expected utility for the auctioneer is
R(x, p, y, q) = Ev,w[
∑
i
pi(v, w)−
∑
j
qj(v, w)] (5.3)
We call a mechanism (x, p, y, q) feasible if and only if it satisfies the following con-
straints.
xi(v, w) ≤ di, yj(v, w) ≤ kj∑
i xi(v, w) ≤
∑
j yj(v, w)
xi(v, w), yj(v, w) ≥ 0
(5.4)
Uˆi(p, x, vi) ≥ 0, Tˆj(q, y, wj) ≥ 0 (5.5)
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Uˆi(p, x, vi) ≥ Uˆi(p, x, v′i)
Tˆj(q, y, wj) ≥ Tˆj(q, y, w′j)
(5.6)
As is well known, the Incentive Compatibility is equivalent to the monotonicity.
Given a mechanism (p, x, q, y), we define Hi(x, vi) = Ev−i,w[xi(v, w)] and Li(y, wj) =
Ev,w−j [yj(v, w)]. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5. A mechanism (x, p, y, q) is feasible if and only if the following conditions
hold:
if v′i ≤ vi then Hi(x, v′i) ≤ Hi(x, vi)
if w′j ≤ wj then Lj(y, w′j) ≥ Lj(y, wj)
(5.7)
Uˆi(p, x, vi) = Uˆi(p, x, vi) +
∫ vi
vi
Hi(x, v
′
i)dv
′
i
Tˆj(q, y, wj) = Tˆj(q, y, wj) +
∫ wj
wj
Lj(y, w
′
j)dw
′
j
(5.8)
Uˆi(p, x, vi) ≥ 0, Tˆj(q, y, wj) ≥ 0 (5.9)
and inequalities (5.4)
Proof. The IC constraint (5.6) is equivalent to
Uˆi(p, x, vi) ≥ Ev−i,w[vixi((v′i; v−i), w)− pi((v′i; v−i), w)]
= Ev−i,w[(vi − v′i + v′i)xi((v′i; v−i), w)− pi((v′i; v−i), w)]
= Uˆi(p, x, v
′
i) + (vi − v′i)Hi(x, v′i)
Tˆj(q, y, wj) ≥ Tˆj(q, y, w′j) + (w′j − wj)Lj(y, w′j)
(5.10)
Using (5.10) twice, we have (5.7). By integrating Hi and Lj , we have (5.8). The proof
of the necessary part is similar.
Now we can characterize the optimal double auction in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose that (x, y) maximizes
Ev,w[
∑
i
ci(vi)xi(v, w)−
∑
j
rj(wj)yj(v, w)]
subject to the constraints (5.4) and (5.7). Suppose also that
pi(v, w) = xi(v, w)vi −
∫ vi
vi
xi((v
′
i; v−i), w)dv
′
i
qj(v, w) = yj(v, w)wj +
∫ wj
wj
yj(v, (w
′
j ;w−j))dw
′
j
(5.11)
Then (x, p, y, q) represents an optimal auction.
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Proof. Recalling (5.3), we may write the auctioneer’s objective function as
R(p, x, q, y) = Ev,w[
∑
i
pi(v, w)−
∑
j
qj(v, w)]
=
∑
i
Ev,w[xi(v, w)vi] +
∑
i
Ev,w[pi(v, w)− xi(v, w)vi]
−
∑
j
Ev,w[yj(v, w)wj ]−
∑
j
Ev,w[qj(v, w)− yj(v, w)wj ]
(5.12)
But, using Lemma 5.5, we have
Ev,w[pi(v, w)− xi(v, w)vi] = −Evi [Uˆi(p, x, vi)]
=− Evi [Uˆi(p, x, vi) +
∫ vi
vi
Hi(x, v
′
i)dv
′
i]
=− Uˆi(p, x, vi)−
∫ vi
vi
∫ vi
vi
Hi(x, v
′
i)fi(vi)dv
′
idvi
=− Uˆi(p, x, vi)−
∫ vi
vi
∫ vi
v′i
Hi(x, v
′
i)fi(vi)dvidv
′
i
=− Uˆi(p, x, vi)−
∫ vi
vi
∫ vi
v′i
fi(vi)dviHi(x, v
′
i)dv
′
i
=− Uˆi(p, x, vi)− Ev−i,w[
∫ vi
vi
fi(v
′
i)dv
′
ixi(v, w)]
Similarly,
− Ev,w[qj(v, w)− yj(v, w)wj ]
=− Tˆj(q, y, wj)− Ev,w−j [
∫ wj
wj
gj(w
′
j)dw
′
jyi(v, w)]
(5.13)
Substituting (5.13) into (5.12) gives us,
R(p, x, q, y) = −
∑
i
Uˆi(p, x, vi)−
∑
j
Tˆj(p, x, wj)
+ Ev,w[
∑
i
ci(vi)xi(v, w)]− Ev,w[
∑
j
rj(wj)yj(v, w)]
(5.14)
So the auctioneer’s problem is to maximize (5.14) subject to the constraints (5.4), (5.7),
(5.8) and (5.9). In this formulation, p, q appear only in the first two terms and in the
constraints (5.8) and (5.9). These two constraints may be rewritten as
Ev−i,w[xi(v, w)vi −
∫ vi
vi
xi((v
′
i; v−i), w)dv
′
i − pi(v, w)] = Uˆi(p, x, vi) ≥ 0
Ev,w−j [qj(v, w)− yj(v, w)wj −
∫ wj
wj
yj(v, (w
′
j ;w−j))dw
′
j ] = Tˆj(q, y, wj) ≥ 0
If the seller chooses p, q according to (5.11), then he satisfies both (5.8) and (5.9), and
he gets the best possible value for (5.14). So we can drop p, q from the problem entirely.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
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By the above lemma, we can reduce the optimal double auction design problem to
a combinatorial optimization problem. Subject to constraint (5.4), our greedy mech-
anism always maximizes
∑
i ci(vi)xi(v, w) −
∑
j rj(wj)xj(v, w) for all v, w. If ci is not
increasing and rj is not decreasing, we just use the standard Myerson’s technique to
refine ci and rj to c¯i and r¯j .
Therefore, we complete the proof of Theorem 5.4.
Finally, we give an example for n = m = 1, v1 ∈ [0, 100], f1(v1) = 1/100, w1 ∈
[0, 100] and g1(w1) = 1/100. We also suppose that di = kj = 1. It is easy to see,
c1(v1) = 2v1 − 100 and r1(w1) = 2w1. So our optimal auction is to make a trade iff
v1 − w1 ≥ 50. Then we charge the buyer 50 + w1 and pay the seller v1 − 50. So our
revenue is 100 − (v1 − w1). This is interesting because (v1 − w1) is the social welfare
in this game. It follows (perhaps counter-intuitively) that the revenue decreases when
the social welfare increases.
5.4 Approximate Multi-Dimensional Double Auction
In this section, we provide a general framework for approximately reducing the double
auction design problem for multiple buyers and sellers to the subproblem for a single
pair of buyer and seller. As an application, we apply the framework to construct a
1
4 -approximate mechanism for the multi-dimensional setting. Our approach is inspired
by the work of Alaei [1] which provides a general framework for the one sided auction.
We first give a high-level idea of our approach. It is not hard to see, following
the previous section, we can also write the multi-dimensional double auction design
problem as a linear program (with exponential size). Our first step is to relax the
feasibility constraint (demand and supply constraints) from the ex-post ones to ex-ante
ones. Clearly, this relaxation will not decrease the expected revenue. Then we can
use the solution of the magician problem described in [1] to modify an ex-ante feasible
allocation to a ex-post feasible allocation with a constant fraction loss. In order to
solve the relaxed optimization problem, we need to define Primary Mechanisms which
is only for a single buyer and a single seller. As we will show, this single-buyer and
single-seller problem can be solved efficiently.
Recall that all bids are drawn from publicly known distributions and our goal is to
maximize the expected revenue for the auctioneer. It should be emphasized that, in
this section, we assume the buyers’ values for different items are independent, i.e. vij
and vij′ are independent. To use Alaei’s general framework, we also assume each buyer
can at most buy one copy of items from one seller. This is w.l.o.g. because we can
remove this assumption by constructing kj duplicate sellers (each with one copy item
to sell) for each seller.
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First of all, we introduce the concept of Primary Mechanism which can be viewed
as a mechanism between one buyer and one seller.
Definition 5.7 (Primary Mechanism/Primary Benchmark).
A primary mechanism denoted by Mij for buyer i and seller j is a single buyer and
single seller mechanism which allows specifying an upper bound on the ex-ante expected
probability k¯ij of allocating the item j to the buyer i. A primary benchmark denoted
by R¯ij is a concave function such that the optimal revenue of any primary mechanism
Mij subject to k¯ij is upper bounded by R¯ij(k¯ij).
Intuitively, for any allocation rule, define the ex-ante probability of assigning the jth
seller’s items to the i-th buyer as k¯ij = Evi,wj [xij(vi, wj)]. Then we can divide the supply
constraints
∑
i xij(v, w) ≤ kj and demand constraints
∑
j xij(v, w) ≤ di to the ex-ante
probability constraints,
∑
i k¯ij ≤ kj and
∑
j k¯ij ≤ di. Then we compute the optimal
ex-ante probability by convex programming. Obviously, the optimal solution of the
relaxed problem must be an upper bound for any original solution. Unfortunately, the
solution obtained by convex programming may not be a feasible solution of the original
problem. To solve this problem, Alaei introduced the following rounding process to
round the relaxed solution to a feasible one.
Lemma 5.8 (γ-Conservative Magician (Theorem 2 in [1])). In the Magician problem,
a magician is presented with a series of boxes one by one. He has k magic wands that
can be used to open the boxes. On each box is written a probability qi. If a wand is used
on a box, it opens, but with probability at most qi the wand breaks. Given
∑
i qi ≤ k
and any γ ≤ 1 − 1√
k+3
, a γ-conservative magician guarantees that each box is opened
with an ex-ante expected probability at least γ.
Using the above lemma, we describe our mechanism for multi-dimensional double
auction problem. Recall that in the classical auction setting, all items are sold by the
auctioneer. However, in the double auction setting, items are sold by different sellers
and more efforts should be taken to handle the truthfulness issue of sellers. We extend
Alaei’s rounding mechanism from one-dimension (considering buyers one by one) to
two-dimension (considering each pair of buyer and seller sequentially) as follows.
Mechanism (Modified γ-Pre-Rounding Mechanism)
(I) Solve the following convex program and let k¯ij denote an optimal assignment for
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it.
Maximize:
∑
i∈[n],j∈[m]
R¯ij(xij) (CP)
Subject to:
∑
j∈[m]
xij ≤ di for all i ∈ [n]∑
i∈[n]
xij ≤ kj for all j ∈ [m]
xij ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]
(II) For each buyer i, create an instance of γ-conservative magician with di wands
(this will be referred to as the buyer i’s magician). For each item j create an
instance of γ-conservative magician with kj wands (this will be referred to as the
seller j’s magician).
(III) For each pair of buyer and seller (i, j):
(a) Write k¯ij on a box and present it to the buyer i’s magician and the seller j’s
magician.
(b) If both of them open the box, run Mij(k¯ij) on buyer i and seller j otherwise
consider next pair.
(c) If the mechanism buys an item from seller j and sells it to buyer i, then break
the wands of buyer i’s magician and seller j’s magician.
Theorem 5.9 (Modified γ-Pre-Rounding Mechanism). Suppose for each buyer and
seller pair (i, j), we have an α-approximate primary mechanism Mij and a correspond-
ing primary benchmark R¯ij
3. Then for any γ ∈ [0, 1− 1√
k∗+3 ] where k
∗ = mini,j{di, kj},
the Modified γ-Pre-Rounding Mechanism is a γ2 · α-approximation mechanism.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7 in [1]. First, we prove that
the expected revenue of any mechanism is upper bounded by
∑
i
∑
j R¯ij(k¯ij). For any
mechanism M = (x, p, y, q), let kij = Ev,wxij(v, w). Due to the feasibility of M , kij
must be a feasible solution of the convex programming (CP ). So we have,
R(M) =
∑
i
∑
j
Rij(kij) ≤
∑
i
∑
j
R¯ij(kij) ≤
∑
i
∑
j
R¯ij(k¯ij)
Then it suffices to show that for each pair (i, j), our mechanism can gain the revenue
R¯ij(k¯ij) with probability at least γ
2 · α, i.e. each box will be opened with probability
at least γ2 (this is because the γ-conservative magician for the buyer is independent to
that for the seller and each of them chooses to open the box with ex-ante probability
γ, the box will be opened iff both magicians choose to open the box). This can be
deduced from Lemma 5.8 easily.
3Since we require the valuations of the buyer for different items are independent, R¯ij has a budget
balanced cross monotonic cost sharing scheme defined in Definition 6 of [1]
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Then we consider the multi-dimensional double auction design problem and present
a constant approximate mechanism. For each buyer and seller pair i, j, we use the
mechanism in Section 5.3 for one-dimensional cases to be the primary mechanism Mij
and the expected revenue of Mij to be the primary benchmark R¯ij .
Theorem 5.10. Assume that all bidders’ bids are drawn from continuous distributions.
A 14 approximate double auction for the multi-dimensional setting can be found and
implemented in polynomial time.
Proof. Now we use the similar approach in Section 5.3 to prove that the optimal allo-
cation rule must be the solution of the following optimization problem.
Maximize: Evi,wj [xij(vi, wj)(c¯i(vi)− r¯j(wj)]
Subject to: Evi,wj [xij(vi, wj)] ≤ k¯ij
xij(vi, wj) ∈ [0, 1]
The above problem can be solved by the our previous algorithm for the one dimension
case where we allocate one item to buyer i if Evi,wj [xij(vi, wj)] ≤ k¯ij and ci(vi) ≥ rj(wj).
Then by the pricing rule described in Section 5.3, we can compute the optimal revenue
as follows.
R¯ij(k¯ij) =
∫ vi
vi
∫ min{r¯−1j (c¯i(vi)),G−1j (k¯ij)}
wj
(
c¯−1i (r¯j(wj))− r¯−1j (c¯i(vi))
)
dwjdvi
In the above formula, we use c¯−1i and r¯
−1
j to denote the inverse function of c¯i and r¯j
respectively. However, c¯−1i and r¯
−1
j are non-decreasing, so c¯
−1
i (y) = arg minx{c¯i(x) = y}
is well-defined, so as r¯−1j .
Note Mij is optimal for buyer i and seller j and R¯ij is the expected revenue of Mij ,
i.e. R(Mij). Let M
′
ij(λ, x, y) be the randomized mechanism which runs Mij(x) with
probability λ and Mij(y) with probability 1− λ. Then for all x, y, λ ∈ [0, 1], we have
λ · R¯ij(x) + (1− λ) · R¯ij(y)
= λ ·R(Mij(x)) + (1− λ) ·R(Mij(y))
= R(M ′ij(λ, x, y))
≤ R(M(λx+ (1− λ)y))
= R¯ij(λx+ (1− λ)y)
Therefore, R¯ij(x) is a concave function. Hence, we obtain an 1-approximate primary
mechanism Mij and a corresponding primary benchmark R¯ij . By Theorem 5.9, we have
a γ2-approximation mechanism, where γ = 1 − 1√
k∗+3 ≥ 12 since k∗ = mini,j{di, kj} ≥
1.
For the discrete distribution case, the optimal mechanism for single buyer and single
seller can be computed by linear programming. So we have the similar result.
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Theorem 5.11. Assume that all bidders’ bids are drawn from discrete distributions.
A 14 approximate double auction for the multi-dimensional setting can be found and
implemented in polynomial time.
5.5 Optimal Mechanism for Discrete Distributions
In this section, we consider the multi-dimensional double auction when all the bidders’
value distributions are discrete. Unlike Section 5.4, we consider two special cases of
the problem. One is the case where all buyers have unlimited demand, i.e., di = +∞
for all buyer i and the other one is the case where all sellers have unlimited supply, i.e.
kj = +∞ for all seller j. In this section, we focus on the former. The mechanism and
the proof of the latter are similar.
Recall that, in the multi-dimensional setting, the auctioneer collects each buyer’s
bid, denoted by a vector vi = (vi1, . . . , vim) drawn from a public known distribution Vi
and seller’s bid denoted by wj drawn from Wj . Throughout this section, Vi and Wj are
discrete distributions and we use fi and gj to denote their probability mass function,
i.e. fi(t) = Pr[vi = t] and gj(t) = Pr[wj = t]. It should be emphasized that, unlike
Section 5.4, we do not need to assume that the buyer’s bids for each item should be
independent, i.e. vij and vij′ can be correlated in this section. We also add a dummy
buyer 0 with only one type v0 for buyers and seller 0 with w0 for sellers.
Our approach is motivated by the results of Cai et al. [11] and Alaei et al. [2] which
require a reduced form of x, y, p, q denoted by x¯, y¯, p¯ and q¯ respectively, defined as
follows:
x¯ij(vi, wj) = Ev−i,w−j [xij(v, w)] y¯j(vi, wj) = Ev−i,w−j [yj(v, w)]
p¯i(vi, wj) = Ev−i,w−j [pi(v, w)] q¯j(vi, wj) = Ev−i,w−j [qj(v, w)]
(5.15)
Now we are ready to convert an optimization problem of x, p, y, q to a problem of
x¯, p¯, y¯, q¯ which can be represented by a linear program with polynomial size in T , n
and m where T is the maximum among all |Vi| and |Wj |.
Then BIC constraints (5.1) and IR constraints (5.2) can be rewritten as
Ewj [
∑
j x¯ij(vi, wj)vij − p¯i(vi, wj)] ≥ Ewj [
∑
j x¯ij(v
′
i, wj)vij − p¯i(v′i, wj)]
Evi [q¯j(vi, wj)− y¯j(vi, wj)wj)] ≥ Evi [q¯j(vi, w′j)− y¯j(vi, w′j)wj ]
Ewj [
∑
j x¯ij(vi, wj)vij − p¯i(vi, wj)] ≥ 0
Evi [q¯j(vi, wj)− y¯j(vi, wj)wj)] ≥ 0
(5.16)
Finally, the mechanism should satisfy the supply constraints, i.e., for each item j
and profiles v, w,yj(v, w) =
∑
i xij(v, w) ≤ kj . Note that there is no demand constraint
on buyers. Without loss of generality, we assume that kj = 1 for all j. Otherwise, we
can normalize x by setting x′ij(v, w) = xij(v, w)/kj and refine v, w by setting v
′
ij = kjvij
and w′j = kjwj such that k
′
j = 1 for all item j.
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For the single-item setting of classical auction, i.e. m = 1 and seller’s value for
his item is always 0, Alaei et al. [2] prove a sufficient and necessary condition for the
supply constraint.
Lemma 5.12 (Theorem 2 in [2]). A reduced allocation rule x¯ is feasible if and only if
it can be implemented by the Stochastic Sequential Allocation (SSA) algorithm for some
choice of stochastic transition table. In other words, there exists an ex-post implemen-
tation x of x¯ such that x¯i(vi) = Ev−i [xi(v)] and
∑
i xi(v) ≤ 1 for all v iff there exists
(s, z) such that
s0(v0, 0) = 1
si(vi, i) =
∑i−1
k=0
∑
vk∈Vk zki(vk, vi) ∀i, vi ∈ Vi
sk(vk, i) = sk(vk, i− 1)−
∑
vi∈Vi zki(vk, vi) ∀i, k < i, vk ∈ Vk
zki(vk, vi) ≤ sk(vk, i− 1)fi(vi) ∀i, k < i, vi ∈ Vi, vk ∈ Vk
x¯i(vi)fi(vi) = si(vi, n) ∀i, vi ∈ Vi
(5.17)
Moreover, given any feasible reduced allocation rule x¯, the ex-post of x can be found
efficiently.
We generalize Lemma 5.12 to a multi-dimensional double auction setting.
Lemma 5.13. Given a reduced form x¯, there exists an ex-post implementation x such
that xij(v, w) ≥ 0,
∑
i xij(v, w) ≤ 1 and x¯ij(vi, wj) = Ev−i,w−j [xij(v, w)] iff there exists
(s, z) such that, for each seller j and wj ∈Wj
s
(j)
0 (v0, wj , 0) = 1
s
(j)
i (vi, wj , i) =
∑i−1
k=0
∑
vk∈Vk z
(j)
ki (vk, vi, wj) ∀i, vi ∈ Vi
s
(j)
k (vk, wj , i) = s
(j)
k (vk, wj , i− 1)−
∑
vi∈Vi z
(j)
ki (vk, vi, wj) ∀i, k < i, vk ∈ Vk
z
(j)
ki (vk, vi, wj) ≤ s(j)k (vk, wj , i− 1)fi(vi) ∀i, k < i, vi ∈ Vi, vk ∈ Vk
x¯ij(vi, wj)fi(vi) = s
(j)
i (vi, wj , n) ∀i, vi ∈ Vi
(5.18)
Moreover, given any feasible reduced allocation rule x¯, the ex-post of x¯ can be found
efficiently.
Proof. First, we prove that given a reduced form x¯, there exists an ex-post implemen-
tation x such that
xij(v, w) ≥ 0∑
i xij(v, w) ≤ 1
x¯ij(vi, wj) = Ev−i,w−j [xij(v, w)]
if and only if there exists an ex-interim implementation xˆ such that
xˆij(v, wj) ≥ 0∑
i xˆij(v, wj) ≤ 1
x¯ij(vi, wj) = Ev−i [xˆij(v, wj)]
The necessary part is obvious by just setting xˆij(v, wj) = Ew−j [xij(v, w)]. And the
sufficiency can be checked by letting xij(v, w) = xˆij(v, wj).
Now the lemma can be proved by straightforwardly applying Lemma 5.12 for all j
and wj .
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Finally, we convert the problem of multi-dimensional double auction design problem
to a linear program with reduced form which can be solved in polynomial time in
m,n, T .
Theorem 5.14. Assume all bidders’ bids are drawn from discrete distributions and
all bidders are without demand constraints. An optimal double auction for multi-
dimensional setting can be found and implemented in polynomial time.
Proof. By Lemma 5.13, it suffices to prove the recuded form defined in (5.15) can be
computed in polynomial time. Actually, it can be computed by solving the following
linear program.
Max:
∑
i,j Evi,wj [pi(vi, wj)− qj(vi, wj)]
s.t. Ewj [
∑
j x¯ij(vi, wj)vij − p¯i(vi, wj)] ≥ Ewj [
∑
j x¯ij(v
′
i, wj)vij − p¯i(v′i, wj)]
Evi [q¯j(vi, wj)− y¯j(vi, wj)wj)] ≥ Evi [q¯j(vi, w′j)− y¯j(vi, w′j)wj ]
Ewj [
∑
j x¯ij(vi, wj)vij − p¯i(vi, wj)] ≥ 0
Evi [q¯j(vi, wj)− y¯j(vi, wj)wj)] ≥ 0∑
i xij(vi, wj) ≤ kj
(5.19)
Then by lemma 5.13, we can find the ex-post allocations in polynomial time.
Theorem 5.15. Assume that all bidders’ bids are drawn from discrete distributions
and all sellers are without supply constraints. An optimal double auction for multi-
dimensional setting can be found and implemented in polynomial time.
The proof of the above theorem is similar to Theorem 5.14.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present several optimal or approximately-optimal auctions for a
double auction market. Double auction platforms have started to gain importance
in electronic commerce. One possible example is the ad exchange market proposed to
bring advertisers and web publishers together [63]. There are other potentials in setting
up electronic platforms for sellers and buyers of other types of resources such as in the
context of cloud computing.
Our results on the one hand show the power of recent significant progress in one-
sided markets, and on the other hand raise new challenges in the development of math-
ematical and algorithmic tools for market design.
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Chapter 6
Crowdsourcing Contests: The
Efficiency of All-Pay Auctions
In this chapter, we study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria of all-pay auctions in three
different environments – combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we
consider item-bidding combinatorial auctions where m all-pay auctions run in parallel,
one for each good. For fractionally subadditive valuations, we strengthen the upper
bound from 2 [76] to 1.82 by proving some structural properties that characterize
the mixed Nash equilibria of the game. Next, we design an all-pay mechanism with
a randomized allocation rule for the multi-unit auction. We show that, for bidders
with submodular valuations, the mechanism admits a unique, 75% efficient, pure Nash
equilibrium. The efficiency of this mechanism outperforms all the known bounds on
the price of anarchy of mechanisms used for multi-unit auctions. Finally, we analyze
single-item all-pay auctions motivated by their connection to contests and show tight
bounds on the PoA of social welfare, revenue and maximum bid.
This chapter is based on a joint work [20] with Georgios Chirstodoulou and Alkmini
Sgouritsa, which appears in ESA 2015.
6.1 Overview
It is a common economic phenomenon in competitions that agents make irreversible
investments without knowing the outcome. All-pay auctions are widely used in eco-
nomics to capture such situations, where all players, even the losers, pay their bids. For
example, a lobbyist can make a monetary contribution in order to influence decisions
made by the government. Usually the group invested the most increases their winning
chances, but all groups have to pay regardless of the outcome. In addition, all-pay
auctions have been shown useful to model rent seeking, political campaigns and R&D
races. There is a well-known connection between all-pay auctions and contests [74].
In particular, the all-pay auction can be viewed as a single-prize contest, where the
payments correspond to the effort that players make in order to win the competition.
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In this chapter, we study the efficiency of mixed Nash equilibria in all-pay auctions
with complete information, from a worst-case analysis perspective, using the price of an-
archy [56] as a measure. As social objective, we consider the social welfare, i.e. the sum
of the bidders’ valuations. We study the equilibria induced from all-pay mechanisms
in three fundamental resource allocation scenarios; combinatorial auctions, multi-unit
auctions and single-item auctions.
In a combinatorial auction a set of items are allocated to a group of selfish individ-
uals. Each player has different preferences for different subsets of the items and this
is expressed via a valuation set function. A multi-unit auction, can be considered as
an important special case, where there are multiple copies of a single good. Hence the
valuations of the players are not set functions, but depend only on the number of copies
received. Multi-unit auctions have been extensively studied since the seminal work by
Vickrey [78]. As already mentioned, all-pay auctions have received a lot of attention for
the case of a single item, as they model all-pay contests and procurements via contests.
6.1.1 Main Results
Combinatorial Auctions. Our first result is on the PoA of simultaneous all-pay auctions
with item-bidding that was previously studied by Syrgkanis and Tardos [76]. For si-
multaneous all-pay auctions with fractionally subadditive valuations, it was previously
shown that the price of anarchy was at most 2 [76] and at least e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58 [22].
We narrow further this gap, improving the upper bound to 1.82. In order to obtain
the bound, we come up with several structural theorems that characterize mixed Nash
equilibria in simultaneous all-pay auctions.
Multi-unit Auctions. Our next result shows a novel use of all-pay mechanisms to the
multi-unit setting. We propose an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation
rule inspired by Kelly’s seminal proportional-share allocation mechanism [53]. We
show that this mechanism admits a unique, 75% efficient pure Nash equilibrium and
no other mixed Nash equilibria exist, when bidders’ valuations are submodular. As a
consequence, the price of anarchy of our mechanism outperforms all current price of
anarchy bounds of prevalent multi-unit auctions including uniform price auction [61]
and discriminatory auction [28], where the bound is e/(e− 1) ≈ 1.58.
Single-item Auctions. Finally, we study the efficiency of a single-prize contest that can
be modeled as single-item all-pay auction. We show a tight bound on the PoA for mixed
equilibria which is approximately 1.185. Following previous study on the procurement
via contest, apart from the social welfare, we also study two other standard objectives,
revenue and maximum bid. We evaluate the performance of all-pay auctions in the
prior-free setting, i.e. no distribution over bidders’ valuation is assumed. We show that
both the revenue and the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium are at least as
high as v2/2, where v2 is the second highest valuation. In contrast, the revenue and the
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maximum bid in some mixed Nash equilibrium may be less than v2/2 when using reward
structure other than allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder. This result
coincides with the optimal crowdsourcing contest developed in [16] for the setting with
prior distributions. We also show that in conventional procurements (modeled by first-
price auctions), v2 is exactly the revenue and maximum bid in the worst equilibrium. So
procurement via all-pay contests is a 2-approximation to the conventional procurement
in the context of worst-case equilibria.
6.1.2 Literature Review
The inefficiency of Nash equilibria in auctions has been a well-known fact (see e.g. [57]).
Existence of efficient equilibria of simultaneous sealed bid auctions in full information
settings was first studied by Bikhchandani [8]. Christodoulou, Kova´cs and Schapira [21]
initiated the study of the (Bayesian) PoA of simultaneous auctions with item-bidding.
Several variants have been studied since then [7, 48, 40], as well as multi-unit auctions
[61, 28].
Syrgkanis and Tardos [76] proposed a general smoothness framework for several
types of mechanisms and applied it to settings with fractionally subadditive bidders
obtaining several upper bounds (e.g., first price auction, all-pay auction, and multi-
unit auction). Christodoulou et al. [22] constructed tight lower bounds for first-price
auctions and showed a tight PoA bound of 2 for all-pay auctions with subadditive
valuations. Roughgarden [72] presented an elegant methodology to provide PoA lower
bounds via a reduction from the hardness of the underlying optimization problems.
All-pay auctions and contests have been studied extensively in economic theory.
Baye, Kovenock and de Vries [4], fully characterized the Nash equilibria in single-item
all-pay auction with complete information. The connection between all-pay auctions
and crowdsourcing contests was proposed in [34]. Chawla et al. [16] studied the design
of optimal crowdsourcing contest to optimize the maximum bid in all-pay auctions
when agents’ value are drawn from a specific distribution independently.
6.2 Preliminaries
In a combinatorial auction, n players compete on m items with unit supply. Every
player (or bidder) i ∈ [n] has a valuation function vi : {0, 1}m → R+ which is monotone
and normalized, that is, ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ [m], vi(S) ≤ vi(T ), and vi(∅) = 0. The outcome of
the auction is represented by a tuple of (X,p) where X = (X1, . . . , Xn) specifies the
allocation of items (Xi is the set of items allocated to player i) and p = (p1, . . . , pn)
specifies the buyers payments (pi is the payment of player i for the allocation X). In
the simultaneous item-bidding auction, every player i ∈ [n] submits a non-negative bid
bij for each item j ∈ [m]. The items are then allocated by independent auctions, i.e.
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the allocation and payment rule for item j only depend on the players’ bids on item
j. In a simultaneous all-pay auction the allocation and payment for each player is
determined as follows: each item j ∈ [m] is allocated to the bidder i∗ with the highest
bid for that item, i.e. i∗ = arg maxi bij , and each bidder i is charged an amount equal
to pi =
∑
j∈[m] bij .
Definition 6.1 (Valuations). Let v : 2[m] → R be a valuation function. Then v is called
a) additive, if v(S) =
∑
j∈S v(j); b) submodular
1, if v(S ∪T ) + v(S ∩T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T );
c) fractionally subadditive or XOS, if v is determined by a finite set of additive valuations
fk such that v(S) = maxk fk(S).
The classes of the above valuations are in increasing order of inclusion.
Multi-unit Auction. In a multi-unit auction, m copies of an item are sold to n bidders.
Here, bidder i ’s valuation is a function that depends on the number of copies he
gets. That is vi : {0, 1, . . . ,m} → R+ and it is non-decreasing and normalized, with
vi(0) = 0. We say a valuation vi is submodular, if it has non-increasing marginal values,
i.e. vi(s+ 1)− vi(s) ≥ vi(t+ 1)− vi(t) for all s ≤ t.
Nash equilibrium and price of anarchy We use bi to denote a pure strategy of player i and
it might be a single value or a vector, depending on the auction. So, for the case of m si-
multaneous auctions, bi = (bi1, . . . , bim). We denote by b−i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn)
the strategies of all players except for i. Any mixed strategy Bi of player i is a probability
distribution over bi.
For any profile of strategies, b = (b1, . . . , bn), X(b) denotes the allocation under
the strategy profile b. The valuation of player i for the allocation X(b) is denoted by
vi(X(b)). The utility ui of player i is defined as the difference between her valuation
and payment: ui(X(b)) = vi(X(b))− pi(b).
Definition 6.2. (Nash equilibria) A bidding profile b forms a pure Nash equilibrium
if for all bids b′i and every player i, ui(b) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i). Similarly, a mixed bidding
profile B = ×iBi is a mixed Nash equilibrium if for all bids b′i and every player i,
Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ Eb−i∼B−i [ui(b′i,b−i)]. Clearly, any pure Nash equilibrium is also a
mixed Nash equilibrium.
Our global objective is to maximize the sum of the valuations of the players for their
received allocations, i.e., to maximize the social welfare SW (X) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(Xi). For an
optimal allocation O(v) = O = (O1, . . . , On), SW (O) = maxX SW (X). In Section 6.5,
we also study two other objectives: the revenue, which equals the sum of the payments,∑
i pi, and the maximum payment, maxi bi. We also refer to the maximum payment as
the maximum bid.
1As an equivalent definition, submodular valuations are exactly the valuations with decreasing
marginal bids, meaning that v({j} ∪ T ) − v(T ) ≤ v({j} ∪ S) − v(S) holds for any item j and any
S ⊆ T.
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For simplicity, if the allocation rule X is clear from the context, we use SW (b),
vi(b) and ui(b) instead of SW (X(b)), vi(Xi(b)) and ui(X(b)), to express social welfare,
valuation and utility of player i for the allocation X(b).
Let B = (B1, . . . , Bn) be a profile of mixed strategies. Given the profile B, we fix
the notation for the following cumulative distribution functions (CDF): Gij is the CDF
of the bid of player i for item j; Fj is the CDF of the highest bid for item j and Fij is
the CDF of the highest bid for item j if we exclude the bid of player i. Observe that
Fj = ΠkGkj , and Fij = Πk 6=iGkj . We also use ϕij(x) to denote the probability that
player i gets item j by bidding x. Then, ϕij(x) ≤ Fij(x). When we refer to a single item,
we may drop the index j. Whenever it is clear from the context, we will use shorter
notation for expectations, e.g. we use E[ui(b)] instead of Eb∼B[ui(b)]. For simplicity,
we also use u(B) to denote Eb∼B[u(b)].
6.3 Combinatorial Auctions
In this section we prove an upper bound of 1.82 for the mixed price of anarchy of
simultaneous all-pay auctions when bidders’ valuations are fractionally subadditive.
This result improves over the previously known bound of 2 due to [76]. We first state
our main theorem and present the key ingredients. Then we prove these ingredients in
the following subsections.
6.3.1 Proof Outline
Here we present a (very short) sketch of the proof highlights of the upper bound.
Theorem 6.3. The mixed PoA for simultaneous all-pay auctions with fractionally
subadditive bidders is at most 1.82.
Proof Sketch. We first illustrate the main ideas by focusing on a single item APA.
W.l.o.g. we assume bidder 1 has the highest valuation v1 among all bidders. First we
came up with the following two lower bounds on the social welfare in equilibrium,
SW (B) ≥ A+
∫ v1−A
0
1− F (x)dx, SW (B) ≥
∫ v1−A
0
√
F (x)dx
where F (x) is the CDF of maxi{bi} and A = maxx{F1(x) · v1− v1}. Note that F1(x) is
the CDF of maxi 6=1{bi}. The first inequality is derived from the existing upper bound
2. The proof of the second inequality is based on the structure of mixed equilibria in
APAs. By definition, we have Fi(x) · vi − x ≥ Fi(y) · vi − y if bidder i bids x in the
Nash. By taking limits when y → x, we have that 1/vi equals to the derivative of Fi
at x. So SW (B) can be rewritten as
∑
i
∫ v1
x Fi(x)gi(x)
1
F ′i (x)
dx ≥ ∫ v1−Ax ∑i gi(x)∑
k 6=i
gk(x)
Gk(x)
by using Fi(x) =
∏
k 6=iGk(x). Then we can adapt the following proposition to get the
second lower bound for SW (B).
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Proposition 6.4. For any integer l ≥ 2, any positive real Gi ≤ 1 and positive real gi,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
l∑
i=1
gi∑
k 6=i
gk
Gk
≥
√√√√ l∏
i=1
Gi
The bound 1.82 can be derived by an optimal convex combination of these two lower
bounds for SW (B).In order to generalize the proof from a single to multiple items, we
introduce a notion, that we call expected marginal valuation denoted by vij(x) for
which we show that Fij(x) · vij(x)−x ≥ Fij(y) · vij(x)− y. This allows us to treat each
item separately and get the improved upper bound for simultaneous APAs.
6.3.2 Full Proof
Proof. Given a valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn), let O = (O1, . . . , On) be a fixed
optimal solution that maximizes the social welfare. Since vi is a fractionally subadditive
valuation, let fOii be a maximizing additive function w.r.t Oi. Let j ∈ Oi be one of
the items that i receives. We denote by oj item j’s contribution to the optimal social
welfare, that is, oj = f
Oi
i (j). The optimal social welfare is thus SW (O) =
∑
j oj . In
order to bound the price of anarchy, we consider only items with oj > 0, as it is without
loss of generality to omit items with oj = 0.
For a fixed mixed Nash equilibrium B, recall that by Fj and Fij we denote the
CDFs of the maximum bid on item j among all bidders, with and without the bid
of bidder i, respectively. Observe that Fj(x) ≤ Fij(x). For any item j ∈ Oi, let
Aj = maxx≥0 {Fij(x)oj − x}.
As a key part of the proof we use the following two inequalities that bound from
below the social welfare in any mixed Nash equilibrium B.
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(1− Fj(x))dx) (6.1)
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
∫ oj−Aj
0
√
Fj(x)dx (6.2)
Inequality (6.1), suffices to provide a weaker upper bound of 2 (see [22]). The proof
of Inequality (6.2) is much more involved, and requires deeper understanding of the
properties of equilibria of the induced game. We postpone their proofs to Section 6.3.3
(Lemma 6.5) and Section 6.3.4 (Lemma 6.6) respectively.
By combining (6.1) and (6.2) we get
SW (B) ≥ 1
1 + λ
·
∑
j
(
Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(1− Fj(x))dx+ λ ·
∫ oj−Aj
0
√
Fj(x)dx
)
, (6.3)
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for any λ ≥ 0. It suffices to bound from below the right-hand side of (6.3) with respect
to the optimal social welfare. For any cumulative distribution function F , and any
positive real number v, let
R(F, v)
def
= A+
∫ v−A
0
(1− F (x))dx+ λ ·
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx,
where A = maxx≥0{F (x) · v− x}. Then inequality (6.3) can be rewritten as SW (B) ≥
1
1+λ
∑
j R(Fj , oj). Finally, we show a lower bound on R(F, v) that holds for any CDF
F and any positive real v.
R(F, v) ≥ 3 + 4λ− λ
4
6
· v. (6.4)
The proof of inequality 6.4 is given in Section 6.3.5 (Lemma 6.27). Finally, we obtain
that for any λ > 0,
SW (B) ≥ 1
1 + λ
∑
j
R(Fj , oj) ≥ 3 + 4λ− λ
4
6λ+ 6
·
∑
j
oj =
3 + 4λ− λ4
6λ+ 6
· SW (O)
We conclude that the price of anarchy is at most 6λ+6
3+4λ−λ4 ' 1.82 by taking λ = 0.56.
6.3.3 Proof of Inequality (6.1)
This section is devoted to the proof of the following lower bound.
Lemma 6.5. SW (B) ≥∑j∈[m](Aj + ∫ oj−Aj0 (1− Fj(x))dx).
Proof. Recall that Aj = maxx≥0 {Fij(x)oj − x}. We can bound bidder i’s utility in
the Nash equilibrium B by ui(B) ≥
∑
j∈Oi Aj . To see this, consider the deviation for
bidder i, where he bids only for items in Oi, namely, for each item j, he bids the value
xj that maximizes the expression Fij(xj)oj−xj . Since for any obtained subset T ⊆ Oi,
he has value vi(T ) ≥
∑
j∈T oj , and the bids xj must be paid in any case, the expected
utility with these bids is at least
∑
j∈Oi maxx≥0 (Fij(x)oj − x) =
∑
j∈Oi Aj . With B
being an equilibrium, we infer that ui(B) ≥
∑
j∈Oi Aj .
By summing up over all bidders, we have
SW (B) =
∑
i∈[n]
ui(B) +
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ] ≥
∑
j∈[m]
Aj +
∑
j∈[m]
∑
i∈[n]
E[bij ]
≥
∑
j∈[m]
(Aj + E[max
i∈[n]
{bij}]) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(
Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(1− Fj(x))dx
)
.
The first equality holds because SW (B) =
∑
i Eb[vi(b)] =
∑
i Eb[ui(b)+
∑
j∈[m] bij ].
The second inequality follows because
∑
i bij ≥ maxi bij and the last one is implied by
the definition of the expected value of any positive random variable.
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6.3.4 Proof of Inequality (6.2)
In this section, we prove the following lemma for any mixed Nash equilibrium B.
Lemma 6.6. SW (B) ≥∑j∈[m] ∫ oj−Aj0 √Fj(x)dx.
First we show a useful lemma that holds for fractionally subadditive valuations.
Lemma 6.7. For any fractionally subadditive valuation function v,
v(S) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(v(S)− v(S \ {j})) .
Proof. Let f be a maximizing additive function of S for the fractionally subadditive
valuation v; then by definition v(S) = f(S) and for every item j it holds that v(S \
{j}) ≥ f(S \ {j}). Then,∑
j∈[m]
(v(S)− v(S \ {j})) ≤
∑
j∈[m]
(f(S)− f(S \ {j})) =
∑
j∈S
f(j) = v(S).
We will use the following technical proposition.
Proposition 6.8. For any integer n ≥ 2, any positive reals Gi ≤ 1 and positive reals
gi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n∑
i=1
gi∑
k 6=i
gk
Gk
≥
√√√√ n∏
i=1
Gi.
In order to prove the proposition, we will minimize the left hand side of the inequal-
ity over all Gi and gi, such that
0 < Gi ≤ 1 gi > 0 (i ∈ [n]) where
n∏
t=1
Gt is a constant. (6.5)
We introduce the following notation:
H =
n∑
i=1
gi∑n
t=1,t6=i
gt
Gt
and ∀i, Hi = gi∑n
t=1,t6=i
gt
Gt
.
Note that H =
∑n
i=1Hi. Our goal is to minimize H over all possible variables Gi and
gi under the constraints (6.5), and eventually show H ≥
√∏n
i=1Gi. We also use the
notation G = (Gi)i, g = (gi)i, H = H(G,g) and Hi = Hi(G,g), ∀i.
Lemma 6.9. For every G and g that minimize H(·, ·) under constraints (6.5):
1. If Gi < 1 and Gj < 1, then Hi = Hj ,
2. If Gi = Gj = 1 then gi = gj.
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We prove Lemma 6.9, by proving Lemmas 6.10 and 6.11.
Lemma 6.10. Under constraints (6.5), if G and g minimize H(·, ·), then for every
Gi < 1 and Gj < 1, Hi(G,g) = Hj(G,g).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exist Gi < 1 and Gj < 1 such
that (w.l.o.g.) Hi(G,g) > Hj(G,g). Let
r = min
{(
Hi(G,g)
Hj(G,g)
) 1
2
,
1
Gj
}
.
Notice that r > 1.
Claim: We claim that H(G,g) > H(G′,g′), where G′ = (Gir , rGj ,G−ij) and g
′ =
(gir , rgj ,g−ij).
As usual G−ij stands for G vector after eliminating Gi and Gj (accordingly for g−ij).
Therefore G′ and g′ are the same as G and g by replacing Gi, Gj , gi, gj by Gir , rGj ,
gi
r , rgj , respectively.
Proof of the claim: Notice that
g′i
G′i
=
gi/r
Gi/r
=
gi
Gi
,
g′j
G′j
=
rgj
rGj
=
gj
Gj
and ∀s 6= i, j, G′s = Gs and g′s = gs.
Therefore, ∀s 6= i, j, Hs(G,g) = Hs(G′,g′). So, we only need to show that Hi(G,g) +
Hj(G,g) > Hi(G
′,g′) +Hj(G′,g′).
Hi(G
′,g′) +Hj(G′,g′) =
g′i(x)∑n
t=1,t6=i
g′t(x)
G′t(x)
+
g′j(x)∑n
t=1,t6=j
g′t(x)
G′t(x)
=
gi(x)/r∑n
t=1,t6=i
gt(x)
Gt(x)
+
rgj(x)∑n
t=1,t6=j
gt(x)
Gt(x)
=
Hi(G,g)
r
+ rHj(G,g)
=
(
1
r
− 1
)
Hi(G,g) + (r − 1)Hj(G,g) +Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)
≤
(
1
r
− 1
)
r2Hj(G,g) + (r − 1)Hj(G,g) +Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)
= − (r − 1)2Hj(G,g) +Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)
< Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g).
In the above inequalities we used that r > 1 and r2 ≤ Hi(G,g)Hj(G,g) . The claim contradicts
the assumption that H(G,g) is the minimum, so the lemma holds.
Lemma 6.11. Under constraints (6.5), if G and g minimize H(·, ·), then for every
Gi = Gj = 1, gi = gj .
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Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exist Gi = Gj = 1 such that
gi 6= gj . We will prove that for g′ = (gi+gj2 ,
gi+gj
2 , g−ij) (i.e. for every k 6= i, j, g′k = gk,
and g′i = g
′
j =
gi+gj
2 ), H(G,g) > H(G,g
′).
Notice that for every k 6= i, j, Hk(G,g′) = Hk(G,g), since gi+gj = g′i+g′j and Gi =
Gj = 1. Hence it is sufficient to show that Hi(G,g)+Hj(G,g) ≥ Hi(G,g′)+Hj(G,g′).
Let Aij =
∑
t6=j,t6=i
gt
Gt
.
Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)−Hi(G,g′)−Hj(G,g′)
=
gi
gj +Aij
+
gj
gi +Aij
− gigi+gj
2 +Aij
− gjgi+gj
2 +Aij
=
gi
gj +Aij
+
gj
gi +Aij
− 2gi + 2gj
gi + gj + 2Aij
= gi
(gi +Aij)((gi + gj + 2Aij)− 2(gj +Aij))
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
+ gj
(gj +Aij)((gi + gj + 2Aij)− 2(gi +Aij))
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
=
gi(gi +Aij)(gi − gj) + gj(gj +Aij)(gj − gi)
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
=
(gi − gj)(g2i − g2j +Aij(gi − gj))
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
=
(gi − gj)2(gi + gj +Aij)
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
> 0,
which contradicts the assumption that G and g minimize H(·, ·).
Lemma 6.12. If Hi = Hj, then:
1. gi = gj ⇔ Gi = Gj,
2. (gi = rgj > 0 and r ≥ 1)⇒ Gi ≥ r2Gj.
Proof. Let Aij =
∑
t6=j,t6=i
gt
Gt
; then Hi =
gi
gj
Gj
+Aij
. By assumption:
gi
gj
Gj
+Aij
=
gj
gi
Gi
+Aij
g2i
Gi
+ giAij =
g2j
Gj
+ gjAij
(gi − gj)Aij =
g2j
Gj
− g
2
i
Gi
.
If gi = gj then
1
Gj
− 1Gi = 0, so Gi = Gj .
If Gi = Gj then (gi− gj)(gi + gj +AijGi) = 0 . Under constraints (6.5), AijGi > 0 and
gi, gj > 0, so gi − gj = 0 which results in gi = gj .
If gi = rgj , with r ≥ 1 then (gi − gj)Aij ≥ 0 and so 1Gj − r
2
Gi
≥ 0, which implies
Gi ≥ r2Gj .
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Lemma 6.13. For n, k integers, n ≥ 2, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, 0 < a ≤ 1 and g > 0:
L =
kg
(k − 1) ga + n− k
+
n− k
k ga + n− k − 1
≥ a.
Proof. We distinguish between two cases, 1) k > 1
1−√a and 2) k ≤ 11−√a .
Case 1 (k > 1
1−√a): For k = n, L =
k
k−1a ≥ a. We next show that dLdg ≤ 0, for n ≥ 2,
1 ≤ k < n, 0 < a ≤ 1 and g > 0.
dL
dg
=
(n− k)k(
(k−1)g
a + n− k
)2 − (n− k)k(
kg
a + n− k − 1
)2
a
≤ 0
(
(k − 1)g
a
+ n− k
)2
−
(
kg
a
+ n− k − 1
)2
a ≥ 0(
(k − 1)g
a
+ n− k −
(
kg
a
+ n− k − 1
)
a
1
2
)
≥ 0(g
a
(
k − 1− ka 12
)
+ (n− k)
(
1− a 12
)
+ a
1
2
)
≥ 0
k − 1− ka 12 ≥ 0
which is true by the case assumption. Therefore, L is non-increasing and so it is
minimized for g =∞. Hence, L ≥ kk−1a ≥ a.
Case 2 (k ≤ 1
1−√a): L is minimized (dL/dg(g
∗) = 0) for g∗ = a(
√
a+(n−k)(1−√a))
k
√
a−k+1 ,
therefore:
L ≥
k2 (1−√a)2 + k
(
a− n (1−√a)2 − 1
)
+ n)
(n− 1) ,
which is minimizes for k = n2 +
(1+
√
a)
2(1−√a) . However, for n ≥ 2,
n
2 +
(1+
√
a)
2(1−√a) ≥
1
1−√a .
Notice, though, that for k ≤ 1
1−√a , L is decreasing, so it is minimized for k =
1
1−√a .
Therefore, L ≥ √a ≥ a.
Proof. (Proposition 6.8)
Let G and g minimize H(·, ·) and also let S = {i|Gi < 1} and F =
∏n
t=1Gt. Moreover,
given Lemma 6.9, for gi = gˆ for every i /∈ S and j = arg mini∈S gi, H(G,g) can be
written as:
H(G,g) = |S| gj∑
t∈S,t6=j
gt
Gt
+ (n− |S|)gˆ + (n− |S|)
gˆ∑
t∈S
gt
Gt
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ .
Let gi = rigj , for every i ∈ S. Since j = arg mini∈S gi, then for every i ∈ S, ri ≥ 1. By
using Lemma 6.12:
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H(G,g) = |S| gj∑
t∈S,t6=j
rtgj
G
1
2
t G
1
2
t
+ (n− |S|)gˆ + (n− |S|)
gˆ∑
t∈S
rtgj
G
1
2
t G
1
2
t
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ
≥ |S| gj∑
t∈S,t6=j
gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S|)gˆ + (n− |S|)
gˆ∑
t∈S
gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ
= |S| gj
(|S| − 1) gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S|)gˆ + (n− |S|)
gˆ
|S| gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ .
Let g =
gj
gˆ , then:
H(G,g) ≥ |S|g
(|S| − 1) g
F
1
2
+ n− |S| +
n− |S|
|S| g
F
1
2
+ n− |S| − 1 .
If |S| = 0, H(G,g) ≥ nn−1 ≥ 1 ≥
√
F . else, due to Lemma 6.13, H(G,g) ≥ √F .
We are now ready to proceed with the proof of Lemma 6.6. We first state a proof
sketch here to illustrate the main ideas.
Sketch of Lemma 6.6. Recall that Gij is the CDF of the bid of player i for item j.
For simplicity, we assume Gij(x) is non-decreasing, continuous and differentiable, with
gij(x) being the PDF of player i’s bid for item j. The general case is considered later.
First, we define the expected marginal valuation of item j w.r.t player i.
vij(x)
def
= Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x]
Given the above definition and a careful characterization of mixed Nash equilibria, we
are able to show Fij(x) · vij(x) = E[vi(Xi(b)) − vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x] and 1vij(x) =
dFij(x)
dx for any x in the support of Gij . Let gij(x) be the derivative of Gij(x). Using
Lemma 6.7, we have
SW (B) =
∑
i
E[vi(Xi(b))] ≥
∑
i
∑
j
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})]
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x] · gij(x)dx
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x)dx,
where the second inequality follows by the law of total probability. By using the facts
that Fij(x) =
∏
k 6=iGkj(x) and
1
vij(x)
=
dFij(x)
dx , for any x > 0 such that gij(x) > 0 and
Fj(x) > 0, we obtain
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) =Fij(x) · gij(x)dFij
dx (x)
=
∏
k 6=iGkj(x) · gij(x)∑
k 6=i
(
gkj ·
∏
s 6=k∧s 6=iGsj
) = gij(x)∑
k 6=i
gkj(x)
Gkj(x)
.
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For every x > 0, we use Proposition 6.8 only over the set S of players with gij(x) > 0.
After summing over all bidders we get,∑
i∈[n]
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) ≥
∑
i∈S
gij(x)∑
k 6=i,k∈S
gkj
Gkj
≥
√∏
i∈S
Gij(x) ≥
√
Fj(x).
Note that the above inequality holds even for x > 0, such that Fj(x) = 0. Finally, by
merging the above inequalities, we conclude that
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
∫ oj−Aj
0
√
Fj(x)dx.
Recall that oj is the contribution of item j to the optimum social welfare. If player i
is the one receiving item j in the optimum allocation, then Aj = maxx≥0{Fij(x)·oj−x}.
The proof of Lemma 6.6 needs a careful technical preparation that we divided into a
couple of lemmas.
First of all, we define the expected marginal valuation of item j for player i. For
given mixed strategy Bi, the distribution of bids on items in [m] \ {j} depends on the
bid bij , so one can consider the given conditional expectation:
Definition 6.14. Given a mixed bidding profile B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn), the expected
marginal valuation vij(x) of item j for player i when bij = x is defined as
vij(x)
def
= Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x].
For a given B, let ϕij(x) denote the probability that bidder i gets item j when she
bids x on item j. It is clear that ϕij is non-decreasing and ϕij(x) ≤ Fij(x) (they are
equal when no ties occur).
Lemma 6.15. For a given B, for any bidder i, item j and bids x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0,
ϕij(y) · vij(x) = Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x],
where b′ is the modified bid of b such that b′ = b except that b′ij = y.
Proof.
Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x]
= Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)]Pr(j ∈ Xi(b′)|bij = x)
+ Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j /∈ Xi(b′)]Pr(j /∈ Xi(b′)|bij = x)
= Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)]Pr(j ∈ Xi(b′)|bij = x)
= Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)] · ϕij(y)
= Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b′) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)] · ϕij(y)
= Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b′) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x] · ϕij(y)
= ϕij(y) · vij(x).
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The second equality is due to Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b′)))−vi(Xi(b′)\{j})|bij = x, j /∈ Xi(b′)] =
0; the third one holds because b′ij = y, and that other players’ bids have distribution
×k 6=iBk. The fourth one is obvious, since Xi(b′) = Xi(b′) ∪ {j} given that j ∈ Xi(b′).
The last two equalities follow from the fact that vi(Xi(b
′) ∪ {j}) − vi(Xi(b′) \ {j}) is
independent of the condition j ∈ Xi(b′) and of the player i’s bid on item j.
Definition 6.16. Given a Nash equilibrium B, we say a bid x is good for bidder i and
item j (or bij = x is good) if E[ui(b)] = E[ui(b)|bij = x], otherwise we say bij = x is
bad.
Lemma 6.17. Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i and item j, Pr[bij is bad] =
0.
Proof. The lemma follows from the definition of Nash equilibrium; otherwise we can
replace the bad bids with good bids and improve the bidder’s utility.
Lemma 6.18. Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i, item j, good bid x and
any bid y ≥ 0,
ϕij(x) · vij(x)− x ≥ ϕij(y) · vij(x)− y.
Moreover, for a good bid x > 0, ϕij(x) > 0 holds.
Proof. Let b′ be the modified bid of b such that b′ = b except that b′ij = y.
E[ui(b)] = E[ui(b)|bij = x] ≥ E[ui(b′)|bij = x].
Now we consider the difference between the above two terms:
0 ≤ E[ui(b)|bij = x]− E[ui(b′)|bij = x]
= E[vi(Xi(b))− bij |bij = x]− E[vi(Xi(b′))− b′ij |bij = x]
= E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x]− E[vi(Xi(b′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j}|bij = x] + y − x
= (ϕij(x) · vij(x)− x)− (ϕij(y) · vij(x)− y).
The second equality holds since Xi(b) \ {j} = Xi(b′) \ {j}; the third equality holds by
Lemma 6.15.
Finally, ϕij(x) > 0 for positive good bids follows by taking y = 0, since with
ϕij(x) = 0 the left hand side of the inequality would be negative.
Next, by using the above lemma, we are able to show several structural results for
Nash equilibria.
Definition 6.19. Given a mixed strategy profile B, we say that a positive bid x > 0
is in bidder i’s support on item j, if for all ε > 0, Gij(x)−Gij(x− ε) > 0.
Lemma 6.20. Given a mixed strategy profile B, if a positive bid x is in bidder i’s
support on item j, then for every ε > 0, there exists x−ε < x′ ≤ x such that x′ is good.
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Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there is an ε > 0 such that for all x′, such that
x− ε < x′ ≤ x, x′ is bad. Then Pr[bij is bad] ≥ Gij(x)−Gij(x− ε) > 0 (given that x
is in the support), which contradicts Lemma 6.17.
Lemma 6.21. Given a Nash equilibrium B, if x > 0 is in bidder i’s support on item j,
then there must exist another bidder k 6= i such that x is also in the bidder k’s support
on item j, i.e. for all ε > 0, Gkj(x)−Gkj(x− ε) > 0.
Proof. Assume on the contrary that for each player k 6= i, there exists εk > 0 such
that Gkj(x) −Gkj(x − εk) = 0. Clearly, for ε = min{εk|k 6= i} it holds that Gkj(x) −
Gkj(x − ε) = 0 for all bidders k 6= i. That is ϕij(x) = ϕij(x − ε). By Lemma 6.20,
there exists x − ε < x′ ≤ x such that x′ is good for player i. Since ϕij is a non-
decreasing function and ϕij(x) = ϕij(x− ε), we have ϕij(x′) = ϕij(x− ε). By Lemma
6.18, ϕij(x
′) · vij(x′) − x′ ≥ ϕij(x − ε) · vij(x′) − x + ε which contradicts the fact that
ϕij(x
′) = ϕij(x− ε) and x′ > x− ε.
Lemma 6.22. Given a Nash equilibrium B, for bidder i and item j, there are no x > 0
such that Pr[bij = x] > 0, i.e. there are no mass points in the bidding strategy, except
for possibly 0.
Proof. Assume on the contrary that there exists a bid x > 0 such that Pr[bij = x] > 0
for some bidder i and item j. By Lemma 6.17, x is good for bidder i and item j, and
ϕij(x) > 0 by Lemma 6.18.
According to Lemma 6.21, there must exist a bidder k such that x is in her support
on item j. We can pick a sufficiently small ε such that ε < (x− ε) ·ϕij(x) ·Pr[bij = x].
This can be done since (x − ε) increases when ε decreases. Due to Lemma 6.20 there
exists x − ε < x′ ≤ x such that x′ is good for bidder k and item j. Now we consider
the following two cases for x′.
Case 1: vkj(x
′) ≤ x′. Then ϕkj(x′) · vkj(x′) − x′ ≤ ϕkj(x′) · x′ − x′ ≤ (1 − ϕij(x) ·
Pr[bij = x]) · x′ − x′ < 0, contradicting Lemma 6.18. The first inequality holds by
the case assumption. The second holds because player k cannot get item j with bid x′
whenever player i gets it by bidding x. The last inequality holds because both ϕij(x) > 0
and Pr[bij = x] > 0.
Case 2: vkj(x
′) > x′. Then there exists a sufficiently small ε′ such that ε′ ≤
(x− ε) · ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x]− ε. So ε+ ε′ ≤ x′ · ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x]. Then,
ϕkj(x+ ε
′) · vkj(x′)− x− ε′
≥(ϕkj(x′) + ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x]) · vkj(x′)− x− ε′
>ϕkj(x
′) · vkj(x′) + ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x] · x′ − x′ − (x− x′)− ε′
>ϕkj(x
′) · vkj(x′) + ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x] · x′ − x′ − ε− ε′
≥ϕkj(x′) · vkj(x′)− x′,
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which contradicts Lemma 6.18. Here the first inequality holds because the probability
that player k gets the item with bid x+ ε′ is at least the probablity that he gets it by
bidding x′ plus the probability that i bids x and gets the item (these two events for
b−k are disjoint). The second inequality holds by case assumption, and the rest hold
by our assumptions on ε and ε′.
Lemma 6.23. Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i and item j, ϕij(x) =
Fij(x) for all x > 0.
Proof. The lemma follows immediately from Lemma 6.22. The probablity that some
player k 6= i bids exactly x is zero. Thus Fij(x) equals the probability that the highest
bid of players other than i is strictly smaller than x, and 1− Fij(x) is the probability
that it is strictly higher. Therefore ϕij(x) = Fij(x).
Lemma 6.24. Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i, item j and good bids
x1 > x2 > 0, vij(x1) ≥ vij(x2).
Proof. By Lemma 6.18, we have (ϕij(x1)− ϕij(x2)) · vij(x1) ≥ x1 − x2 and (ϕij(x2)−
ϕij(x1)) · vij(x2) ≥ x2 − x1. Combining these two inequalities, we have
1
vij(x1)
≤ ϕij(x1)− ϕij(x2)
x1 − x2 ≤
1
vij(x2)
.
Lemma 6.25. Given a Nash equilibrium B and item j, let T = sup{x|x is in some
bidder’s support on item j}. For any bid x < T , x is in some bidder’s support on item
j.
Proof. Assume on the contrary that there exist a bid x < T such that x is not in any
bidder’s support. Then there exists δ > 0 such that Gij(x) = Gij(x− δ) for all bidder
i. Let y = sup{z|∀i, Gij(x) = Gij(z)}. By Lemma 6.22, Gij is continuous. So we have
Gij(y) = Gij(x) = Gij(x − δ) for any bidder i. That is Fij(y) = Fij(x − δ) for any
bidder i.
By the definition of supremum, there exists a bidder k such that for any ε > 0,
Gkj(y+ ε) > Gkj(x) = Gkj(y). By Lemma 6.17, there exists a good bid y
+ ∈ (y, y+ ε]
for bidder k and item j. We pick a sufficiently small ε such that (Fkj(y
+) − Fkj(y)) ·
vkj(y
+) < δ. This can be done since Fkj is continuous by Lemma 6.22 and vkj is
non-decreasing by Lemma 6.24.
Fkj(x− δ) · vij(y+)− x+ δ
=Fij(y) · vij(y+)− x+ δ
>Fij(y) · vij(y+)− y+ + δ
>Fij(y
+) · vij(y+)− y+,
which contradicts Lemma 6.18 and Lemma 6.23.
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Lemma 6.26. Given a Nash equilibrium B, if x > 0 is a good bid for bidder i and
item j, and Fij is differentiable in x, then
1
vij(x)
=
dFij(x)
dx
.
Proof. Notice that vij(x) 6= 0 by Lemma 6.18. By Lemma 6.18 and 6.23, we have
Fij(x) · vij(x)− x ≥ Fij(y) · vij(x)− y for all y ≥ 0. So for any ε > 0,
Fij(x) · vij(x)− x ≥ Fij(x+ ε) · vij(x)− x− ε
Fij(x) · vij(x)− x ≥ Fij(x− ε) · vij(x)− x+ ε.
That is,
Fij(x+ ε)− Fij(x)
ε
≤ 1
vij(x)
,
Fij(x)− Fij(x− ε)
ε
≥ 1
vij(x)
.
The lemma follows by taking the limit when ε goes to 0.
Proof of Lemma 6.6. Since Gij(x) is non-decreasing, continuous (Lemma 6.22) and
bounded by 1, Gij(x) is differentiable on almost all points. That is, the set of all
non-differentiable points has Lebesgue measure 0. So it will not change the value of in-
tegration if we remove these points. Therefore it is without loss of generality to assume
Gij(x) is differentiable for all x. Let gij(x) be the derivative of Gij(x), i.e. probability
density function for bidder i’s bidding on item j. Using Lemma 6.7, we have
SW (B) =
∑
i
E[vi(Xi(b))]
≥
∑
i
∑
j
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})]
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x] · gij(x)dx
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x)dx.
The second inequality follows by the law of total probability, and the third is due
to Lemmas 6.15 and 6.23. By Lemma 6.26 and the fact that Fij(x) =
∏
k 6=iGkj(x), if
x is good, gij(x) > 0 and Gij(x) > 0 we have for all j
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) =Fij(x) · gij(x)dFij
dx (x)
=
∏
k 6=iGkj(x) · gij(x)∑
k 6=i
(
gkj ·
∏
s6=k∧s 6=iGsj
) = gij(x)∑
k 6=i
gkj(x)
Gkj(x)
.
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By concentrating on a specific item j, let Sx be the set of bidders so that x is
in their support. We next show that |Sx| ≥ 2 for all x ∈ (0, oj − Aj ]. Recall that
Aj = maxx {Fij(x)·oj−x} for the bidder i who receives j in O. Let hij = min{x|Fij = 1}
(we use minimum instead of infimum, since, by Lemma 6.22, Fij is continuous). By
definition hij should be in some bidder’s support. Moreover, Aj ≥ Fij(hij) · oj − hij =
oj − hij , resulting in oj −Aj ≤ hij . Therefore, by Lemma 6.25, for all x ∈ (0, oj −Aj ],
x is in some bidder’s support and by Lemma 6.21, there are at least 2 bidders such
that x is in their supports.
By the definition of derivative, for all i 6∈ Sx, gij(x) = 0. Similarly, we have
gij(x) > 0 and Gij(x) > 0 for all i ∈ Sx by definition 6.19. Moreover, for every
i ∈ Sx, x is good for bidder i and item j, since x is in their support. So, for any
fixed x ∈ (0, oj − Aj ],
∑
i∈[n] Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) =
∑
i∈Sx Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x), and
according to Proposition 6.8,∑
i∈[n]
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) ≥
∑
i∈Sx
gij(x)∑
k 6=i,k∈Sx
gkj
Gkj
≥
√∏
i∈Sx
Gij(x) ≥
√∏
i∈[n]
Gij(x).
Merging all these inequalities,
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
∫ oj−Aj
0
√∏
i∈[n]
Gij(x)dx =
∑
j∈[m]
∫ oj−Aj
0
√
Fj(x)dx.
6.3.5 Proof of Inequality (6.4)
In this section we prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma 6.27. For any CDF F and any real v > 0, R(F, v) ≥ 3+4λ−λ46 v.
In order to obtain a lower bound for R(F, v) as stated in the lemma, we show first
that we can restrict attention to cumulative distribution functions of a simple special
form, since these constitute worst cases for R(F, v). In the next lemma, for an arbitrary
CDF F we will define a simple piecewise linear function Fˆ that satisfies the following
two properties.
∫ v−A
0
(1− Fˆ (x))dx =
∫ v−A
0
(1− F (x))dx and
∫ v−A
0
√
Fˆ (x)dx ≤
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx.
Once we establish this, it will be convenient to lower bound R(Fˆ , v) for the given
type of piecewise linear functions Fˆ .
Lemma 6.28. For any CDF F and real v > 0, there always exists another CDF Fˆ
such that R(F, v) ≥ R(Fˆ , v) that is defined by
Fˆ (x) =
{
0 if x ∈ [0, x0]
x+A
v if x ∈ (x0, v −A]
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.1: Figure (a) illustrates Fˆ (x) = liml→∞ Fˆl(x) and figure (b) shows how Q′ is
derived from Q.
where A = maxx≥0{F (x) · v − x}.
Proof. First notice that maxx≥0{Fˆ (x) · v − x} = A. By the definition of Riemann
integration, we can represent the integration as the limit of Riemann sums. For any
positive integer l, let Rl be the Riemann sum if we partition the interval [0, v−A] into
small intervals of size (v −A)/l. That is
Rl(F, v) = A+
v −A
l
·
(
l−1∑
i=0
(1− F (xi)) + λ ·
l−1∑
i=0
√
F (xi)
)
where xi =
i
l · (v −A). So we have R(F, v) = liml→∞Rl(F, v).
For any given l, let i∗ be the index such that
∑
i>i∗(xi + A)/v <
∑l−1
i=0 F (xi) and∑
i>=i∗(xi +A)/v ≥
∑l−1
i=0 F (xi). We define Fˆl as follows.
Fˆl(x) =

0 if x < xi∗∑l−1
i=0 F (xi)−
∑
i>i∗(xi +A)/v if x ∈ [xi∗ , xi∗+1)
(x+A)/v if x ∈ [xi∗+1, v −A]
It is straight-forward to check that Fˆ (x) = liml→∞ Fˆl(x), as described in the statement
of the lemma. We will show that for any l, Rl(F, v) ≥ Rl(Fˆl, v). Then the lemma
follows by taking the limit, since Rl(F, v) → R(F, v), and Rl(Fˆ , v) → R(Fˆ , v). Figure
6.1(a) illustrates Fˆ (x) (when we take the limit of l to infinity).
By the construction of Fˆl, it is easy to check that
∑l−1
i=0 F (xi) =
∑l−1
i=0 Fˆl(xi) and
maxx{Fˆl(x) · v − x} = A. Then in order to prove Rl(F, v) ≥ Rl(Fˆl, v), it is sufficient
to prove that
∑l−1
i=0
√
F (xi) ≥
∑l−1
i=0
√
Fˆl(xi). Let Q be the set of CDF functions such
that ∀Q ∈ Q, ∑l−1i=0Q(xi) = ∑l−1i=0 F (xi) and A = maxx≥0{Q(x) · v − x}, meaning
further that Q(x) ≤ (x+A)/v, for all x ≥ 0. We will show that Fˆl(x) has the minimum
value for the expression
∑l−1
i=0
√
Fˆl(xi) within Q.
Assume on the contrary that some other function Q ∈ Q has the minimum value for∑l−1
i=0
√
Q(xi) within Q and Q(xj) 6= Fˆl(xj) for some xj . Let i1 be the smallest index
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such that Q(xi1) > 0 and i2 be the largest index such that Q(xi2) < (xi2 + A)/v. By
the monotonicity of Q, we have i1 ≤ i2. Due to the assumption that Q(xj) 6= Fˆl(xj)
for some xj and
∑l−1
i=0
√
Q(xi) ≤
∑l−1
i=0
√
Fˆl(xi), we get i1 6= i2. So i1 < i2 and
Q(xi1) < Q(xi2) by the monotonicity of CDF functions. Now consider another CDF
function Q′ such that Q′(xi) = Q(xi) for all i 6= i1 ∧ i 6= i2, Q′(xi1) = Q(xi1) −  and
Q′(xi2) = Q(xi2) +  where  = min{Q(xi1), (xi2 +A)/v−Q(xi2)}. Figure 6.1(b) shows
how we modify Q to Q′. It is easy to check Q′ ∈ Q and ∑l−1i=0√Q(xi) >∑l−1i=0√Q′(xi)
which contradicts the optimality of Q. The inequality holds because of
√
a +
√
b >√
a− c+√b+ c for all 0 < c < a < b, which can be proved by simple calculations.
Now we are ready to proceed with the proof of Lemma 6.27.
Proof of Lemma 6.27. By Lemma 6.28, for any fixed v > 0, we only need to consider
the CDF’s that have the following form. For any positive A and x0 such that x0+A ≤ v,
F (x) =
{
0 if x ∈ [0, x0]
x+A
v if x ∈ (x0, v −A]
Clearly, maxx≥0{F (x) · v − x} = A. Let t = A+x0v . Then
R(F, v) = A+
∫ v−A
0
1− F (x)dx+ λ ·
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx
= v − v
2
·
(
x+A
v
)2 ∣∣∣∣v−A
x0
+ λ · 2v
3
·
(
x+A
v
) 3
2
∣∣∣∣v−A
x0
= v − v
2
· (1− t2) + λ · 2v
3
· (1− t 32 )
= v ·
(
1
2
(1 + t2) +
2λ
3
(1− t 32 )
)
By optimizing over t, the above formula is minimized when t = λ2 ≤ 1. That is,
R(F, v) ≥ v ·
(
1
2
(1 + λ4) +
2λ
3
(1− λ3)
)
=
3 + 4λ− λ4
6
· v
6.4 Multi-unit Auctions
In this section, we propose a randomized all-pay mechanism for the multi-unit setting,
where m identical items are to be allocated to n bidders. Markakis and Telelis [61] and
de Keijzer et al. [28] have studied the price of anarchy for several multi-unit auction
formats. The current best upper bound obtained was 1.58 for both pure and mixed
Nash equilibria.
We propose a randomized all-pay mechanism that induces a unique pure Nash equi-
librium, with an improved price of pnarchy bound of 4/3. We call the mechanism Ran-
dom proportional-share allocation mechanism (PSAM), as it is a randomized version of
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Kelly’s celebrated proportional-share allocation mechanism for divisible resources [53].
The mechanism works as follows (illustrated as Mechanism 1).
Each bidder submits a non-negative real bi to the auctioneer. After soliciting all
the bids from the bidders, the auctioneer associates a real number xi with bidder i that
is equal to xi =
m·bi∑
i∈[n] bi
. Each player pays their bid, pi = bi. In the degenerate case,
where
∑
i bi = 0, then xi = 0 and pi = 0 for all i.
We turn the xi’s to a random allocation as follows. Each bidder i secures bxic
items and gets one more item with probability xi − bxic. An application of the
Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition theorem guarantees that given an allocation vec-
tor (x1, x2, . . . , xn) with
∑
i xi = m, one can always find a randomized allocation
2 with
random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn such that E[Xi] = xi and Pr[bxic ≤ Xi ≤ dxie] = 1.
We next show that the game induced by the Random PSAM when the bidders
have submodular valuations is isomorphic to the game induced by Kelly’s mechanism
for a single divisible resource when bidders have piece-wise linear concave valuations.
For convenience, we review the definition of isomorphism between games as appears in
Monderer and Shapley [62].
Definition 6.29. [62]. Let Γ1 and Γ2 be games in strategic form with the same set of
players [n]. For k = 1, 2, let (Aik)i∈[n] be the strategy sets in Γk, and let (u
i
k)i∈[n] be the
utility functions in Γk. We say that Γ1 and Γ2 are isomorphic if there exists bijections
φi : ai1 → ai2, i ∈ [n] such that for every i ∈ [n] and every (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ ×i∈[n]Ai1,
ui1(a
1, a2, . . . , an) = ui2(φ
1(a1), φ2(a2), . . . , φn(an)).
Theorem 6.30. Any game induced by the Random PSAM applied to the multi-unit set-
ting with submodular bidders is isomorphic to a game induced from Kelly’s mechanism
applied to a single divisible resource with piece-wise linear concave functions.
2As an example, assume x1 = 2.5, x2 = 1.6, x3 = 1.9. One can define a random allocation such that
assignments (3, 2, 1), (3, 1, 2) and (2, 2, 2) occur with probabilities 0.1, 0.4, and 0.5 respectively.
Mechanism 1: Random PSAM
Input: Total number of items m and all bidders’ bid b1, b2, . . . , bn
Output: Ex-post allocations X1, X2, . . . , Xn and payments p1, p2, . . . , pn
if
∑
i∈[n] bi > 0 then
foreach bidder i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
xi ← m·bi∑
i∈[n] bi
;
pi ← bi;
Sample {Xi}i∈[n] from {xi}i∈[n] by using Birkhoff-von Neumann
decomposition theorem such that bxic ≤ X ≤ dxie and the expectation of
sampling Xi is xi;
else Set X = 0 and p = 0;
Return Xi and pi for all i ∈ [n];
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of the concave function.
The left part of the figure depicts some submodular function f , while the right part
depicts the modified concave function g. One can verify that g is concave if f is
submodular.
Proof. For each bidder i’s submodular valuation function fi : {0, 1, . . . ,m} → R+, we
associate a concave function gi : [0, 1]→ R+ such that,
for every x ∈ [0,m], gi(x/m) = fi(bxc) + (x− bxc) · (fi(bxc+ 1)− fi(bxc)). (6.6)
Essentially, gi is the piecewise linear function that comprises the line segments that
connect fi(k) with fi(k + 1), for all nonnegative integers k. It is easy to see that gi is
concave if fi is submodular (see also Figure 6.4 for an illustration).
We use identity functions as the bijections φi of Definition 6.29. Therefore, it suffices
to show that, for any pure strategy profile b, ui(b) = u
′
i(b), where ui and u
′
i are the
bidder i’s utility functions in the first and second game, respectively. Let xi =
m·bi∑
i bi
,
then
ui(b) = (xi − bxic)fi(bxic+ 1) + (1− xi + bxic)fi(bxic)− bi
= fi(bxic) + (xi − bxic)(fi(bxic+ 1)− fi(bxic))− bi
= gi
(xi
m
)
− bi = gi
(
bi∑
i bi
)
− bi = u′i(b),
where gi
(
bi∑
i bi
)
− bi is the utility of player i, under strategy profile b, in Kelly’s
mechanism.
Given submodular functions (fi)i, let (gi)i be the associated concave functions as
defined in (6.6). We can show the following equivalence between optimal welfares.
Lemma 6.31. The optimum social welfare in the multi-unit setting, with submodular
valuations f = (f1, . . . , fn), is equal to the optimal social welfare in the divisible resource
allocation with concave valuations g = (g1, . . . gn), where g is derived from f as described
in (6.6).
Proof. For any valuation profile v and (randomized) allocationA, we denote by SWv(A)
the social welfare of allocation A under the valuations v. For any fractional allocation
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x = (x1, . . . , xn), such that
∑
i xi = m, let X(x) = (X1(x), . . . , Xn(x)) be the random
allocation as computed by the Random PSAM given the fractional allocation x. Also
let o = (o1, . . . , on) and O = (O1, . . . , On) be the optimal allocations in the divisible
resource allocation problem and in the multi-unit auction, respectively.
First we show that SWg(o) ≥ SWf (O). Consider the fractional allocation o′ =
(o′1, . . . , o′n), where o′i = Oi/m, for every i. Then it is easy to see that for every i,
gi(o
′
i) = fi(bOic) + (Oi − bOic) · (fi(bOic + 1) − fi(bOic)) = fi(Oi), since Oi is an
integer. Therefore, SWg(o) ≥ SWg(o′) = SWf (O), by the optimality of o.
Now we show SWf (O) ≥ SWg(o). Note that for any fractional allocation x, such
that
∑
j xj = m, EX(x)[fi(Xi(x))] = fi(bxic) + (xi − bxic) · (fi(bxic+ 1)− fi(bxic)) =
gi(xi/m), for every i. By the optimality of O, SWf (O) ≥ EX(m·o)[SWf (X(m · o))] =
SWg(o).
Theorem 6.30 and Lemma 6.31, allow us to obtain the existence and uniqueness of
the pure Nash equilibrium, as well as the price of anarchy bounds of Random PSAM
by the corresponing results on Kelly’s mechanism for a single divisible resource [51].
Moreover, it can be shown that there are no other mixed equilibria by adopting the
arguments of [13] for Kelly’s mechanism. The main conclusion of this section is sum-
marized in the following Corollary.
Corollary 6.32. Random PSAM induces a unique pure Nash equilibrium when applied
to the multi-unit setting with submodular bidders. Moreover, the price of anarchy of
the mechanism is exactly 4/3.
6.5 Single item auctions
In this section, we study mixed Nash equilibria in a single item all-pay auction. First,
in Section 6.5.1 we measure the inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria, showing tight
results for the price of anarchy. Then in Section 6.5.2, we analyze the quality of two
other important criteria, the expected revenue (the sum of bids) and the quality of
the expected highest submission (the maximum bid), which is a standard objective in
crowdsourcing contests [16]. For these objectives, we show a lower bound of v2/2, where
v2 is the second highest value among all bidders’ valuations. In the following, we drop
the word expected while referring to the revenue or to the maximum bid.
We quantify the loss of revenue and the highest submission in the worst-case equi-
libria. We show that the all-pay auction achieves a 2-approximation comparing to
the conventional procurement (modeled as the first price auction), when considering
worst-case mixed Nash equilibria; we show in Section 6.5.3 that the revenue and the
maximum bid of the conventional procurement equals v2 in the worst case. We also
consider other structures of rewards allocation and conclude that allocating the entire
reward to the highest bidder is the only way to guarantee the approximation factor of
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2. Roughly speaking, allocating all the reward to the top prize is the optimal way to
maximize the maximum bid and revenue among all the prior-free all-pay mechanisms
where the designer has no prior information about the participants’ skills.
Throughout this section we assume that the players are ordered based on decreasing
order of their valuations, i.e. v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn.
6.5.1 Social Welfare
Our analysis is based on the characterization of the Nash equilibrium with single item
by [4]. En route, we also show the price of anarchy is 8/7 for auctions with two players.
Theorem 6.33. The mixed price of anarchy of single item all-pay auction is at most
1.185.
Proof. Based on the results of [4], inefficient Nash equilibria only exist when players’
valuations are in the form v1 > v2 = ... = vk > vk+1 ≥ ... ≥ vn (with v2 > 0),
where players k + 1 through n bid zero with probability 1. W.l.o.g., we assume that
v1 = 1 and vi = v > 0, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Let P1 be the probability that bidder 1
gets the item in any such mixed Nash equilibrium denoted by B. Then the expected
utility of bidder 1 in b ∼ B can be expressed by E[u1(b)] = P1 · 1 − E[b1]. Based on
the characterization in [4], no player would bid above v in any Nash equilibrium and
nobody bids exactly v with positive probability. Therefore, if player 1 deviates to v,
she will gets the item with probability 1. By the definition of Nash equilibrium, we
have E[u1(b)] ≥ E[u1(v,b−i)] = 1− v, resulting in P1 ≥ 1− v + E[b1].
It has been shown in the proof of Theorem 2C in [4], that E[b1] is minimized when
players 2 through k play symmetric strategies. Following their results, we can extract
the following equations (for a specific player i):
G1(x) =
x
v
∏
i′ 6=1,iGi′(x)
, ∀x ∈ (0, v],
∏
i′ 6=1
Gi′(x) = 1− v + x, ∀x ∈ (0, v]
recall that Gi′(x) is the CDF according to which player i
′ bids in B. Since players 2
through k play symmetric strategies, Gi′(x) should be identical for i
′ 6= 1. Then, for
some i′ 6= 1,
G1(x) =
x
v ·Gk−2i′ (x)
=
x
v · (1− v + x) k−2k−1
, ∀x ∈ (0, v]
Note that 1− v + x ≤ 1, and so we get G1(x) ≤ xv(1−v+x) (for two players, G1(x) = xv )
and
E[b1] ≥
∫ v
0
(
1− x
v (1− v + x)
)
dx = v − 1− (1− v) ln(1− v)
v
.
Now we can derive that P1 ≥ 1−vv ln 11−v . For two players, E[b1] =
∫ v
0 (1− x/v) dx = v/2
and so P1 = 1− v/2.
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The expected social welfare in B is E[SW (b)] ≥ P1 + (1− P1)v ≥ (1−v)
2
v ln
1
1−v + v.
The expression, T (v) = (1−v)
2
v ln
1
1−v +v, is minimized for v ≈ 0.5694 and therefore, the
price of anarchy is at most T (0.5694) ≈ 1.185. Particularly, for two players, E[SW (b)] ≥
1 − v/2 + v2/2, which is minimized for v = 1/2 and therefore the price of anarchy for
two players is at most 8/7.
Theorem 6.34. The mixed price of anarchy of single item all-pay auction is at least
1.185.
Proof. Consider n players, with valuations v1 = 1 and vi = v > 0, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Let
B be the Nash equilibrium, where bidders bid according to the following CDFs,
G1(x) =
x
v (1− v + x)n−2n−1
x ∈ [0, v], Gi(x) = (1− v + x)
1
n−1 x ∈ [0, v], i 6= 1
Note that Fi(x) =
∏
i′ 6=iGi′(x) is the probability of bidder i getting the item when she
bids x, for every bidder i.
F1(x) = (1− v + x) x ∈ [0, v], Fi(x) = x
v
x ∈ [0, v], i 6= 1.
If player 1 bids any value x ∈ [0, v], her utility is u1 = F1(x) · 1 − x = 1 − v. Bidding
greater than v is dominated by bidding v. If any player i 6= 1 bids any value x ∈ [0, v],
her utility is ui = Fi(x) · v − x = 0. Bidding greater than v results in negative utility.
Hence, B is a Nash equilibrium. Let P1 be the probability that bidder 1 gets the item
in B, then
E[SW (b)] = 1 · P1 + (1− P1)v = v + (1− v)P1 = v + (1− v)
∫ v
0
Gn−1i (x)dG1(x).
When n goes to infinity, E[SW (b)] converges to v + (1 − v) ∫ v0 1−vv(1−v+x)dx = v + (1 −
v)1−vv ln
1
1−v =
(1−v)2
v ln
1
1−v + v = T (v). If we set v = 0.5694, the price of anarchy is
at least T (v) ≈ 1.185.
For n = 2, E[SW (b)] = v + (1− v) ∫ v0 1−v+xv = v + (1− v)(1− v/2) = 1− v/2 + v2/2,
which for v = 1/2 results in price of anarchy at least 8/7.
6.5.2 Revenue and Maximum Bid
In this section we bound the revenue and the maximum bid of the single-item all-
pay auction, for the case of mixed Nash equilibria. Specifically, the revenue and the
maximum bid have value of at least v2/2 and this value goes to v2/2 when the number
of bidders goes to infinity and v2/v1 approaches 0.
Theorem 6.35. In any mixed Nash equilibrium of the single-item all-pay auction, the
revenue and the maximum bid are at least half of the second highest valuation.
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Proof. Let k be any integer greater or equal to 2, such that v1 ≥ v2 = . . . = vk ≥
vk+1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. Let F (x) =
∏
iGi(x) be the CDF of the maximum bid h. By
the characterization of [4], in any mixed Nash equilibrium, players with valuation less
than v2 do not participate (always bid zero) and there exist two players 1, i bidding
continuously in the interval [0, v2]. Then, by [4], F1 = (v1−v2+x)/v1 and Fi(x) = x/v2,
for any x ∈ (0, v2]. Therefore, we get
F (x) = Fi(x)Gi(x) =
x
v2
Gi(x).
In the proof of Theorem 2C in [4], it is argued that Gi1(x) is maximized (and
therefore the expected maximum bid is minimized) when all the k players play sym-
metrically (except for the first player, in the case that v1 > v2). So, F (x) is maximized
for Gi =
(∏
i′ 6=1Gi′
) 1
k−1
= F
1
k−1
1 =
(
v1−v2+x
v1
) 1
k−1
. Finally we get
E[h] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))dx ≥
∫ v2
0
(
1− x
v2
(
v1 − v2 + x
v1
) 1
k−1
)
dx
≥ v2 −
∫ v2
0
x
v2
dx =
1
2
v2.
The same lower bound also holds for the expected revenue, which is at least as high
as the expected maximum bid. This lower bound is tight for the expected maximum
bid, as indicated by our analysis, when k goes to infinity and for the symmetric mixed
Nash equilibrium. In the next lemma, we show that this lower bound is also tight for
the expected revenue.
Lemma 6.36. There exists a mixed Nash equilibrium of the single-item all-pay auction,
where the revenue converges to v2/2 when the number of players goes to infinity and
v2/v1 approaches 0.
Proof. In [4], the authors provide results for the revenue in all possible equilibria. For
the case that v1 = v2, the expected revenue is always equal to v2. To show a tight lower
bound, we consider the case where v1 > v2 and there exist k players with valuation v2
playing symmetrically in the equilibrium, letting k go to infinity. For this case, based
on [4], the revenue is equal to3
∑
i
E[bi] = v
2 + (1− v) E[b1],
where, E[b1] =
∫ v
0 (1−G1(x)) dx. From the proof of Theorem 6.35 we can derive that
G1(x) = F (x)/F1(x) =
x
v (1− v + x)
1
k−1−1 = xv (1− v + x)−1, when k goes to infinity.
3For simplicity we assume v1 = 1 and v2 = v.
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By substituting we get,∑
i
E[bi] = v
2 + (1− v)
∫ v
0
(
1− x
v
(1− v + x)−1
)
dx
= v2 + (1− v)
(
v − 1
v
(v + (1− v) ln(1− v))
)
= 2v − 1− (1− v)
2
v
ln(1− v)
= v − (1− v)
(
1 +
1− v
v
ln(1− v)
)
.
By taking limits, we finally derive that limv→0
(∑
i E[bi]
v
)
= 1/2.
Finally, the next theorem indicates that allocating the entire reward to the highest
bidder is the best choice. In particular a prior-free all-pay mechanism is presented by
a probability vector q = (qi)i∈[n], with
∑
i∈[n] qi = 1, where qi is the probability that
the ith highest bidder is allocated the item, for every i ≤ n.
Theorem 6.37. For any prior-free all-pay mechanism that assigns the item to the
highest bidder with probability strictly less than 1, i.e. q1 < 1, there exists a valuation
profile and mixed Nash equilibrium such that the revenue and the maximum bid are
strictly less than v2/2.
Proof. We will assert the statement of the theorem for the valuation profile (1, v, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
where v ∈ (0, 1) is the second highest value. It is safe to assume that q2 ∈ [0, q1) 4. We
show that the following bidding profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium. The first two bid-
ders bid on the interval [0, v(q1 − q2)] and the other bidders bid 0. The CDF of bidder
1’s bid is G1(x) =
x
v(q1−q2) and the CDF of bidder 2’s bid is G2(x) = x/(q1−q2)+1−v.
It can be checked that this is a mixed Nash equilibrium by the following calculations.
For every bid x ∈ [0, v(q1 − q2)],
u1(x) = G2(x) · q1 + (1−G2(x)) · q2 − x = q1 − v(q1 − q2)
u2(x) = G1(x) · q1v + (1−G1(x)) · q2v − x = q2v
The expected revenue is∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(1−G1(x))dx+
∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(1−G2(x))dx
=
∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(
1− x
v(q1 − q2)
)
dx+
∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(
1−
(
x
q1 − q2 + 1− v
))
dx
=
v(q1 − q2)
2
+
v2(q1 − q2)
2
When v goes to 0, the revenue go to v(q1−q2)/2 < v/2 since q1−q2 < 1. Obviously, the
same happens with the maximum bid, which is at most the same as the revenue.
4Otherwise, consider the tie-breaking rule that allocates the item equiprobably. Then for q2 ≥ q1,
the strategy profile where all players bid zero is strictly dominant.
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6.5.3 Conventional Procurement
In this section we give bounds on the expected revenue and maximum bid of the single-
item first-price auction. In the following, we just write revenue and maximum bid
instead of expected revenue and expected maximum bid, respectively.
Theorem 6.38. In any mixed Nash equilibrium, the revenue and the maximum bid lie
between the two highest valuations. There further exists a tie-breaking rule, such that
in the worst-case, these quantities match the second highest valuation (This can also be
achieved, under the no-overbidding assumption).
Lemma 6.39. In any mixed Nash equilibrium, if the expected utility of any player i
with valuation vi is 0, then with probability 1 the maximum bid is at least vi.
Proof. Consider any mixed Nash equilibrium b ∼ B and let h = maxi{bi} be the highest
bid; h is a random variable induced by B. For the sake of contradiction, assume that
h is strictly less than vi with probability p > 0. Then, there exists ε > 0 such that
h < vi − ε with probability p. Consider now the deviation of player i to pure strategy
si = vi − ε. si would be the maximum bid with probability p and therefore the utility
of player i would be at least p(vi − (vi − ε)) = p · ε > 0. This contradicts the fact that
B is an equilibrium and completes the proof of lemma.
Lemma 6.40. In any mixed Nash equilibrium, if v is the highest valuation, any player
with valuation strictly less than v has expected utility equal to 0.
Proof. In [22] (Theorem 5.4), they proved that the price of anarchy of mixed Nash
equilibria, for the single-item first-price auction, is exactly 1. This means that the
player(s) with the highest valuation gets the item with probability 1. Therefore, any
player with valuation strictly less than v gets the item with zero probability and hence,
her expected utility is 0.
Consider the players ordered based on their valuations so that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ . . . ≥
vn. In order to prove Theorem 6.38, we distinguish between two cases: i) v1 > v2 and
ii) v1 = v2.
Lemma 6.41. If v1 > v2, the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium, is at least
v2 and at most v1. If we further assume no-overbidding, the maximum bid is exactly
v2.
Proof. If v1 > v2, by Lemma 6.40, the expected utility of player 2 equals 0. From
Lemma 6.39, the highest bid is at least v2 with probability 1. Moreover, if there
exist players bidding above v1 with positive probability, then at least one of them
(whoever gets the item with positive probability) would have negative utility for that
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bid and would prefer to deviate to 0; so, the bidding profile couldn’t be an equilibrium.
Therefore, the maximum bid lies between v1 and v2.
If we further assume no-overbidding, nobody, apart from player 1, would bid above
v2. So, the same hold for player 1, who has an incentive to bid arbitrarily close to
v2.
Corollary 6.42. If v1 > v2, there exists a tie breaking rule, under which the maximum
bid of the worst-case mixed Nash equilibrium is exactly v2.
Proof. Due to Lemma 6.41, it is sufficient to show a tie breaking rule, where there
exists a mixed Nash equilibrium with highest bid equal to v2. Consider the tie-breaking
rule where, in a case of a tie with player 1 (the bidder of the highest valuation), the
item is always allocated to player 1. Under this tie-breaking rule, the pure strategy
profile, where everybody bids v2 is obviously a pure Nash equilibrium, with v2 being
the maximum bid.
Lemma 6.43. If v1 = v2, the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium, equals v2.
Proof. Consider a set S of k ≥ 2 players having the same valuation v1 = v2 = . . . =
vk = v and the rest having a valuation strictly less than v. For any mixed Nash
equilibrium b ∼ B and any player i, let Gi and Fi be the CDFs of bi and maxi′ 6=i bi′ ,
respectively. We define li = inf{x|Gi(x) > 0} to be the infimum value of player’s i
support in B. We would like to prove that maxi li = v. For the sake of contradiction,
assume that maxi li < v (Assumption 1).
We next prove that, under Assumption 1, li = l for any player i ∈ S and for some
0 ≤ l < v. We will assume that lj < li for some players i, j ∈ S (Assumption 2) and we
will show that Assumption 2 contradicts Assumption 1. There exists ε > 0 such that
lj + ε < li. Moreover, based on the definition of lj , for any ε
′ > 0, Gj(lj + ε′) > 0 and
so Gj(lj + ε) > 0. When player’s j bid is derived by the interval [lj , lj + ε], she receives
the item with zero probability, since li > lj + ε. Therefore, for any bid of her support
that is at most lj + ε, her utility is zero (Gj(lj + ε) > 0, so there should be such a bid).
Since B is a mixed Nash equilibrium, her total expected utility should also be zero. In
that case, Lemma 6.39 contradicts Assumption 1, and therefore Assumption 2 cannot
be true (under Assumption 1). Thus, for any player i ∈ S, li = l for some 0 ≤ l < v.
Moreover, Lemma 6.40 indicates that no player i /∈ S bids above l with positive
probability, i.e. Gi(l) = 1 for all i /∈ S. We now show that for any i ∈ S, Gi cannot
have a mass point at l, i.e. Gi(l) = 0 for all i ∈ S.
Case 1. If Gi(l) > 0 for all i, then p =
∏
iGi(l) > 0 is the probability that the highest
bid is l, or more precisely, it is the probability that all players in S bid l and a tie
occurs. Given that this event occurs, there exists a player j ∈ S that gets the item
with probability pj strictly less than 1 (this is the conditional probability). Therefore,
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player j has an incentive to deviate from l to l + ε, for ε < (1 − pj)(v − l) (so that
pj(v − l) < v − (l + ε)); this contradicts the fact that B is an equilibrium.
Case 2. If Gi(l) > 0 and Gj(l) = 0 for some i, j ∈ S, then l is in the support of player
i, but she does never receives the item when she bids l, since player j bids above l with
probability 1. Therefore, the expected utility of player i is 0 and due to Lemma 6.39
this cannot happen under Assumption 1.
Overall, we have proved so far that, under Assumption 1 (that now has become
l < v), Gi(l) = 0 for all i ∈ S and Gi(l) = 1 for all i /∈ S. Since k ≥ 2, Fi(l) =∏
i′ 6=iGi′(l) = 0 for all i. Consider any player i ∈ S and let ui be her expected utility.
Based on the definition of li, for any ε > 0, there exists x(ε) ∈ [l, l + ε], such that x(ε)
is in the support of player i. Therefore, ui ≤ Fi(x(ε))(v−x(ε)) ≤ Fi(l+ε)(v− l). As Fi
is a CDF, it should be right-continuous and so for any δ > 0, there exists some ε > 0,
such that Fi(l + ε)(v − l) < δ and therefore, ui < δ. We can contradict Assumption 1,
right away by using Lemma 6.39, but we give a bit more explanation. Assume that, in
B, the maximum bid h is strictly less than v with probability p > 0. Then, there exists
some ε′ > 0, such that h < v−ε′ with probability p. If we consider any δ < p(v−ε′), it
is straight forward to see that player i has an incentive to deviate to the pure strategy
v − ε′. Therefore, we showed that Assumption 1 cannot hold and so the highest bid
is at least v with probability 1. Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.41, nobody will bid
above v in any mixed Nash equilibrium.
6.6 Conclusion
All-pay auctions are widely used to model economic agents making irreversible invest-
ments in competitions. Specifically, both winners and losers have to pay their bids in
(first-price) all-pay auctions. We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria of all-pay
auctions in three different settings — combinatorial auctions, multi-unit auctions and
contests.
First, we study item-bidding combinatorial auctions where m all-pay auctions run
in parallel, one for each good. We consider fractionally subadditive valuations where
the current best upper bound on the price of anarchy is 2 due to [76]. We strengthen
this upper bound to 1.82 by proving some structural properties that characterize the
mixed Nash equilibria of the game.
Next, we design an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation rule for the
multi-unit auction. We show that, for bidders with submodular valuations, the mech-
anism admits a unique, 75% efficient, pure Nash equilibrium. The efficiency of this
mechanism outperforms all the known bounds on the price of anarchy of mechanisms
used for multi-unit auctions.
Finally, we analyze single-item all-pay auctions motivated by their connection to
contests. In a contest, the objective is to design a reward allocation rule to maximize
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social welfare, sum of bids (revenue) or maximum bid. For the social welfare, we
show a tight bound on the price of anarchy of approximately 1.185. For the revenue
and maximum bid, we show that they are at least as high as half of the second highest
valuation in any mixed Nash equilibrium. In contrast, when using any reward structure
other than allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder, the revenue and maximum
bid in some mixed Nash equilibrium may be strictly less than half of the second highest
valuation.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, open problems and conclusions for each chapter were discussed individ-
ually. In this final chapter, we will summarize the entire thesis and discuss relevant
broad research issues.
The thesis studies the incentive issues arsing from four different real-life applica-
tions. For each of them, we provide an appropriate economic model by extending
or generalizing previous results in the literature. We also systematically analyze the
auction design and optimization problems in all these models by adopting economic
concepts like market equilibrium, truthfulness, envy-freeness. This thesis aims at using
methodology from computer science (e.g. approximation algorithms, computational
complexity) to investigate the effect of strategic behaviors on algorithm design. More
specifically, we generalize the sponsored search auctions to the setting for online rich
media advertisement and investigate three major pricing mechanisms there. Second,
we use the digital good auctions to model the fund raising problems by altering the auc-
tioneer’s objective to maximizing the probability to get a target revenue. We provide
both positive and negative results for this setting and show some approximately opti-
mal algorithms for simple auctions. Then we study the double auction setting where
a trading broker wants to maximize his total revenue by buying low from the sellers
and selling high to the buyers. Our results here extend the recent results for one-side
auctions and make more elaborate arguments. Finally, we examine the efficiency of all
pay auctions, motivated by its connection to crowdsourcing contests. We improve the
previous bound by using structural characterization of the Nash equilibrium in all pay
auctions.
Several open problems have been mentioned at the end of each chapter for different
settings. But we would like to mention a bit more general and broader related research
issues. In the chapter for rich media advertisement, we assume that the advertisement
slots are aligned in a line, i.e. single-dimensional displayed. But in many websites,
the display of banner advertisement is two-dimensional, i.e. besides the width of the
advertisement, we can also consider its height. It would be interesting to generalize
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our result to this 2D setting. For the chapter for revenue target, we only study the
problem for single-parameter buyers, whose valuation can be represented by a single
private parameter. It would be a good idea to also look at multi-parameter versions
of this problem. For double auction, one major open problem is to give a general
framework to reduce the optimization problems in two-sided markets to the ones in
the well-studied one-sided market. Actually, a recent work [36] by Du¨tting et al. has
done some work in this direction by investigating the social welfare. However, for the
revenue maximization problems, it is still unexplored. Finally, in the chapter for all-
pay auctions, the crowdsourcing contests are always modeled as a single-item all-pay
auction. It would be more challenging to consider the crowdsourcing contests as multi-
item all pay auctions, i.e. participators can attend several contests simultaneously.
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